Doc's Talk: Iranian subversion in Yemen

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Iranian subversion in Yemen

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

October 13, 2009

Iranian websites expose additional evidence of the regime’s ideological and religious influence on the Shi’ite rebels in north Yemen and the rebellion’s importance for Iran in supporting the Shi’ite minority in the Arab-Muslim world1

1. On September 28, 2009, a Persian website associated with Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Expediency Council and one of the four candidates for the presidency in June 2009, posted an interview with the Yemeni Shi’ite cleric Dr. Issam al-Imad. Dr. Al-Imad was described as a Yemeni citizen who had recently converted to Shi’a and who was studying its principles at religious seminaries in the Iranian city of Qom. Dr. Al-Imad spoke of the growing Iranian ideological and religious influence on the Houthi rebel leadership in north Yemen. He is well-known from television appearances in Yemen in which he defended Shi’a and was consequently attacked by Sunni Internet forums.

Dr. Issam al-Imad
Dr. Issam al-Imad
(Photo from Iran’s Arabic TV channel, www.alkawthattv.ir).

2. The theme of the interview was “The warm and cordial connections between the Houthi leader in Yemen and the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei are a reflection of the ideological and religiously close relations between Hassan Nasrallah and the Ayatollah Khamenei.” The main points were the following:2

i) Sayid Hussein Houthi [the first leader of the Houthi rebellion, who was killed in 2004] had deep, cordial relations with the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Hussein Houthi, who even after his death was considered the rebellion’s ideological leader, customarily said on cassettes that the contemporary personality closest to Allah was the Imam Khomeini, and that the Ayatollah Khamenei was continuing his path. According to Issam al-Imad, Hussein Houthi was also influenced by the thought of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and that they had similar political opinions.

ii) Abd al-Malek Houthi, Hussein’s younger brother [who inherited the role of rebellion leader], spent time in Iran living in Qom. Hussein Houthi also visited Iran, lived in Qom, and made an extensive study of Khomeini’s works. He used to say that the Shi’ites in Yemen needed to take the Iranian Republic as their model. He wrote a book called Iran in the philosophy of Hussein Houthi, which was published in a number of editions.

iii) For generations the Houthi tribe was armed. The region in which the Houthis live is considered the Yemeni “weapons market,” and that throughout their history Yemenis customarily bought arms from the Houthi tribe. Thus the Iranian regime’s call to the Yemenis living in the [rebels’] area to lay down their weapons was meaningless because weapons are an integral part of Yemeni culture.

iv) The Zaydi Shi’ites in Yemen [about 30% of the population] believe in the existence of four imams and not 12 [as do the Shi’ites in Iran]. However, according to Issam al-Imad, the Houthis now believe in 12 imams and therefore they are very close to the Iranian school of Shi’a, and cannot be likened to the Zaydi Shi’ites. Nevertheless, the Zaydi Shi’ites also oppose the current regime even though it is headed by President Al Abdallah Salah, a so-called Zaydi Shi’ite. That is because the president has become an enemy of the Zaydi Shi’ites on account of his support for the Wahhabis [i.e., the Saudi Arabians] and the Salafist Muslims.3

3. Iran’s influence on the Houthi rebellion’s leadership is not only ideological and religious but also has political implications. Propaganda videotapes distributed by the rebels show banners with Iranian-inspired slogans such as “Allah is the greatest of all, Death to America, Death to Israel, A curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam.”
Allah is the greatest of all, Death to America, Death to Israel, A curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam

Videotape distributed by the Houthi rebels
The slogans of the Houthi rebels: “Allah is the greatest of all, Death to America, Death to Israel, A curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam” (From the Houthi rebel forum, linked through Hezbollah’s Bint Jbeil website).

Videotape distributed by the Houthi rebels. The slogans appear again on the sign (manarvideo.com).

Internal Iranian criticism of the regime’s support for the Houthi rebels

4. Iran’s important IRdiplomacy website, run by a group of senior diplomats affiliated with the reformists, posted an article entitled “The Iranian broadcasting authority openly supports the rebels in Yemen” (October 6, 2009). It said that the Khabar television network, which belongs to the broadcasting authority, had turned the discussion of the Palestinian issue into a forum for supporting the Houthi rebels.

5. The article also reported that at 6:30 p.m. on October 2, 2009, there had been a discussion of “the tragedy of human rights violations in Palestine.” Guests to the program were supposed to contribute their “expert knowledge” of human rights and “the crimes of the Zionist regime” in Palestine and Lebanon. One of the experts spoke enthusiastically about how “we [i.e., the Iranian regime] now relate to Yemen as part of [Iran’s] front line, [standing at] the side of Gaza and Lebanon, and we must defend them.” He said that the Houthi group was like the Palestinians, adding that “the leader, Abd al-Malek al-Houthi, regards himself as taking the same path as the Imam Khomeini and Iran’s Shi’ite revolution.” During the program, Khabar TV repeatedly broadcast pictures and videotapes of the Houthi fighting and the rebel leader, Abd al-Malek Houthi.

6. An Internet posting claimed that the remarks made on Khabar TV contradicted official Iranian diplomacy, which denies the reports that Iran supports the Houthi rebels with weapons and money, calling them “baseless.” For example, according to the posting, the Iranian embassy in Bahrain rejected the claims that Iran was supporting the rebellion and stressed the need to preserve Yemen’s integrity. The posting further stated that this was not the first time discrepancies had been revealed between reports on official Iranian media and Iranian diplomacy.

1 Update of our October 1, 2009 bulletin, “Geopolitically strategic Yemen has become a focus of local Iranian-Saudi Arabian strife” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_e025.pdf.

2 http://www.ayandenews.com/news/13285.

3 Salafiyya is an Islamic school which preaches that the religious behavior of the first generations of Islam should be an example for all Muslims..

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk