Doc's Talk: The struggle between Hamas and the jihadi-Salafist networks

Monday, October 05, 2009

The struggle between Hamas and the jihadi-Salafist networks

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

Overview

1. On August 14, 2009, Hamas used military force to suppress the global jihad-affiliated Jund Ansar Allah (The Army of Allah’s Supporters) network. The confrontations in and around the Ibn Taymmiyah mosque in Rafah killed at least 24 Palestinians and wounded more than 130. Several hundred suspected Palestinians were detained, among them jihadi-Salafist operatives. The dead included Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa (a source of religious-ideological authority for the jihadi-Salafist networks) and Khaled Banath, known as Abu Abdallah, “the Syrian” (the Jund Ansar Allah’s military commander). During the confrontations the Hamas forces did not hesitate to shoot at the mosque, a prominent Islamic symbol named for Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymmiyah, and to cause heavy damages.1

2. About a month and a half after the bloodshed at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque Hamas and the jihadi-Salafists in the Gaza Strip tend toward the following:

i) Hamas has adopted a conciliatory attitude tow ard Jund Ansar Allah and the other networks (although it has not abandoned its policy of imposing its control over the jihadist networks and other centers of power which try to challenge it). That was reflected in Ismail Haniya’s September 15 speech, in which he expressed Hamas’ readiness to cross off the recent events with the “brothers” in Rafah. His attitude was conciliatory, and he suggested releasing several dozen of them from detention for Eid al-Fitr, the holiday that ends the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. On September 17 the minister of justice in the Hamas de-facto administration announced that 50 security detainees would be liberated (Hamas sources stated that they were Jund Ansar Allah network operatives).

ii) The jihadi-Salafist networks have continued their activities, keeping a low profile to avoid exposure to measures Hamas might take against them. A senior Jund Ansar Allah operative told Reuters that the network’s operatives had gone underground and were keeping their activities covert to evade Hamas’ security forces (by shaving their beards and abandoning their Afghani style of dress). He said that the strength of Jund Ansar Allah had not been weakened and the network continued to attract not only civilians but also senior Hamas operatives. He also said he opposed the ceasefire with Israel, stressing that Jund Ansar Allah would continue its attacks against Israel and not hesitate to confront Hamas if it tried to stop them. (Note: On the ground, jihadist operatives are in fact involved in the rogue attacks from the Gaza Strip meant to undermine the relative calm, to which Hamas is still committed.)

iii) Hamas is the subject of savage attacks by the jihadi-Salafist networks and operatives affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. They strongly condemn the suppression of its operatives and some of them even called to avenge the men murdered in the events and to destroy the “Hamas state” (or in the words of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, “the gang controlling Gaza”). The events have apparently caused a deep rift between Al-Qaeda and the global jihad and Hamas which will not quickly heal, even in view of Hamas’ recent conciliatory attitude toward Jund Ansar Allah and the jihadi-Salafist operatives in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas’ (possibly temporary) conciliatory attitude toward the jihadi-Salafist networks
3. Since the events at the Ibn Taymmiyah mosque, Hamas’ attitude toward Jund Ansar Allah and the other jihadi-Salafists has been conciliatory, if only for tactical reasons, while on the other hand, Hamas has not abandoned its policy of imposing its authority on all the focal points of power in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has done so because of the networks’ popularity in the Gaza Strip, even among Hamas operatives, and because of the sharp criticism it has faced from radical Islamic groups, especially those affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad. At the same time Hamas is careful to represent itself as a movement based on Islam and faithful to jihad in order to answer the accusations made against it after the events at the Ibn Taymmiyah mosque.

4. That outlook was expressed in a speech given by Ismail Haniya, head of the de facto Hamas administration, during the Ramadan fast-breaking meal on September 15. He represented himself as the pupil of the “great preachers and generous educators” of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had taught him. He boasted of his activities for Islam, Jerusalem and Palestine in accordance with the “jihad ideology of the Hamas movement.” He claimed that since Hamas had been running the Gaza Strip it had made sure not to do anything contrary to Muslim religious law and often consulted with the sages about problems related to religious law (Hamas’ Palestine-Info website, Al-Aqsa TV, September 15, 2009). He spoke of the “difference of opinion we had with out brothers in the city of Rafah,” claiming that it had been a case of “young brothers who were deeply attached to Islam but had been influenced by an incorrect understanding of it and of our law – They performed acts of heresy, shed blood and proclaimed an emirate.” However, he said, “what happened, happened,” and the government decided to release dozens of those detained after the events at the Ibn Taymmiyah mosque on August 14. He said that their release was a gesture to the sages for Eid al-Fitr and “as part of spreading [the spirit of] concession from within” (Hamas’ Palestine-Info website, September 15, 2009).

