Canada.com
George Jonas, Canwest News service"What on Earth could have prompted the Israeli government to negotiate the current ceasefire with Hamas?" asks Caroline Glick in the Jerusalem Post. The pained bewilderment implicit in the noted commentator's question isn't surprising. The decision to negotiate a ceasefire with Hamas is creating a huge controversy in Israel.
Published: Friday, July 11
"What on Earth could have prompted the Israeli government to negotiate the current ceasefire with Hamas?" asks Caroline Glick in the Jerusalem Post. The pained bewilderment implicit in the noted commentator's question isn't surprising. The decision to negotiate a ceasefire with Hamas is creating a huge controversy in Israel. Championed, among others, by Israel's Defence Minister (and former prime minister) Ehud Barak, a ceasefire seems, on the face of it, naive. So does dialogue with Hamas, urged by such ultra-sophisticated observers as former Mossad chief, Efraim Halevy.
But is naive the word?
Well, the leopard isn't likely to change its spots. Glick reports that since the ceasefire's implementation Hamas has stepped up its arms smuggling and military training. "The Hamas that Israel will confront in the aftermath of Barak's ceasefire will be a more formidable foe than it was before the ceasefire," she writes.
But the goal isn't solution; it's management, Halevy argues (if not in so many words.) Putting out the fire will take generations. The task at hand is to contain the flames. It makes sense to dampen down the worst spots.
Can both sides have a point?
Yes, and here's why. The Arab/Muslim world hasn't been struggling to establish a Palestinian state but to prevent or destroy a Jewish one. Israelis aren't resisting a Palestinian state; they're trying to secure the existence of their own. A Palestinian state is taken for granted by both sides; the conflict is about a Jewish state in the Middle East. Palestinians acquiring a state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea won't satisfy the Arab/Muslim world, but the Jews no longer having a state - well, that's a different question.
If Palestinian statehood had been at the heart of the conflict, it could have been resolved before it started. The Palestinians could have had a state in 1937, when the Peel Commission recommended it. But the Arab/Muslim world rejected partition then, and rejected it again when the United Nations voted for it in 1947. The war wasn't about a state for Palestinians, but no state for Jews. Within hours of Israel's flag having been raised on May 14, 1948, five Arab states attacked to pull it down.
The War of Independence lasted 13 months and cost 6,000 Israeli lives. Although the Arab coalition hadn't been able to push the Jews into the sea, it lost only North and Western Galilee and actually gained the Old City of Jerusalem, which came under Jordanian control. What hurt the Arab world wasn't the establishment of Israel, but not being able to accept what it viewed as its defeat.
For the next 18 years, the "rejectionist" states conducted a low-grade war of attrition, making the refugee problem intractable. Then, on May 22, 1967, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser closed the Strait if Tiran to Israeli and Israel-bound ships. "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel," he declared on May 27, just in case people wondered what he was up to. On June 1 he was echoed by Iraq's then-president, Abdel-Rahman Aref: "Our goal is clear - to wipe Israel off the map."
Israel's pre-emptive strike came five days later, followed by the Six Day War, resulting in Syria losing the Golan Heights, Egypt the Sinai Peninsula, and Jordan the West Bank and the old city of Jerusalem. The territory occupied during that week became the "land" that Israel was supposed to barter for "peace" a generation later during the heady decade of the Madrid-to-Oslo-to-Wye River Accords. It sounded reasonable, except when one remembered that these lands were all in Arab hands from 1948 to 1967, yet Israel had no peace.
It was always a puzzle how Israel could trade land for peace with Yasser Arafat. He either remained a rejectionist, in which case he'd just take the land, thank you, and give no peace in exchange, or he had actually become a moderate, in which case he no longer had title to peace.
By definition, peace belongs to the most intractable foe. In Is
© The Gazette 2008
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