When President Barak Obama first made his
controversial reference to the 1967 lines as the basis for future
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on May 19, 2011, he introduced one main
caveat that stuck out: the idea that there would be "mutually agreed
swaps" of land between the two sides. He added that both sides were
entitled to "secure and recognized borders." But the inclusion of land
swaps also raised many questions.
Several months after Israel captured the West Bank
and Gaza in the 1967 Six Day War, the U.N. Security Council defined the
territorial terms of a future peace settlement in Resolution 242, which
over the decades became the cornerstone for all Arab-Israeli diplomacy.
At the time, the Soviets had tried to brand Israel as the aggressor in
the war and force on it a full withdrawal, but Resolution 242 made clear
that Israel was not expected to withdraw from all the territories that
came into its possession, meaning that Israel was not required to
withdraw from 100 percent of the West Bank.
Given this background, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
made clear in his last Knesset address in October 1995 that Israel
would never withdraw to the 1967 lines. He stressed that Israel would
have to retain control of the Jordan Valley, the great eastern,
geographic barrier which provided for its security for decades since the
Six Day War. He didn't say a word about land swaps. For neither
Resolution 242 nor any subsequent signed agreements with the
Palestinians stipulated that Israel would have to pay for any West Bank
land it would retain by handing over its own sovereign land in exchange.
So where did the idea of land swaps come from?
During the mid-1990s there were multiple backchannel efforts to see if
it was possible to reach a final agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians. The Palestinians argued that when Israel signed a peace
agreement with Egypt, it agreed to withdraw from 100 percent of the
Sinai Peninsula. So they asked how could PLO chairman Yasser Arafat be
given less than what Egyptian president Anwar Sadat received.
As a result, Israeli academics involved in these
backchannel talks accepted the principle that the Palestinians would
obtain 100 percent of the territory, just like the Egyptians, despite
the language of Resolution 242, and they proposed giving Israeli land to
the Palestinians as compensation for any West Bank land retained by
Israel. This idea appeared in the 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen paper, which was
neither signed nor embraced by the Israeli or the Palestinian
leaderships. Indeed, Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) subsequently denied in
May 1999 that any agreement of this sort existed.
There is a huge difference between Egypt and the
Palestinians. Egypt was the first Arab state to make peace, and in
recognition of that fact, Prime Minister Menachem Begin gave Sadat all
of Sinai. Moreover, the Israeli-Egyptian border had been a recognized
international boundary since the time of the Ottoman Empire. The
pre-1967 Israeli boundary with the West Bank was not a real
international boundary; it was only an armistice line demarcating where
Arab armies had been stopped when they invaded the nascent state of
Israel in 1948.
In July 2000 at the Camp David Summit, the Clinton
administration raised the land swap idea that had been proposed by
Israeli academics, but neither Camp David nor the subsequent negotiating
effort at Taba succeeded. Israel's foreign minister at the time, Shlomo
Ben-Ami, admitted in an interview in Haaretz on September 14,
2001: “I'm not sure that the whole idea of a land swap is feasible.” In
short, when the idea was actually tested in high-stakes negotiations,
the land swap idea proved to be far more difficult to implement as the
basis for a final agreement.
After the collapse of the Camp David talks,
President Clinton tried to summarize Israeli and Palestinian positions
and put forward a U.S. proposal that still featured the land swap. But
to his credit, Clinton also stipulated: “These are my ideas. If they are
not accepted, they are off the table, they go with me when I leave
office.” The Clinton team informed the incoming Bush administration
about this point. Notably, land swaps were not part of the 2003 Roadmap
for Peace or in the April 14, 2004 letter from President Bush to Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon.
It was Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who
resurrected the land swap idea in 2008 as part of newly proposed Israeli
concessions that went even further than Israel's positions at Camp
David and Taba. It came up in these years in other Israeli-Palestinian
contacts, as well. But Mahmoud Abbas was only willing to talk about a
land swap based on 1.9 percent of the territory, which related to the
size of the areas of Jewish settlement, but which did not even touch on
Israel's security needs. So the land swap idea still proved to be
unworkable.
Writing in Haaretz on May 29, 2011, Prof.
Gideon Biger, from Tel Aviv University's department of geography, warned
that Israel cannot agree to a land swap greater than the equivalent of
2.5 percent of the territories since Israel does not have vast areas of
empty land which can be transferred. Any land swap of greater size would
involve areas of vital Israeli civilian and military infrastructure.
Furthermore, in the summaries of the past
negotiations with Prime Minister Olmert, the Palestinians noted that
they would be demanding land swaps of "comparable value" – meaning, they
would not accept some remote sand dunes in exchange for high quality
land near the center of Israel. In short, given the limitations on the
quantity and quality of territory that Israel could conceivably offer,
the land swap idea was emerging as impractical.
In Jerusalem, the old pre-1967 armistice line
placed the Western Wall, the Mount of Olives, and the Old City as a
whole on the Arab side of the border. From 1948 to 1967, Jews were
denied access to their holy sites; some 55 synagogues and study halls
were systematically destroyed, while the Old City was ethnically
cleansed of all its Jewish residents. If land swaps have to be "mutually
agreed" does that give the Palestinians a veto over Israeli claims
beyond the 1967 line in the Old City, like the Western Wall?
The land swap question points to a deeper dilemma
in U.S.-Israel relations. What is the standing of ideas from failed
negotiations in the past that appear in the diplomatic record? President
Obama told AIPAC on May 22 that the 1967 lines with land swaps “has
long been the basis for discussions among the parties, including
previous U.S. administrations.” Just because an idea was discussed in
the past, does that make it part of the diplomatic agenda in the future,
even if the idea was never part of any legally binding, signed
agreements?
In October 1986, President Ronald Reagan met with
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, and made a
radical proposal that both superpowers eliminate all of their ballistic
missiles, in order to focus their energies on developing missile
defenses alone. The idea didn't work, Reagan's proposal was not
accepted, and the arms control negotiations took a totally different
direction. But what if today Russian president Dmitry Medvedev asked
President Obama to implement Reagan’s proposals? Would the U.S. have any
obligation to diplomatic ideas that did not lead to a finalized treaty?
Fortunately, there are other points in President
Obama's recent remarks about Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that can
take the parties away from the 1967 lines and assuage the Israeli side.
At AIPAC, the president spoke about "the new demographic realities on
the ground" which appears to take into account the large settlement
blocs that Israel will eventually incorporate. Using the language of
Resolution 242, Obama referred to "secure and recognized borders," and
importantly added: "Israel must be able to defend itself—by
itself—against any threat."
However, for Israelis, mentioning the 1967 lines
without these qualifications brings back memories of an Israel that was 8
miles wide, and a time when its vulnerability turned it into a repeated
target of hegemonial powers of the Middle East, that made its
destruction their principle cause. Sure, Israel won the Six Day War from
the 1967 lines, but it had to resort to a preemptive strike as four
armies converged on its borders. No Israeli would like to live with such
a short fuse again. The alternative to the 1967 lines are defensible
borders, which must emerge if a viable peace is to be reached.
Dore Gold, a former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, is president of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
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