Iran Early Bird
Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, head of the Khomeini Research Center and widely considered Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad's spiritual mentor, traveled to Iraq this week to meet with Ayatollah Ali Husseini Sistani, the Shias' source of authority both in and outside Iraq.
The rare visit constituted a meeting between the two extremes of the Shia faith - the traditional, quietist, Iraqi approach versus the activist, Khomeini-style Iranian approach. Sistani is at odds with the Iranian interpretation of the Shia faith, and leads the traditional approach, calling - including in the framework of the shaping of the new, post-Saddam, Iraqi political arena - for the separation of religion and state and the election of worthy political candidates who do not necessarily come from among the worthy religious figures.
Sistani has numerous supporters outside of Iraq - particularly in Lebanon and among the Shia communities in the Persian Gulf; and many in Iran, too, sympathize with his approach - a cause of much concern for the Islamic regime in light of the gradual strengthening of the traditional Shia religious centers and seminars in Iraq, and the re-emergence of Najaf and Karbala as the country's leading, vibrant centers of Shia life in the post-Saddam era that has seen a Shia revival.
On the opposite end of the spectrum stands the activist Iranian approach, which believes in the principle of the rule of the religious leader, the Velayat-e Faqih, that was formulated by Khomeini.
Iran has just cause for concern. Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini, does not enjoy any particular religious status, and is not considered a significant source of religious authority either in or outside Iran. Recently, too, he has also become increasingly dependent on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps for upholding the principle of the Velayat-e Faqih. Iran's senior ayatollah, Montazeri, who was supposed to have succeeded Khomeini, was instead pushed aside, with Khamenei appointed in his place. Montazeri, too, has had second thoughts about the principle of the Velayat-e Faqih that was determined by Khomeini, and he remains the Islamic regime's most outspoken critic from within the Iranian religious establishment, which has gone as far as to isolate him and place him and his sons under house arrest on a number of occasions. The Iranian leadership is also very worried about the strengthening of the support for Sistani's quietist Shia in Iraq, and the trickling down of this support into the ranks of the Iranian religious establishment and seminars, particularly in the city of Ghom.
This fundamental difference between the two streams of Shia is of much political significance when it comes to the shaping some of the most central political arenas in the Middle East that are home to a Shia majority - Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, as well as several secondary arenas in which a Shia majority is ruled by a Sunni minority (Bahrain); and also a number of the other Gulf states in which Shia minorities are being influenced by the strengthening of the Shia in the region and the intra-Shia ties - Saudi Arabia (primarily in the eastern, oil-rich parts of the country) and Kuwait.
Sistani appears to have the upper hand in Iraq. He supported the U.S. move to liberate, stabilize and re-shape Iraq, despite the flak he came under from other, more-radical streams of Shia active in the arena, and from Muqtada al-Sadr in particular. Al-Sadr has close ties with Iran; he resides there for lengthy periods, mostly in Ghom, where he participates in religious studies, and he shares the Islamic regime's perception of the role of the religious leaders. He also heads the Mahdi Army, which receives generous support from Iran in the form of training and also weapons such as EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators), which have caused fatalities both among U.S. forces in Iraq as well as civilians and Iraqi security personnel.
Al-Sadr believes in activist Shia in keeping with the Iranian model, and makes no effort to hide his intentions to turn Iraq into an Islamic society on the same lines. In the long term, this is a dangerous trend, which adds to the trend of Iran's strengthening in the region. If the United States fails to properly plan ahead with respect to a-Sadr and his supporters, it could find itself in the mid-to-long term facing an Iranian-style development in Iraq that would spread from the south to the north.
Despite the massive support he receives from Iran and the noise he has stirred in the Iraqi arena, al-Sadr, primarily due to his lowly religious status, has been unable to shake the position and authority wielded by Sistani, who, despite his poor medical condition, remains the central source of authority and the anchor of the political process in Iraq. Sistani is the one who played a significant role in achieving security stability in Iraq and preventing bloody conflicts among the Shia factions themselves, and between the Shia and the other forces in the Iraqi arena, the Sunni in particular.
Al-Sadr still has a long way to go before completing his studies in Iraq and obtaining the title coveted by all Shia, ayatollah. Completing his studies is likely to boost his religious status and afford him more prestige among his supporters, particularly in Iraq, and perhaps elsewhere too in the future. He will also be able to claim independence and set himself apart from the other sources of religious authority in Iraq, primarily Sistani and his son, who is destined to step into his shoes. But there is still a long way to go before then.
The violent shortcuts that al-Sadr has tried to take, under advisement from Tehran, have not worked out. The Provincial Elections Law that was approved this week in Iraq after lengthy deliberations will pave the way for local elections in several Iraqi provinces at the beginning of next year. These elections will serve as a test of the country's "political maturity;" under the surface, however, they will also be a test of the Iranian religious perceptions versus the Iraqi ones. Iran is already preparing for these elections, and will assist candidates who are affiliated with al-Sadr and its viewpoints; at the same time, the regime in Tehran is also ready for "the day after Sistani."
Al-Sadr v. Al-Sistani (jr.) - on a collision course
Al-Sistani is seen as the most senior Shia religious figure both in and outside Iraq, and his unique status and the significant authority he wields make the issue of his successor a particularly problematic and complex one. A number of names come to mind: Ayatollah Mohammad Saeed al-Khakim, Ayatollah Mohammad Bashir al-Najafi, Ayatollah Mohammad Ashak al-Fayed and Ayatollah Mohammad Yakubi. Despite being well-known sources of authority, they do not enjoy widespread support and are not involved in the steaming cauldron of Iraqi politics.
The uncertainty surrounding the issue of the successor to al-Sistani's unique approach to the Shia faith could play into the hands of Iran and also its protectorates in the domestic Iraqi arena. Iran will undoubtedly be involved in the succession struggle, and already today it is lending its support to al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army he heads. In practice, Iran wants al-Sadr and his army to assume the same role that Hezbollah plays in Lebanon, and Tehran is nurturing him in keeping with the same model. Al-Sistani's disappearance from the scene will free Iran of a significant threat posed by one of the central figures, alongside Ayatollah Montazeri, who has challenged the changes to the Shia faith that were made by Khomeini. One of the challengers to al-Sadr and Iran is al-Sistani's son, Mohammed Reza al-Sistani, who has designs on stepping into his father's large shoes.
For now, both young men are building up their respective power bases ahead of a struggle for religious authority in Iraq, and perhaps even beyond. Both men hold completely different views of the Shia faith: Mohammad Reza al-Sistani follows the quietist school of thought of his father that calls for a separation of religion and state; Muqtada al-Sadr, for his part, is being educated in Ghom in keeping with the activist, Iranian, Khomeini-style Shia, which believes in the principle of the rule of the religious leader, the Velayat-e Faqih.
"Human idol"
One of Sistani's most prominent supporters, Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of the Shia in Lebanon who is fiercely opposed to Iranian involvement in the country, is viewed as an enlightened religious figure who is widely accepted by most of the Shia in Lebanon and the Arab world. In many aspects, he represents the middle of the road between Iran's activist, Khomeini-style Shia, which purports to be a solution for all Shia (and Muslims) wherever they may be, and the quietist, Sistani-style approach to the religion.
Over the years, Fadlallah has tried to distance the Shia in Lebanon from what he has defined as the "damaging" influence of Iran and its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah. This has put Fadlallah on a collision course with Tehran and also its Lebanon-based proxy and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, who is seen as both a military and religious leader. Fadlallah has harshly criticized Nasrallah in the past, branding him a "human idol." According to Fadlallah, the leaders and political parties in Lebanon no longer pay attention to "the hungry and downtrodden people who live with a constant sense of fear and worry" - particularly, he adds, since "the people have become addicted to human idols [Nasrallah], who they adore and blindly obey."
Fadlallah refuses to visit Iran and does not recognize Khamenei's supreme religious authority. As a result, Nasrallah and many others among Hezbollah's hardcore members, who, for their part, do view Khamenei as the religious and political source of authority and emulation, have reservations about Fadlallah's rulings and opinions. Like Montazeri, Fadlallah, too, has voiced harsh criticism of Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad in the past, commenting that he "is totally lacking in diplomatic skills and is creating problems for Iran."
Najaf - Beirut - Tehran
Sistani's viewpoint stems from his desire to contain Iran's damaging influence in Iraq, and he believes that Iraqi citizens should vote in the upcoming elections in keeping with their conscience and independently, and not in accordance with instructions and lists from Tehran. This approach is of significant importance with respect to the shaping of the political landscape not only in Iraq, but in Lebanon, too, where Iran's proxy, Hezbollah, is perceived as almost omnipotent. Iran is well aware of this dangerous development from its point of view - a development that could undermine Iran's aspiration for hegemony over the Shia wherever they may be, and one that Tehran is trying to neutralize.
In mid-July of this year, the head of Lebanon's Future Movement, Saad al-Hariri, paid a surprising visit to Iraq, ending his trip with a meeting with Sistani in the city of Najaf. The meeting centered on a discussion on the points of similarity between the Lebanese and Iraqi political arenas, as well as the possibility of investment by the Hariri Fund in Iraq. The rare encounter did not win widespread media coverage (some participants in Shia forums on the Internet even struggled to believe that the report about the meeting was true). Hariri's newspaper, Al-Mustaqbal, wrote that the meeting was designed to forge closer ties between the Sunni and Shia Arabs - an inference to a desire to block the influence of Persian Iran - and to promote "the state project" rather than "the quarrel-mongering project" (an allusion to Syria and Iran), particularly in Iraq and Lebanon, "where sectarian forces are trying to secure a grip."
Hariri's March 14 coalition comprises primarily Druze, Sunni and Christians, and is finding it tough to cope with the strength of Hezbollah, which has "occupied Beirut" and is supported by Iran and Syria. The Doha Accord, which preserves the political status quo, is making things even more difficult for the Hariri-led coalition to change the political picture in Lebanon. Hariri knows that he needs the "Shia vote" to implement a change of direction and turn Lebanon into a real democracy. This would involve undermining Hezbollah's supposed dominance over the Shia community in Lebanon and the recruitment of supporters from among this community into his coalition so as to show that not all the Shia in the country speak in a single voice, the voice of Hezbollah - no easy task in light of Hezbollah's success in its struggle against Israel and the extensive services the organization provides to the Shia in Lebanon.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah's weakness stems from a realm that is sometimes pushed aside but is of immense significance - the religious realm. Aside from Nasrallah and the Hezbollah hardcore, most of the Shia in Lebanon recognize Sistani and not Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei as their Marja Taqlid, or source of emulation. Hariri can exploit this as a means to chisel away at Nasrallah's political power - and this is the light in which one should view his meeting with Sistani in Iraq.
The pluralism and follow-your-conscience approach that Sistani is touting to the Shia voters in Iraq could serve Hariri's political interests in Lebanon; like Fadlallah, Hariri, too, would like to see the Shia in Lebanon remain loyal, first and foremost, to Lebanon itself. Hariri is putting together a "Shia strategy; he has already visited the Bekaa, where he met with Shia leaders, and he is in contact also with other Shia elements who are opposed to Hezbollah.
Even though they may be afraid to admit it, a significantly large number of the Shia in Lebanon are dissatisfied with the outcome of the war. The secular Shia in the country, particularly the merchant and bourgeoisie classes, were severely affected by the fighting and are finding it hard to rebuild. Some may go over to the Hariri camp.
In any event, Hezbollah, like Iran, will not readily forgo its achievements in the Lebanese political arena, and will not hesitate to resort to force to preserve them; and the same can be said for Iran, where the IRGC will not readily agree to give up the increasingly strong grip it has taken on the Iranian governmental institutions, local government and economy. Iran and Hezbollah constitute a mirror image of one another; whatever happens in Iran will have an effect on Lebanon, and vice versa.
The traditional Shia has once again been set free, and it is posing a threat, from among religious figures in Iran, too, to the viewpoint of Khomeini, who led the revolution among the Shia. Will there be a counter-revolution in Iran against the one implemented by Khomeini; and if so, when? Much depends on the results of the elections in Iraq and Lebanon, Sistani's life expectancy, and the authority and strength of his successors.
Iran is keeping a close eye on the political developments in Iraq and Lebanon, and is trying to influence them by way of its allies. In Iraq, it has failed; and the reverberations from the "big Shia bang" that took place after the fall of Saddam Hussein are now threatening Tehran.
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