Doc's Talk: Tinkering at the Margins of Israeli Rule Will Not End Occupation or Settlement‏

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

Tinkering at the Margins of Israeli Rule Will Not End Occupation or Settlement‏

Settlement Report | Vol. 18 No. 6 | November-December 2008
By Geoffrey Aronson
November-December 2008 Settlement Report

“Israel’s continued settlement expansion and land confiscation in the West Bank makes physical separation of our two peoples increasingly impossible,” wrote Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas in the Wall Street Journal on September 19, 2008. “We are impatient for our freedom. Yet partial peace, as proposed again by my current [Israeli] interlocutors, is not the way forward. Partial freedom is a contradiction in terms. Either a Palestinian lives free or continues to live under the yoke of Israeli military occupation. “We want our children to live with hope and the opportunity to realize their potential,” Abbas continued.” Yet our daily reality worsens. We are walled into shrinking pockets of land, reminiscent of the Bantustans of South Africa.”

Abbas, having despaired of an agreement with Israel, has reportedly turned his efforts to winning a letter of support from outgoing U.S. president George W. Bush for a “political solution based on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the June 4, 1967 borders.”

There was a time in the early decades of occupation and settlement when the international community applauded Israel’s “benevolent occupation.” Israeli leaders rationalized settlement creation by explaining that settlements were making use of “empty” land and that the introduction of settlers did not compromise Palestinian life in any way but was in fact an engine of modernization and economic advancement. When, however, Palestinian children are forbidden by Israeli soldiers to ride their bikes to school because of the outrageous security prerogatives of Israeli settlers, where concrete and barbed wire mark roads whose use by Palestinians is prohibited, and when Palestinian farmers are required to harvest olives only in coordination with Israeli soldiers for fear of settler attacks, it is not surprising that even the pretense of harmonious coexistence under occupation was long ago dropped from Israel’s arsenal of excuses for maintaining the status quo.

What has not changed, however, is Israel’s continuing commitment to preserving the core elements of occupation that today require the imposition of expansive restrictions on Palestinian life that grow more onerous as the settler population expands, whatever the costs to Palestinians. A recent International Monetary Fund report on the effect of the Annapolis process* notes that restrictions on Palestinian movement have increased in the past year, resulting in a contraction in real GDP in the first quarter of 2008. Despite extraordinary international effort, and the contribution of an unprecedented international aid, including $1.63 billion in direct budget support to the Palestinian Authority this year, the results achieved—more checkpoints, continuing economic stagnation, Gaza’s relentless push into penury, and the consolidation of Hamas’ rule there—are the opposite of the objectives established one year ago at Annapolis.

In an address to Quartet representatives on September 22, PA prime minister Salaam Fayyad took note of the failure of the central assumption guiding the international effort, namely, that Palestine’s economic rehabilitation can be achieved without reversing the essential elements of Israeli rule.

Expanding the settlements, which is a complete contradiction of the Israeli commitments in the framework of the road map and the Annapolis commitments, continues to limit the scope of the Palestinian economy and distances the political scope of a two state solution. This led to an increase in lack of expectations towards positive growth which has been generated among the investors. What has also aggravated the situation recently is that there was an increase in violence by the settlers against the Palestinians without any firm response on the part of the Israeli forces.

A recent World Bank report** highlights the calamitous, multi-faceted effect on Palestinian economic life produced by Israel’s land, settlement, and security policies, which resulted in a 150 percent increase in the West Bank settler population to almost 300,000 between 1989 and 2008 and a 400 per cent increase in the amount of land under its direct control. The report explains that Palestinians require “economic space”—in a word, land—for development and growth, without which they will be unable to prosper. “The increasingly entrenched and expanding impact of Israeli settlement activity on the Palestinian economy” must be addressed, it noted, “so that land administration policy foster[s] rather than constrain[s] growth and development and promote[s] the rational use of land resources in the entire West Bank .”

The crisis in Palestine created by Israel’s settlement and security strategy cannot be solved by piecemeal tinkering with the constituent elements of Israeli policy. Although reducing or even eliminating checkpoints, “freezing” settlements, restoring some sense of normality to Palestinian economic life, increasing the effectiveness of Palestinian security forces, or creating “metrics” for judging Israeli and Palestinian goodwill, are useful at the margins of Palestinian daily life, they fail to challenge the systemic nature of a hostile, military occupation intent upon preempting the exercise of Palestinian sovereignty and removing the levers of economic development from Palestinian control. As a recent newspaper advertisement by the Israeli anti-occupation organization Peace Bloc declares, the problem is not only the settlers: “The occupation is guilty in all of its spheres—the government, the army, the police, and the courts.”

Follow Us Not Them

One year ago, U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice exhorted Palestinians to “follow us, not them [Hamas].” Meanwhile the Hamas model for ending occupation maintains its attraction, and Hamas’ rule is exhibiting the very characteristics of sovereignty—including a cease-fire negotiated with Israel—that the PA can only dream about. As Israeli columnist Nahum Barnea observed, “We tend to think that the residents of Gaza are unhappy: they suffer both from the oppressive Hamas regime, and from the siege that imprisons them in a small, suffocating enclave, and from IDF fire, in periods when there is no tahdia (cease-fire). A high ranking IDF officer reminded me this week that people there have a different perspective from here. ‘The West Bank lives under occupation,’ he said. ‘Gaza is independent. There are no roadblocks there. There are no settlers. There is the sea. The model for the admiration of every Palestinian child is the Hamas fighter, who fires Kassam rockets at Israel.’”

These Palestinian gains in Gaza are being won at high cost, but the achievements of the Gaza model may prove more substantial than those of the Annapolis process. As Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad warned during a November visit by Rice to Jenin, the centerpiece of the international effort to re-create an Israeli-Palestinian security and economic partnership, the U.S.-led effort is “not going to be sufficient to really get us to where we are going. What we are doing here is building towards statehood, toward ending the occupation and building towards statehood. If nothing else happens, or things do not happen on the other track to make it possible for us to realize that dream of getting to the point of being free, then that is not going to work. And it is going to increasingly be seen as an exercise in improving the quality of occupation. This is not what this exercise is about. This is about ending the occupation, not beautifying it.”

Notes

*“Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework for the West Bank and Gaza: Second Review of Progress,” Staff Report for the Meeting of the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (Quartet), September 22, 2008.

**“The Economic Effects of Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank,” The World Bank, September 2008.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk