Doc's Talk: Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team II, August '08

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team II, August '08

Information and Focal Points

MAJOR POINTS
1. The Second LIBAT (Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team II) Report, submitted to the Secretary General on August 25th, assesses the situation along the Lebanese borders (the Syrian border, air and navy depots) and focuses on security and supervision issues. The report, prepared by a professional Team on behalf of the UN, criticizes the Lebanese authorities as well the troop-contributing states. The report also indicates that hardly any progress has been made on this issue since the writing of the first report (June 2007), and that most of the recommendations have yet to be implemented. The essence of the report is that the eastern border remains “almost entirely breached”.
2. and coordination of patrols of the integrated Lebanese security force; lack of fencing on many border crossings; long distances between inspection points and the border; disorganized and unsystematic functioning of the border terminals and cargo checks; unsupervised passage of pedestrians and vehicles along the north-eastern border; lack of sufficient planning and coordination between the troop-contributing states; limited local coordination with the The primary shortcomings mentioned in the report include: lack of planning Syrian authorities; and insufficient border delineations.

IMPLICATIONS
1. The lack of security and supervision along the Syrian-Lebanese border, and the fact that it remains breached, as warned by the LIBAT Team allows the continuation of weapons smugglings from Syria to Lebanon.
2. The radical-axis – Iran, Syria and particularly Hezbollah – exploit the breached border in order to continue unchecked Hezbollah strengthening and force building.
3. The report essentially indicates lacking implementation of the core issues of UNSCR 1701 - enforcement of the embargo and the ultimate dismantling of the armed militias in South Lebanon. The Resolution called upon the Lebanese Government to assure and secure its borders and prevent weapons smuggling, while Damascus continues to transfer Iranian and Syrian weapons from its territory to the Hezbollah. Most of the weapons smuggling take place via illegal crossing routes, primarily along the eastern border, in areas controlled by the Hezbollah and pro-Syrian Palestinian factions.

BACKGROUND
1. The border between Syria and Lebanon is approximately 375 km. The border is not clearly marked, provoking numerous disagreements over the years, as well as land expropriation, namely Lebanese lands by Syria.
2. The Syrian-Lebanese border is divided by four main axes connecting the two states, between which four official crossing points are located:
1. Al-Mansa crossing point – connects between Beirut and Damascus.
2. Al-Abudia crossing point– connects between Tripoli and Tartous.
3. Al-Arida crossing point in the north.
4. Joseya crossing point – connects between Baal-Bek and Homes
In addition, there are approximately 70 transition points along the border and dozens of additional illegal crossings, used for smuggling on both sides of the border.
On August 25th the second LIBAT Report was submitted to the Secretary General and the Security Council in light of the Team's second tour of Lebanon (July 15th to July 31st).
The report's objective is to provide an assessment of the situation regarding the security of the Syrian-Lebanese border. Moreover, the report offers the Lebanese Government practical recommendations for the improvement of supervision and security along the border.
Based on the decision made by the Security Council, the Team includes a number of security experts. The Team was initially sent to Lebanon in 2007 (May 25th to June 15th). The first report was submitted on June 22nd, 2007.
The Team visited the four border crossing points, and another crossing point which has yet to be opened, additional points along the border (in the northern and eastern area), disputed areas, crossing points controlled by Palestinian factions, and air and navy ports in Beirut and Tripoli.
While the report suggests practical recommendations, there is no enforcement mechanism which will ensure their implementation. Among the suggestions raised in the report are the following:
· The Lebanese Government's implementation of the findings of the first report, and the establishment of a governmental strategic plan which will include: objectives, means to achieve them, directives and legislation regarding the field of supervision and security along the country's border.
· Integration and cooperation between the various Lebanese security agencies.
· Demarcation of the Syrian-Lebanese border.
· Establishment of collaboration with counterparts in Syria, which will serve as a joint effort to create supervision.
· Improvement of the coordination and cooperation between the troop-contributing countries in order to achieve optimal results.

QUOTES FROM THE REPORT

1. Overall conclusion:
- "The overall situation renders Lebanon's border as penetrable as was the case one year ago during the LIBAT I assessment".
(Taken from: Executive Summary, Paragraph 10)
- "In conclusion, there has been some progress on the northern border through the Common Border Force, Lebanon has not yet succeeded in enhancing the overall security of its border in any significant manner".
(Taken from: Paragraph 77)

2. The political situation in Lebanon:
- "The Team concluded that even taking into consideration the difficult political situation in Lebanon during the past year and notwithstanding the activities of the Northern Border Pilot Project and Common Border Force, the rate of progress and implementations of the recommendations of Team I have been insufficient. There are, at most, disconnected islands of progress but there has been no decisive impeact on overall border security".
((Taken from: Executive Summary, Paragraph 6

3. The Eastern border:
- "The situation along the eastern Green Border has seen virtually no progress and this Green Border remains as penetrable as was the case during Team I mission. The primary reason for this lack of progress given by the Border Security Committee and commanders on the ground is the decision by the Lebanese Government to first complete the consolidation phase and subsequent assessment of the NBPP and await the Government's subsequent decision".
(Taken from: Paragraph 37)
4. Official border crossings:
- "A significant change for the better at Masnaa has been the installation of a
scanner unit which has been operational for almost a year. An average of 30 trucks per day are scanned out of a total of approximately 200 arriving into Lebanon at this border crossing point."
- "The entire location at Masnaa remains disorganized and highly unsystematic It is possible to enter Lebanon without being properly checked by devising a route that circumvents this checkpoint."
(Taken from: Paragraph 23)
- "With the exception of Aboudieh, no progress has been made at any of the
border crossing points towards the recommended “one-stop control” system."
(Taken from: Paragraph 26)

FOCAL POINTS
1. The second LIBAT Report was submitted to the Secretary General and its findings were adopted by him. In essence, it serves as the UN's recognition of the wide scale weapon smugglings along the Syrian-Lebanese border, and of the fact that Lebanon's weapons embargo is not enforced. Both serve as illegal activities and stand in clear violation of UNSCR 1701 and UNSCR 1559, thus enabling the Hezbollah to re-establish.
2. In addition, the report clearly indicates that the Lebanese Government violates UNSCR 1701, which calls on the government to take responsibility and supervise its borders. The Lebanese Cabinet policy, which legitimizes the use of force by resistance factions, places responsibility on the Lebanese Government for any hostile activity executed by the armed militias in Lebanon.
3. As evident in the report, there is no practical solution, at this time, for the weapon smugglings taking place along the Syrian-Lebanese border. The Syrian Foreign Minister himself declared on October 1st: "no one can inspect the border with Lebanon… There are smugglings taking place from Lebanon and to Lebanon…"
4. Israel calls upon the establishment of an international mechanism designed to prevent smugglings, and for the international community to increase its' activity. The impediment of smugglings along the border is vital in order to create change in Lebanon.
5. Syria bears responsibility for the increasing potential escalation in the region, for the Syrian regime plays an active role in the weapons smugglings and in the strengthening of Hezbollah. Via Iranian support Syria continues to extensively rearm Hezbollah with advanced weapons. This process serves as a threat for all forces operating in the region, including UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon. The statements made by Sa'ad Hariri on September 29th that Syria is to be blamed for smuggling radical agents into Lebanese territories, emphasizes the Syrian involvement and influence in Lebanon. Hariri himself called upon the Arab League to send a formal team in order to inspect the border.
6. The stationing of Syrian forces along the border recently, demonstrates that even the Syrians are concerned about the breached border and the problems it creates. Nonetheless, the troop-stationing does not lessen the need to establish an international mechanism which will address the issue of weapons smugglings along the Syrian-Lebanese border.
7. The international community and the troop-contributing states play a significant role. It is within their power to increase the cooperation and efforts in the area in order to attend the smuggling phenomenon. It is up to the international community to take effective action against the various entities undermining the Lebanese sovereignty and its establishments. The emphasis is on Iran, which utilizes Hezbollah as its proxy, and Syria, which continues its intervention in Lebanon and serves as a hub for weapon and supply transfers.
8. A substantial amount of the weapons smuggled into Lebanon reach Hezbollah depots in the Shiite villages in southern Lebanon – south of the Litani River, an area that is under UNIFIL jurisdiction. UNIFIL plays an essential role in shaping the reality in southern Lebanon. It is therefore required that continuous efficient action will be taken against the Hezbollah, hence fully implementing the force's mandate, in accordance with UNSCR1701.
9. The situation within Lebanon decreases Lebanese and regional stability, while posing a threat to Israel and the entire region. This is a result of the strengthening of Hezbollah by the radical-axis, alongside its strengthening within the Lebanese political system and its presence in the government.

Thanks to: Israel Defense Forces
The Strategic Division
The Military-Strategic Information Section

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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