Doc's Talk: The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters from the Arab World in the Syrian Civil War

Tuesday, June 03, 2014

The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters from the Arab World in the Syrian Civil War

A group of foreign fighters from North Africa photographed in the Latakia region of Syria (Magharebia.com, September 5, 2013).

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20646

Overview

1. This study examines the phenomenon of foreign fighters from the Arab world in the ranks of the rebels in Syria. According to ITIC estimate, there are more than 5,000 foreign fighters from the Arab world among the 7,000-8,000 who have joined the ranks of the Syrian rebels.^[2] Most of them belong to the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria(ISIS), two rival organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. A minority of the Arab foreign fighters joined the ranks of the Free Syrian Army and other rebel organizations.

2. Some of the Arab foreign fighters are young and have no military training or experience. They joined the ranks of the rebels for ideological or religious-sectarian reasons (e.g., participating in jihad, fighting the Shi'ites). Others were motivated by the desire to raise their socio-economic status.

Among other reasons were hostility to the Assad regime, the desire for adventure, and identification with the suffering of the Syrian people. Within the Arab foreign fighters there is a hard core of Salafist-jihadi, Al-Qaeda and global jihad operatives, some of them veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and other Islamic combat zones. Most of the Arab foreign fighters come from towns and villages, with only a few coming from the main cities.

3. In our assessment, the Arab foreign fighters form the backbone of the forces fighting in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIS.They also have a high casualty rate and many are killed. In addition, among the foreign fighter suicide bombers in Syria from organizations affiliated Al-Qaeda and the global jihad, the number of Arabs is conspicuous, especially those from Saudi Arabia.^[3]

4. Of the Arab countries from which the largest number of foreign fighters come, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt experienced the regional upheaval. Two other countries, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, are pro-West, and preserved their stability in the era of regional upheaval, with deeply-rooted radical Islamic elements. Initially those five countries did not attempt to stem the flow of their citizens leaving for Syria, regarding them as part of their support for the campaign to overthrow the Assad regime and to confront Iran and Shi'ite Islam. Only during the past year, when the dangers of terrorism and subversion from the Syrian veterans became apparent as they returned to their countries of origin, did some of the Arab regimes take preventive action. They took legislative steps (Saudi Arabia, for example) and prevented the foreign fighters from leaving for Syria, monitored those who returned, and dealt with the local radical organizations providing them with logistical support. However, it is still unclear to what extent the steps taken have been effective.

5. Some of the foreign fighters joined the fighting in Syria on an individual basis. However, in certain prominent instances local Salafist-jihadi organizations and activists who preach joining the fighting have given the foreign fighters logistical support and dispatched them to Syria. They include, for example, Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, Ansar and Sharia and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt, Jam'iyya al-Asala al-Islamiyya in Bahrain, Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, the Salafist movement in Jordan, Jaish al-Ummah and other Salafist-jihadi organizations and networks in the Gaza Strip.

6. The Arab foreign fighters in the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations are a ticking bomb for their countries of origin, especially countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Iraq and the Persian Gulf states. That is because in Syria the foreign fighters acquire operational experience and combat skills, are inculcated with the ideology of jihad and radical Islam, and form a network of contacts with Salafist-jihadi organizations and operatives throughout the Arab-Muslim world. They are expected to return to their countries of origin (as some of them already have), join local Salafist-jihadi networks or establish new networks for terrorism and subversion. In some cases, in our assessment, the networks will operate in coordination with or be directed by the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIS through contacts made in Syria.

7. However, in our assessment, so far the involvement of Syrian veterans in terrorism and subversion in the various Arab countries is still nascent. However, there have been cases which indicate what the future may hold: in Egypt it was reported that jihadist veterans of the Syrian conflict were detained for their involvement in terrorist activities against the Egyptian regime, or were killed during a terrorist attack carried out by the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (which is affiliated with the global jihad).^[4] In May 2014 the Saudi Arabian ministry of the interior recently announced the exposure of a terrorist network that was in contact with extremists in Syria and Yemen. In Jordan the ISISencouraged demonstrations and riots in the southern city of Ma'an, a hotbed of anti-regime subversive activity. In Israel, two Israeli Arabs were asked by jihadist organizations to carry out terrorist attacks in Israeli territory after they had returned from Syria. In addition, in December 2013 a jihadist network was exposed in east Jerusalem that had been asked to send one of its operatives to Syria for military training and to coordinate terrorist attacks. In Iraq the ISIS, which is affiliated with the global jihad, holds trans-national military-terrorist-subversive activities. The activities do not distinguish between Iraq and Syria, and many expand to Arab countries, Jordan for example.

Estimates of Arab Foreign Fighters in the Arab World

8. The countries from which the Arab foreign fighters left for Syria can be divided into four categories, according to the number of fighters from each one:

1) Libya, Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia – According to estimates, between several hundred and approximately one thousand fighters.

2) Egypt and Iraq – Hundreds of fighters.

3) Morocco, Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Qatar, Mauritania and Somalia – Several dozen fighters.

4) Sudan, Yemen and Oman – A few fighters from each country.

9. The following table summarizes the estimates of Arab foreign fighters from the various countries of origin:[5]

No.	Country	Estimated number of foreign fighters	Notes
1	Libya	Several hundred to almost 1000	Libyan foreign fighters were joined by non-Libyans who had fought there in the revolution against Muammar Gaddafi.
2	Morocco	Several dozen
3	Tunisia	More than 1000	Some of them fought in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi.
4	Algeria	A few dozen
5	Mauritania	A few individuals
6	Egypt	Several hundred
7	Saudi Arabia	Almost 1000
8	Bahrain	Several dozen
9	Kuwait	Several dozen
10	Qatar	A few individuals
11	Lebanon	Many score	Mostly Lebanese Sunnis and Lebanese of Palestinian origin
12	Iraq	Several hundred
13	Jordan	More than 1000
14	Somalia	Between one and a few individuals
15	Gaza Strip^[6]	Approximately 30
16	Palestinian Authority	A few individuals

Read more

Global Jihad Al-Qaeda Salafis Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia

Full Document in PDF Format

^[2]There are higher estimates of the overall number of foreign fighters in Syria. For example, in December 2013 the British-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) estimated that there were 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria from 74 countries, 2,800 of them from Western countries and the other from the Middle East (Icsr.info).
^[3]In 2013 the ITIC counted 53 operatives from the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIS who carried out suicide bombing attacks against targets affiliated with the Syrian regime. The names of 30 were identified, 23 foreign fighters and seven Syrians. Of the 23 foreigners, 13 were Saudis, four were Jordanians, and three were Iraqis. For further information see the February 11, 2014 bulletin "Using suicide bombers as weapons: The leading modus operandi in the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIS' struggle against the Syrian regime and Hezbollah in Lebanon"^[4]For further information see the May 5, 2014 bulletin "Involvement of Operatives Who Returned from Syria in the Terrorist Campaign against the Egyptian Regime"
^[5]The estimates in this study relate to the overall number of foreign fighters from each country according to categories which cannot always be distinguished between: Arab fighters who are still fighting in Syria (the majority), those who returned to the countries of origin (the minority), and those who were killed in the fighting in Syria or who were taken captive by the Syrian regime.
^[6]A report on Palestinian and Israeli Arab foreign fighters was issued on January 19, 2014, therefore Israeli Arabs and Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Authority are not included in this study.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk