Doc's Talk: Livni vs. Netanyahu: From One Election to the Next

Friday, November 14, 2008

Livni vs. Netanyahu: From One Election to the Next

David Makovsky
November 14, 2008

On February 10, Israelis head to their first national election in nearly three years. With the exception of the 1977 election, this will be the only Israeli campaign in which no incumbent has run for the office of prime minister. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni leads the Kadima party, which is neck and neck with Binyamin Netanyahu's Likud party; each is expected to garner approximately 30 seats in the 120-member Israeli parliament. Since their views on the peace process differ, the election's outcome will directly affect U.S. regional policy and the future of the Annapolis process. Background
When Israel last went to the polls, it was unclear whether Kadima would become an established party or just fade away. Ariel Sharon created the centrist Kadima party weeks before his massive stroke in January 2006 in an attempt to break the left-right divide that has dominated Israel since the 1967 war. Two key events since Kadima's 2006 victory -- Israel's inconclusive 2006 Lebanon war and Hamas's 2007 takeover of Gaza -- supported the prevailing wisdom suggesting that Kadima could not hope to compete as a major party, thus reverting Israel back to the Likud-Labor dichotomy. This year, however, has marked a startling turnaround. Kadima -- not Labor -- is vying with Likud for the top electoral spot. Two developments have driven this change: the seeming electoral collapse of the Labor party and the emergence of Livni's leadership in place of the unpopular Ehud Olmert.

Labor's Collapse
Labor won nineteen seats in the 2006 election, down from the forty-four under Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, and is polling a mere nine seats at present. This is a calamitous drop for Ehud Barak, who, as Rabin's protege and the most decorated general in Israeli history, was viewed as the savior of Olmert's government when he joined as defense minister after the disastrous Lebanon war. His growing unpopularity stems from many causes. Barak projects arrogance and aloofness, and his personal financial transactions, such as his endeavors in expensive real estate, are at variance with Labor's socialist roots. Israelis also perceive him as focusing more on undermining Livni than building a solid, center-left coalition. For instance, when he called Livni by her formal name -- Tzipora, which literally translates to "bird" -- many interpreted his attitude as denigrating to the first woman with a chance at the premiership since Golda Meir (who served from 1968 to 1974). In addition, the Israeli public seems happier with Barak as a capable defense minister than as prime minister. To make matters worse, a subgroup within Labor wants to create a separate dovish bloc, which is likely to diminish the party further. Taken together, Barak's chances do not look promising.

Livni's Rise
Barak's eclipse coincides with Livni's rise. While Barak is viewed as unsupportive of peace efforts, Livni has eloquently articulated support for a two-state solution and has met with chief Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala) on a weekly basis over the last year to hammer out details of a framework agreement. At the same time, Israelis see her as a tough negotiator, as she has been critical of some of Olmert's concessions to the Palestinians. She has also made the case publicly that Hamas will seize upon any inactivity to discredit Palestinian moderates.

Since Olmert is not running, he is able to give speech after speech articulating the benefits of creating a Palestinian state (with Israeli security backing) and the dangerous consequences of failing to do so. As of now, this has had a salutary effect for Livni, attracting droves of Labor voters to her. Her poor personal relationship with Olmert has also burnished her image as honest and uncorrupt. Her unwillingness to engage in protracted coalition bargaining with the Shas party over financial resources has increased her standing in the polls. This boost came at an opportune time in light of this week's municipal elections, as Kadima member Haim Ramon insists that his party won a third of the municipalities. Nonetheless, these elections were probably based largely on local issues, as mayors from all parties downplayed their national affiliations.

Livni may also play the "Obama card" in the upcoming election, suggesting that the Middle East peace process is linked to good relations with the United States. As such, campaign aides are likely to allege that a Likud victory will inevitably lead to a clash with Obama administration.

Netanyahu's Electoral Chances
Netanyahu believes he has several cards to play in the election. First, he will seek to neutralize Livni's Obama reference by emphasizing his knowledge of the United States as an asset in avoiding conflict with Washington. Critics will challenge this argument by citing Netanyahu's rough relations during his tenure as Israeli premier with former U.S. president Bill Clinton

Second, Netanyahu recently declared that he favors a national unity government (NUG) in an attempt to cultivate the Israeli center. This NUG could take many forms, but Netanyahu will likely favor the version that enables him to lean on parties within the right and center-right. Netanyahu also favors an "economic peace" with the Palestinians but has provided few details, particularly on how economics could substitute for a political process. He is unlikely to provide more details, given his desire to woo two prominent hawks, Benny Begin and Moshe (Bogie) Yaalon, to his campaign. Israelis regard both as very honest, and Netanyahu hopes their presence will remodel Likud and remove the stain of corruption that has tainted the party in recent years.

Third, Netanyahu is counting on Israeli Arabs. While constituting a fifth of the population, they historically vote for Israeli Arab parties, which traditionally stay out of coalitions, leaving the core issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict to be worked out by center-left Jewish parties. Likud thinks the Israeli Arabs will keep voting for these politically marginal parties, thereby limiting the center-left's prospects. If Israeli Arab voters switched their allegiance to Kadima or Labor, it would alter the race's electoral dynamics and boost Livni's fortunes.

Fourth, as finance minister under Ariel Sharon, Netanyahu slashed spending and earned a reputation as a fiscal hawk. He reduced the bloated welfare system for ultraorthodox Jews, but his significant military cuts factored into Israel's poor performance in the 2006 Lebanon war. Netanyahu will seek to use his experience in finance to suggest he is perfectly suited to lead Israel at a time of global financial crisis.

Both Netanyahu and Livni will seek to ensure that U.S. engagement with Iran is not open-ended and that the negotiations are used as a means to strike a "grand bargain" precluding -- rather than deterring -- an Iranian nuclear weapon.

U.S. Role
The outcome of the upcoming Israeli election will influence how the United States views its prospects in the Middle East. Although many wonder how the Obama administration would shape the election's outcome, this is a moot point since there are no signs that Obama is inclined to influence the process, and the new U.S. administration takes office less than three weeks before the Israeli elections.

A Livni victory will lead to more focus on the Palestinian track, given the progress made by her and Abu Ala. On the other hand, a Netanyahu victory could put more American emphasis on the Syria track. After all, Netanyahu was willing to strike a deal with Syria while he was in office in 1998, yet Ariel Sharon vetoed the back-channel efforts that Netanyahu confidante Ronald Lauder made with Syrian leader Hafez al-Asad. If Netanyahu wins, it will be interesting to see if he picks up where he left off, this time with Hafez's son and current Syrian president, Bashar al-Asad.

David Makovsky is a senior fellow and director of The Washington Institute's Project on the Middle East Peace Process.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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