Doc's Talk: Diagnosing the Impasse in the Middle East Peace Process

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

Diagnosing the Impasse in the Middle East Peace Process

Featuring Ghaith al-Omari and Ehud Yaari
November 17, 2009

On November 6, 2009, Ghaith al-Omari, Ehud Yaari, and Robert Satloff addressed a special Policy Forum luncheon at The Washington Institute. Ghaith al-Omari, advocacy director at the American Task Force on Palestine, is former director of the international relations department in the office of the Palestinian president. Ehud Yaari is a Middle East commentator for Israel's Channel Two and a Lafer international fellow at The Washington Institute. Robert Satloff is the executive director of The Washington Institute; his comments are published as PolicyWatch #1601. The following is a rapporteur's summary. Ghaith al-Omari
Any negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis must be based on the framework of a permanent solution. Talks cannot start with a focus on an intermediate stage in the Quartet's 2003 Roadmap peace initiative -- e.g., a "stage 2½" involving steps such as a partial Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and interim agreements on Jerusalem and refugees. Rather, the participants must identify an end result toward which all negotiations are oriented. The path to a permanent solution must include predetermined benchmarks to highlight interim progress on institution building and the peace process at large, as well as to infuse the negotiations with positive energy.

It is crucial that along this path, state- and institution-building measures are not delinked from the present political track under the guidance of U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell. In addition, a Palestinian state cannot be established if it lacks substance, and a state must not be defined solely by name. Such a hollow entity would provide an opening for Hamas to target the Palestinian Authority's (PA's) capabilities and to gain power in the Palestinian political arena as a result.

Today in Palestinian politics, no consensus exists as to who will lead Fatah and the PA, including in prospective permanent-status negotiations, should President Mahmoud Abbas actually follow through on his threat not to seek reelection in the January 24, 2010, vote. Unlike the smooth transition that occurred after Arafat's death, no clear line of succession exists today. Rather, the PA finds itself in a moment of reorganization: alliances are forming, centers of political power are congealing, and the internal leadership map is being redrawn.

Should a succession struggle take place, it will inevitably, and undoubtedly, cause Abbas's Fatah party to implode. In fact, the Palestinian political system as it currently stands would be unable to survive a multicandidate election in the wake of Abbas's resignation. In the event of a succession fight, Fatah's only chance for survival would be through the agreed-upon selection by senior Fatah leaders of one or two candidates to run in the scheduled January elections. Yet, with the system as fragile as it is, we can safely assume that Abbas will indeed be PA president on January 25, 2010.

This does not mean, however, that Abbas lacks a reason to be frustrated with his current position, even if some of his own miscalculations are to blame. He had expected the United States to bring the Israelis and Palestinians to the table only after a complete settlement freeze had been enacted. Yet he had misread the map in front of him, placing too much emphasis on a settlement freeze as a necessary precondition -- rather than a negotiable aspiration -- for talks.

Hamas's leadership structure is trifold: political, military, and diaspora. The resulting variety of perspectives on the organization, and its future orientation, can cause notable tension come decisionmaking time. Most contentious is the debate over Hamas's use of force and its character as a resistance organization. Across the spectrum, Hamas leaders want the right to use force, but this does not mean that they will actually use it. Hamas garners domestic political support by threatening armed resistance while winning acceptance abroad by shunning violence and putting on the face of a political party. This is why the international community must compel Hamas to make a decision: to use violence or not, but to make a choice. The unacceptable status quo allows Hamas to win on both fronts.

Ehud Yaari
Though efforts have been renewed to bring about a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, to usher in an era of peace, Palestinian statehood should be the primary focus of current and future negotiations. On the Palestinian street, support for a two-state solution is waning. Rather than sovereignty, many have expressed increasing interest in a stateless independence marked by the cessation of the Israeli occupation. To ensure that the Palestinian commitment to a two-state solution does not disintegrate to the point of nonexistence, the Obama administration ought to give financial resources -- and land -- to PA prime minister Salam Fayad, the Palestinian leader who has worked toward building Palestinian institutions.

To begin with, Israeli and Palestinian leaders should agree to a cessation-of-hostilities agreement that will serve as stage 2½ or "2+" in the three-phase Roadmap peace initiative. This stage would entail a comprehensive package deal, short of a final-status peace treaty, leading to Palestinian statehood within armistice boundaries. Stage 2½ would also include Israeli withdrawal from 40 to 80 percent of the West Bank and an "end to occupation" in those areas, as well as interim agreements for East Jerusalem and refugees in PA territory.

While Mahmoud Abbas rightfully feels let down by his Israeli and U.S. counterparts, he himself has yet to show a willingness to compromise on two core issues of the peace process: Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees. Abbas should state publicly that the Palestine Liberation Organization/PA accepts the religious, emotional, and historic attachment of the Jewish people to Jerusalem. Making such a statement would be an enormous step forward on the path to peace and the creation of a Palestinian state.

Hamas has suspended its active resistance against Israel, but the group will not give up the use of force entirely. Since Operation Cast Lead -- Israel's three-week incursion into Gaza early this year -- Hamas has been far more careful about using force. After all, not even militant groups use violence every day of the week. Yet the broader debate centers on whether Hamas's military wing should run the organization and, by default, the entire Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. Can Hamas afford a takeover by its military wing? In addition to the internal importance of this debate are its implications for the Palestinian political arena. Hamas would win if free elections were held in the West Bank today. Therefore, the group's political-military balance will have enormous consequences not only for Palestinian politics but perhaps for the peace process and the establishment of a Palestinian state as well.

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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