Peter Huessy
In 2002 under the Moscow, (SORT) Treaty, we and the Russians actually "trusted" each other to believe each other's declared policy of accepting what were the numbers of "operationally deployed nuclear weapons." Although the START treaty did allow inspections, the START counting rules did not apply to SORT. The START rules required us to count as active parts of our arsenal empty silos and retired bombers.
Part of our current negotiations with the Russians is to come up with inspection protocols and counting rules for a new treaty where warheads would be in a range of 1,500-1,675, compared to the current Moscow range of 1,700-2,200. Some analysts have proposed that further reductions will require getting rid of some portion of either our sea-based or land-based missiles. If we do so, however, it may be very difficult to deflect further cuts in the next round of negotiations in our platforms on which warheads are deployed. The end result would leave the United States with a Monad or single platform deterrent. This is especially true if we go down somewhere near 750-1,000 warheads, the next level being pushed by many in the disarmament community. In short, we would be forcing ourselves to put far too many of our eggs in a very few baskets.
For example, at the 1,000 warhead level for example, even with only 150 Minuteman land-based missiles and 150 bomber warheads, we would have to reduce the submarine fleet to seven boats. Assuming boats 11-14 that are scheduled to be refueled during the next decade would be retired early, far fewer boats would be available for our deterrent needs under this scenario. With a nominal 300 warheads reserved for bombers and ICBMs, for example, we would be able to maintain only 7 boats and unable to cover targets in both the Atlantic and Pacific as we do now. At this point we come perilously close to having to go to one base for our submarines. If it’s in the Pacific, which is most likely, we would not have a deterrent for the Atlantic and thus not an extended deterrent for NATO in that theater.
Thus, to accommodate lower numbers, the submarine fleet needs to come up with new counting rules in any case to preserve an affective deterrent. Killing some portion of the ICBM or bomber fleet does not help with this. On the other hand, preserving both Trident submarines and D-5 missiles would allow you at the same time to reduce warhead levels on each D-5 missile. Cutting SLBM warheads another 150 to accommodate the full 450 Minuteman, for example, would mean reducing every other Trident D-5 missile from 4 to 3 warheads. The four patrolling submarines "in their box" at any one time would thus be carrying 84 warheads rather than 96 per boat or a four boat total of 336 vs. 384. Or you could accomplish the same thing by simply take down slightly less than 40 D-5 missiles, or 1-2 per boat while preserving the up-load or breakout capability of all of your submarines and land-based missiles. Although when we speak of arms control we always think of reducing nuclear weapons, there is always the possibility of the geostrategic table-top tipping in the wrong direction which might very well require the U.S. and its allies to increase its arms.
If we look out even further into the future, further "arms control" reductions to lower than 1,000, for example, would place in peril the viability of the remaining submarine based deterrent as well as our current two ocean patrol capability even if all land-based ICBMs and nuclear bombers were eliminated. To claim that we will simply not reduce our weapons that far doesn't wash either. The current reductions to 1,500-1,675 do not serve any pressing strategic need. It simply is a move in the direction of zero. For many in the disarmament community, any number less than what we have today is better, and I therefore doubt that once having reached 1,500-1,675, the latter number being all of 25 warheads below the lower end of the SORT or Moscow Treaty level agreed to by Russia and the US in 2002, we will somehow magically stop.
Now it is not without some difficulty to reduce our warheads wisely. The Navy apparently does not want to go to 3 warheads per some missiles because they would have to put either ballast or a decoy/dummy warhead on the D-5 to balance the missile. That we can do. However, it is believed the Russians will insist that the decoy or dummy warheads will have to count as REAL warheads. If so, the Trident fleet counts upward of 1344 warheads, (14 submarines each with 24 missiles each carrying four warheads). That leaves little room for bombers and ICBMs. Thus, we would be back looking for ways to reduce warheads all over again.
However, upon examination, the Russian position makes little sense and is unnecessary. For example, bombers do not count under SORT as they did under START. In a new treaty, if bombers counted per their capability, the B-2 and B-52s could count upwards of 2,000 warheads. So if the assumption is the Russians will agree to some different counting rules for bombers, which they have to in order to fit our remaining 450 Minuteman and 14 submarines within the warhead ceilings of 1500-1675, why not the same for the D-5 fleet? After all, the counting rules for U.S. weapons will be the same counting rules for Russian weapons.
This is not a trivial issue. The whole point of maintaining our existing inventory of platforms is to further reduce the ratio of Russian warheads to our platforms or potential targets. Keeping this inventory maintains that ratio at three Russian warheads for every U.S. platform. However, reducing one wing of Minuteman, as an example, increases that ratio to five to one. What is the point of doing so when it is so unnecessary?
Part of the problem is that enthusiasts for going to zero global nuclear weapons have gotten their hearts in front of their brains. We have come to believe that cutting warhead levels just to be seen to be doing so, will give us a big "proliferation bonus." This means parallel restraint by other emerging or existing nuclear powers. But this trades our current hard capability for a future squishy wish-list. This means we have things backward. Instead of determining what is required for deterrence, and then deploying those forces, we are arbitrarily seeking lower numbers in the hope that in the future our actions will be reciprocated by members of the "international community." It is assumed they will help us secure our non-proliferation goals, especially with respect to the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran. Apparently to some, keeping the current platforms in our nuclear arsenal –even should we reduce warheads to the proposed lower levels – means we have to pay a "proliferation penalty" because of the "perception", fueled ironically by the same disarmament advocates of going to zero nuclear weapons, that the US is not "adequately" meeting its obligations under the NPT, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
If, however, the Iranians and North Koreans do not curtail and make transparent their nuclear programs, whether because effective economic sanctions are not implemented or negotiations fail, we will be pushed to make even further force reductions, again in the forlorn hope that the 'international community" will help us, once again, to get "really, really tough" with Iran and North Korea. And as this "rope-a-dope" strategy plays out, the US nuclear deterrent weakens. And in the meantime our allies may deploy their own nuclear deterrent. Even worse, we may get increasingly out of the "deterrent game." Our allies and friends then might very well make accommodations with Iran and North Korea who seeing their geostrategic goals becoming closer to fulfillment, act recklessly and initiate aggression that then leads to the very outbreak of war we have been trying to avoid. But as time marches on, unfortunately, such a war may break out where the aggressors themselves have deployed and use nuclear weapons with catastrophic consequences.
The current triplicate of forces, known as the Triad, made up of bombers, submarines and land-based missiles, were created to provide the U.S. and its allies the necessary insurance to maintain deterrence under all manner of conditions. If there is a technological failure in one leg of the Triad, the other two compensate. At low levels of nuclear weapons, any strike against our 450 Minuteman would require the use of nearly 1,000 warheads, but this would leave our submarines and bombers available for massive retaliation. Thus any contemplated attack on the U.S., designed to "take out our nuclear capability" and thus give an adversary free reign in the conventional military arena, becomes simply impossible. And that, in turn, becomes the best guarantee, yes insurance, that in a crisis, no nuclear weapons will be used against the United States. The current inventory of U.S. nuclear capable platforms numbers roughly at 500, a major reduction from Cold War levels. Our current warhead levels are lower than at any time since the Eisenhower administration. There is no sense in putting too many of our nuclear eggs in too few baskets. Such risks are unnecessary and illogical. While the Cold War is over, the lessons learned during that half-a-century are valuable and represent an accumulated wisdom that should not be casually discarded. Thus, in the absence of a strong strategic rationale for putting at risk our safety and increasing international instability, we must remain committed "to provide for the common defense."
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense consulting company in Potomac, Maryland.
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