5. In the wake of the speech, on September 17 Muhammad Faraj al-Ghoul, minster of justice in the Hamas de-facto administration, held a press conference where he announced that “Prime Minister Ismail Haniya has generously decided to release 120 felons and 50 security detainees for Eid al-Fitr.” A source within the Hamas administration said that the 50 security detainees were members of the Jund Ansar Allah network, detained following the events in Rafah (Reuters, Agence France-Presse, Al-Quds, September 17; Al-Aqsa TV, September 18, 2009).

Detainees released by Hamas for Eid al-Fitr
Detainees released by Hamas for Eid al-Fitr
(Hamas’ Palestine-Info website, September 19, 2009).

Contradictory reports about the fate of jaljalat operative Mahmoud Taleb

6. Another possible expression of Hamas’ policy of reconciliation was “arranging affairs” between Hamas and Mahmoud Taleb, who identified himself as one of the heads of the jaljalat2 and was interviewed by the Palestinian and Arab media, where his views were defiantly anti-Hamas.3 According to a Hamas forum, Mahmoud Taleb, jaljalat commander in the Al-Shati refugee camp, returned to the ranks of Hamas after he surrendered to the leadership of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. As far as can be determined, he was pardoned and returned to his family and “all the differences of opinion were resolved” (Hamas’s PALDF forum, September 21, 2009). However, a Fatah forum reported that he was killed by “Hamas militias,” which issued the cover story that he had escaped from detention (Fatah forum Watan, September 28, 2009).

Senior Jund Ansar Allah commander: jihadi-Salafist activity continues despite
the blow the network suffered at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque

7. A senior Jund Ansar Allah operative calling himself Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi spoke by phone with Reuters, a conversation arranged by senior Salafist operatives in the Gaza Strip. The main issues discussed were the following (Reuters, September 16, 2009):

i) The activities continue, but covertly: The blow suffered by the Jund Ansar Allah network at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque forced its operatives to go underground, but it also increased their motivation. He said they now preserved secrecy and many of them had shaved their beards and abandoned their Afghani style of dress to evade Hamas’ hunt for them. According to al-Maqdisi, Jund Ansar Allah had thousands of operatives and thousands of supporters [Note: The numbers are probably exaggerated.] The network, he claimed, also attracted senior Hamas operatives, who attended secret lectures given by Salafist sheikhs.

ii) Detentions of Jund Ansar Allah operatives: Al-Maqdisi claimed that close to 500 jihadist operatives had been detained since the events at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque [According to Hamas, the number was 160, of whom 50 have already been released and 50 more who were supposed to be released for Eid al-Fitr.] He said the Hamas security forces had also detained their relatives as a means of exerting pressure on them. As to Hamas’ claim that it was “reeducating” the operatives who had been detained, al-Maqdisi’s reaction was that even if they detained all the Jund Ansar Allah operatives, Hamas would never be able to change the way they thought, not even of one operative.

iii) Jund Ansar Allah will continue to act against Israel even if Hamas objects: Hamas, he said, was now regarded as an enemy of Jund Ansar Allah because it prevent the network’s attacks on Israel. The network did not intend to confront Hamas but it opposed the movement’s attempts to maintain a ceasefire with Israel and it would oppose anyone who tried to stop the jihadi activities of the “resistance” [i.e., terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip]. (Note: In effect, jihadist operatives participate in the attempts made by the rogue networks to attack from the Gaza Strip (rocket and mortar shell fire, light arms fire) and in that way undermine the relative lull in the fighting between the Palestinians and Israel, to which Hamas is still committed.)
iv) The Salafist groups in the Gaza Strip do not have formal contacts with Al-Qaeda, but the regard bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri as their ideological mentors. They also said they were loyal to Abu Omar al-Bagdadi, who heads a network called the Islamic State in Iraq.4

8. Jihadist elements have promised to wreak vengeance on Hamas for the events at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque. So far nothing significant has been done except for attempts to detonate bombs near Hamas security installations, which had no real results. On the night of August 29, 2009, two bombs exploded a few minutes apart in Gaza City. “Security sources” in the Gaza Strip reported that two other bombs, also placed near Hamas security installations, were defused. In the assessment (of security sources) in the Gaza Strip, the attacks were the work of the Jund Ansar Allah network in retaliation for the suppression of its operatives (Hamas’s PALDF forum, BBC Radio in Arabic and other media sources). On September 16 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi denied to Reuters that jihadi-Salafist operatives had been involved in the bombings.

