Doc's Talk: Hamas' Positions towards Israel,the Peace Process and a Two State Solution

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

Hamas' Positions towards Israel,the Peace Process and a Two State Solution

General

An examination of three different documents -- the Hamas Charter (August 1988), Hamas' Political Platform for the election to the Palestinian Legislative Council (January 2006), and the Palestinian National Reconciliation Document, also known as the (updated) "Prisoners' Document," (June 2006) -- shows that Hamas adheres to an ideology that rejects recognition of Israel and a peace agreement with Israel, and that Hamas also rejects the recognition of political agreements which the PLO has signed with Israel. This is based on Hamas being first and foremost an Islamist ideological movement that has clear red lines rooted in its religious doctrine. However, during the periods of the Hamas government and the national unity government some Hamas leaders vaguely expressed themselves in a manner that reflected a possible readiness for temporary coexistence with Israel based on the pre-1967 borders.

The Hamas Charter rejects political moves or the possibility of strategic compromises with Israel. According to the Charter, the end of the conflict will be expressed in the liquidation of the Jewish state. The Charter stresses armed conflict as the only means for liberating "the land of Palestine." Moreover, according to the Charter, Hamas opposes any initiatives or possible moves for finding a peaceful solution.

The Hamas Political Platform for the election to the Palestinian Legislative Council (January 2006) expresses Hamas' adherence to continuing the armed struggle in order to attain national Palestinian rights, including the "right of return." The Platform refers, among other things, to economic separation from Israel and avoiding normalization with Israel. However, the Platform does not make mention of destroying Israel.

The Palestinian National Reconciliation Document in Paragraph 7, that deals with "political negotiations and ratification of agreements," states that the PLO and the Chairman of the PLO have the authority for conducting negotiations, but any agreement must be approved by the new Palestinian National Council or by a general national referendum to be held, to the extent possible, within the homeland and among the Palestinians abroad, through a law that would arrange this.

On the basis of Paragraph 7, a political paragraph in the policy guidelines of the Palestinian national unity government (March 2007) was formulated referring to the nature of the mandate given to Mahmoud Abbas to carry out political negotiations with Israel. This item for all practical purposes empties the mandate given to Mahmoud Abbas of all content and makes the political negotiations "conditional."

Today, in view of the antagonistic relations between Hamas and Fatah and especially since Israel's military operation in the Gaza Strip, Hamas rejects in its statements the principle of political negotiations with Israel.

Hamas' View of Contacts with Israel

Hamas, which is bonded with the Moslem Brotherhood, distinguishes between three kinds of possible contact with Israel.

1. Permanent Agreement (which would include political gains for Israel). This is absolutely opposed by Hamas. From the standpoint of Hamas, there is an absolute prohibition against giving Israel legitimacy for sovereignty over Moslem land. Based on this, there is no possibility of Hamas reaching a formula for ending the conflict.

2. "Hudna" (a long-term ceasefire according to the model in Islam - the Hudaybiyyah Treaty which Mohammed signed with the Khureish tribe for a ten-year period, but which was violated after two years). This is a form of conflict management until Hamas would become strong enough to confront Israel and defeat it.

The main conditions for this kind of "Hudna" would be an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders and Israel's giving-up Jerusalem, and fulfilling "the right of return in its entirety" in keeping with the Palestinian interests. (In some of the Hamas texts, mention is also made about the freeing of prisoners.) These are pre-conditions that are not subject to negotiations.

3. "Tahadiya" (according to the parameters that were set in the agreement, mediated by Egypt in June 2008, for a period of calm between Israel and Hamas). In this case too, the period of calm is to be used for an arms buildup and for strengthening Hamas vis-à-vis the interests of the Palestinian public (border crossing points, removal of the Israeli "siege," etc.).

Whether a "Hudna" or a "Tahadiya," understandings or agreements are to be reached through a third party and not through direct dialogue with Israel.

Tactics vs. Strategy

During the period of the Hamas government and the period of the national unity government some leaders of Hamas (both internally and abroad) gave expression to a somewhat more pragmatic and less intransigent approach, primarily in their interviews to the foreign media. We believe that this derived from Hamas' interest to obtain Arab and international legitimacy, as well as from an attempt to calm the fears of the moderate Arab countries regarding Hamas' closeness to Syria and Iran.

The various Hamas spokesmen (including Khalid Mashaal) refer to flexibility on the following matters:

· Temporarily reconciling themselves to the fact of Israel's existence, but no recognition of its right to exist;

· Readiness to accept a Palestinian state based on the pre-1967 borders, but without committing to an end to all claims and without an agreement with Israel;

· Reference to a "civil jihad" against the "occupation."

However, there have been other statements made by the same spokesmen before various audiences (primarily Palestinian and Moslem Arabs) in which they emphasized the "armed struggle" option and stated that Hamas' agreeing to a Palestinian state according to the pre-1967 borders is a tactical and flexible framework at this stage only.

What Hamas is Prepared to Do

From Hamas' standpoint, there is no basis for direct dialogue with Israel. At the very most, in the past (during the periods of the Hamas government and the national unity government) it was prepared to have a technical, but not a political, dialogue with Israel (on a working group level), primarily for the purpose of coordinating matters pertaining to the daily life of the Palestinian public in the Gaza Strip.

What Might Happen Were Israel to Turn to Direct or Indirect Dialogue with Hamas

· Hamas (internally and abroad) might be forced to discuss this issue.

· Tension between "resistance" and political survival might increase (as happened during the period of calm).

· Possibly it would strengthen those in Hamas who are for a more flexible policy towards Israel.

· A possible positive Hamas stance towards the matter would be based on the knowledge that this would bring about the collapse of the Palestinian Authority as it is constituted today and would empty of all content the political view of the Palestinian nationalist movement that is based on a "two states for two peoples" solution. In the long term such a stance is liable to give Hamas a foothold in the PLO, based on Hamas' weight in the Palestinian arena, and transform the PLO into an Islamist organization along the lines of the Moslem Brotherhood.

January 2009

Information Department [mailto:skira@mfa.gov.il]

2 comments:

Anonymous said...: I don't see how any peace can come to Israel as long as the terrorist thugs Hamas control the government.
I do not blame the Israelis for fighting to protect their familes, and their countries. I do get sick and tired of hearing all the propaganda that the human rights groups spew out though against Israel.; 3:03 AM
GS Don Morris, Ph.D./Chana Givon said...: So do we all-thank you for caring-doc; 7:04 AM

The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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