Doc's Talk: The Iranian Nuclear Program

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

The Iranian Nuclear Program

Latest IAEA Report &
UNSCR 1835
Information, Implications and Focal Points

1. On September 15th, 2008, another IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) report was published regarding the "implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803 in the Islamic Republic of Iran". The report was written as part of the IAEA's investigation of the Iranian nuclear facilities.
2. The report deals with two major issues: "current uranium enrichment activity ", and "possible military dimensions". The report includes rather harsh criticism towards Iran.
3. The report states that contrary to Security Council decisions, Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment activities, and even broadens them. Hence, the report reiterates and confirms evaluations and grave fears regarding the true nature of the Iranian nuclear program.
4. The report contains detailed information and data which testify that Iran continues running experiments, establishing a research reactor and conversion activities. The report also lists the Agency's appeals to Iran and the existing gaps, and confirms that several of the most important questions regarding the issue of weaponization remain unanswered. Amongst them, is the manufacturing of nuclear components by military industries.
5. Following the IAEA report, on September 26th the Security Council adopted another resolution (UNSCR 1835), which in essence serves primarily as a symbolic declaration against Iran. As opposed to previous resolutions, this resolution does not include new sanctions, nor does it state a deadline for an additional report to the Security Council. This resolution merely refers to previous Security Council resolutions and the NPT Agreement, as well as to the latest IAEA report and the lack of Iranian cooperation with the Agency's investigators.
IAEA REPORT (15/09)– IMPLICATIONS & QUOTES FROM THE REPORT
1. The issue of military research:
The latest report is a concise document, critical of Iran. Its findings testify as to the IAEA's inability to conclude issues involving "military research", specifically all issues related to the development of nuclear weapons, yet to be addressed by the Iranians, reflecting essential distrust between the two sides. In the concluding chapter it was stated that the key issues related to the weapons remain "a matter of serious concern" –

"There remain a number of outstanding issues, identified in the Director General's last report to the Board (GOV/2008/15, Para. 14), which give rise to concern about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program".
(Taken from: Paragraph 14)

The report restates the phrasings and findings of the previous report (May 26th), and emphasizes that without a complete response pertaining to the issue of the "military research", it is not possible to determine that Iranian nuclear activity is not intended for military purposes.

"The Agency had concluded that Iran might have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile related activities, which could shed more light on the nature of the alleged studies".
(Taken from: Paragraph 16)

2. The issue of uranium enrichment:
The report emphasizes that Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment activity. This is in direct contrast to the decisions made by the Security Council on this matter. Iran continues to operate its enrichment facilities in Natanz, install additional cascades and research and development of advanced centrifuges.

"Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operating of PFEP (Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant) and FEP (Fuel Enrichment Plant), and the installation of new cascades and the operating of new generation centrifuges for test purpose. Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR-40 (Nuclear Research Reactor)"
(Taken from: Summary, Paragraph 24)

The report's findings strengthen the assessments claiming Iran has advanced significantly in its mastery of enrichment technology. Iran continues to accumulate substantial quantities of enriched uranium. According to the report, Iran has accumulated 480 kg of low enriched uranium, thus far. This is one-third of the quantity needed in order to enrich uranium for one bomb, at military standards. It should be stressed that this information is based on Iranian reports, and not on measurements made by the IAEA investigators.

"Based on Iran's daily operating records, as of 30 August 2008, Iran had produced approximately 480 kg of low enriched UF6"
(Taken from: Paragraph 2)

According to the report, since December 12th, 2007, and as of August 30th, 2008, Iran transferred 5,930 kg of low enriched uranium to the enrichment facility in the underground halls in Natanz. The total amount of material transferred to the facility since its operation in February 2007 stands at 7,600 kg.

3. IAEA demands regarding the inspection framework:
According to the report, Iran continues to violate the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, which demands reporting nuclear facilities as soon as a decision to establish them has been made.
The report reiterates the demand of Iran to implement the "additional protocol", which according to the IAEA is essential in order to clarify the nature of the nuclear program.

"Unless Iran provides such transparency, and implements the Additional Protocol, the Agency will not be able to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran"
(Taken from: Summary, Paragraph 23)

FOCAL POINTS
1. The Iranian course of action challenges the decisions made by the international community. Furthermore, it serves as a continuous violation of Iran's international obligations, including Security Council resolutions, as emphasized in the IAEA report itself (Paragraph 24).
2. Resolution 1835 includes declarations only, and reflects the ineffectiveness of the current international policy regarding Iran. The low price Iran currently pays as a result of the sanctions does not force her to contemplate changing, or even making policy adjustments.
3. As a result, international activity must be increased, taking the form of effective sanctions capable of forcing a change in Iranian policies, particularly in the field of energy. Furthermore, there is a growing need for promoting unilateral sanctions and continuing to encourage sanctions in the European Union.
4. The Iranian strategy focuses on reducing the time required to attain a nuclear weapon, while accumulating enriched material within the framework of the "legitimate" civilian nuclear program. This strategy is yet again exposed by the lack of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA as well as by the report's findings, which confirm the continuation of enrichment activity in Iranian territory. It is therefore imperative that Iran be prevented from enriching uranium, which is carried out under the veil of a civilian program in its terrain
5. Conciliations on the terms of the suspension are dangerous and will only lead to short-term benefits which mask long-term dangers. In essence, these conciliations will serve as international recognition of Iranian rights to enrichment.
6. The element of time remains critical in the international activity against Iran. Despite international efforts, Iran is rapidly approaching the point where it will achieve full control of enrichment technologies. Once it crosses this line, the Iranian nuclear program will be extremely difficult to stop. Evidence to this claim can be found in the Iranian Prime Minister's (Mottaki) declaration that the reactor in Bushehr is expected to become operational as soon as mid-2009. In addition, according to the IAEA's findings, Iran has accumulated a third of the quantity needed in order to enrich uranium for one bomb, at military standards.
7. The findings of the IAEA support Israel's remaining assessment that Iran is heading towards a military nuclear program. Israel cannot come to terms with a nuclear Iran. While Israel continues to prefer a diplomatic solution, through international pressure and sanctions, it reserves the right to pursue other courses of action.
8. Beyond the threat which Iran poses to Israel, it represents a significant regional and global threat. Nuclear capabilities in the hands of a fundamentalist Islamic regime will pose a significant challenge to Israel, the Middle East and the entire international community. In Iran's world view, nuclear capabilities serve as a primary means to becoming a dominant power in the region.
9. Iran continues to upgrade the capabilities of its collaborators and proxies in the opposing camp by supplying weapons, funding and incorporating advanced asymmetric warfare doctrines.
10. Iranian proxies are motivated by a radical ideology and pursue their goals via means of terror and violence. Iran's use of these proxies, particularly in failed states (Lebanon, Gaza), serves as yet another Iranian attempt to expand its influence in the Middle East.
Thanks: Israel Defense Forces
The Strategic Division
The Military-Strategic Information Section

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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