Al-Qaeda and the global jihad strongly attack Hamas

9. Jihadi-Salafist networks and operatives affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad, including Salafist Islamic clerics in Arab countries, strongly attacked Hamas for its violent suppression of the jihadists at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque, and some of them even called for their deaths to be avenged and the “Hamas state” to be destroyed.

10. The following are some of their statements:

i) On September 5 Al-Qaeda in Iraq posted a strong denunciation of Hamas on its main information website (Al-Fajr Media Center). It reiterated its denunciation of “the gang controlling Gaza” for attacking the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque. It said that and executing Salafist Muslims was a service to the Crusaders [the West], the Jews and the infidel Arabs, especially the regime of [Egyptian President] Hosni Mubarak. The announcement called on Allah to avenge the blood of the murdered men and to destroy the Hamas state, and demanded that the Salafists in the Gaza Strip not negotiate with “the criminals.”

Headline of the Al-Qaeda in Iraq condemnation of Hamas
Headline of the Al-Qaeda in Iraq condemnation of Hamas
(Al-Fajr Media Center, September 5, 2009).

ii) The Egyptian Salafist sheikh, Sayid Hussein al-Afani, deplored the killing of Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa at the hands of Hamas and the shelling of the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque. On August 17, 2009, interviewed by Al-Khaleejiah TV, he praised Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa, saying that he had been a well-known figure in Salafist circles in Egypt and greatly honored. (Sheikh al-Afani wrote the introduction to Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa’s book about Muslim doctrine. He also wrote a biography of Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas, and wrote a poem eulogizing Nizar Riyyan, a senior Hamas operative killed during Operation Cast Lead.5)

iii) On August 31, 2009, the Salafist Forum in Yemen, an organization of dozens of senior Islamic religious figures, issued a statement signed by many of them severely criticizing the way Hamas handled the crisis and the attacks on Sheik Abd al-Latif Musa and the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque. It called Hamas’ behavior misguided and unjustified. It also said that Hamas’ actions offended the sensibilities of their Salafist brothers, who were considered their strategic depth throughout the world.6

iv) Assad Bayoud al-Tamimi, an extremist Islamic activist of Palestinian extraction, was savagely critical of Hamas, saying that the acts of the organization were an unforgiveable crime and could not be justified. He accused Hamas of believing in “democracy and national unity with the enemies of Allah” [i.e., the Palestinian Authority]. He wondered whether Hamas had “received money from the Persian Shi’ites to fight the Salafist operatives in Gaza and to destroy the mosque bearing the name of Sheik Ibn Taymiyyah, who represented the Salafit doctrine.”7

v) The Jordanian Salafist Sheikh Issam al-Barqawi, nicknamed Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, used his website to post an open letter accusing Hamas of murdering Muslims (Shabicat Filastin al-I’lamiya, August 29, 2009).

1 For further information see our September 1, 2009 bulletin “Hamas steps up its struggle against the global jihad-affiliated networks trying to challenge its control of the Gaza Strip” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e080.pdf.

2 For further information about the jaljalat see Note #1.

3 On July 11, 2009, Mahmoud Muhammad Taleb was interviewed by Al-Ayyam (translated by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center and presented as the appendix to the bulletin referred to in Note #1. On September 6, 2009, he gave a similar interview to the Arab newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat.

4 Abu Omar al-Bagdadi is the nickname of Abu Abdallah al-Rashad al-Bagdadi. He inherited Abu Hamzeh al-Muhajar and his predecessor, Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, the two former leaders of Al-Qaeda in Iraq who were killed. In 2006 he set up a network called “The Muslim State of Iraq” which was a kind of umbrella organization for Islamic operatives in Iraq affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Although it does not actually exist, the Muslim State of Iraq is not entirely virtual. It has a structure – real or imagined – which has ministers who function like a governmental cabinet. There have recently been rumors that the Americans killed Abu Omar al-Bagdadi, or that he was captured by the Iraqi army, but so far they have not been verified.

5 http://mdarik.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1248188005121&pagename=Islamyoun%2FIYALayout

6 http://mdarik.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1251021323143&pagename=Islamyoun%2FIYALayout

7 http://www.almitro.com/09/3547.html

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk