Doc's Talk: The groundwork for a third intifada is already laid

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

The groundwork for a third intifada is already laid

DROR BAR-YOSEF , THE JERUSALEM POST

Since President Barack Obama assumed leadership of the United States, intensive diplomatic efforts have been made to renew the peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. The new spirit in the White House has attained some significant achievements. First, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu declared that an independent Palestinian state will be part of the solution. For the first time, an Israeli government has agreed to freeze the construction of new homes in Gush Etzion and Ma'aleh Adumim, two major settlement blocs in the Jerusalem suburbs (although this settlement freeze does not apply to east Jerusalem). Lastly, in September, Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas publicly met.

Nevertheless, it seems that the US's efforts have only further distanced the Israelis and Palestinians and have not led the sides to announce the renewal of negotiations. This stalemate is neither new nor surprising. While it can perhaps be viewed as a tactical move on the part of the negotiators, the reality on the ground is quite disturbing. Recent months have been marked by violent demonstrations in Jerusalem, a call by many prominent Palestinian leaders to organize a new, nonviolent intifada and statements by Palestinians that a two-state solution might not be possible, due to settlement activity.

An analysis of recent developments reveals that even though a new intifada won't be fought in the near future, it could erupt in several months' time; in fact, we are witnessing how Palestinian society and its leadership have begun laying the groundwork, at least in terms of public opinion, for such an option.

What is so surprising is that Palestinians have remained unfazed by what Israel perceived as "historic" gestures towards Abbas. In fact, the crisis has been bolstered by internal conflicts plaguing the Palestinian political arena; Israeli-Palestinian relations are not the sole factor contributing to the current escalation.

THE PALESTINIAN political landscape has undergone many changes over the last few years, mainly due to the unprecedented crisis between Fatah and Hamas. Current tensions and the failure to reform the "Palestinian home," both within and between the major political parties, have led to widespread frustration among the Fatah leadership and Palestinian people. Scholars widely believe that the competition between the groups over the leadership makes the likelihood of a state nearly impossible. In a similar vein, the Fatah-Hamas schism has been blamed for the outcome of the war in Gaza last winter. The tension between the movements reached new heights after Hamas refused the recent Egyptian proposal to reunite Gaza and the West Bank under one governing system.

The unresolved tension between the two movements is not the only political crisis the Palestinians are facing. Fatah's internal conflicts are entirely unrelated to the peace process - in fact, many leaders of the Tanzim faction, including Kadura Fares, Hatem Abdel Kader and Muhammad Hurani, have openly supported Abbas's positions, including a two-state solution and a compromise on the right of return. They have also publicly stated that the last intifada, including its bloody terror attacks, was a mistake (despite still refusing to publicly accept Israel as a Jewish state). The reason so many Palestinian leaders' refuse to back Abbas is primarily a function of internal political considerations.

In many respects, Abbas's success in the August Fatah convention worked against him, giving him a specious feeling of self-confidence and popular support. Tensions between Abbas and his party emerged after his striking success in convening the convention, and his candidates' electoral victory in the central committee. This victory was marred by harsh allegations by many Fatah activists who claimed incongruity between votes cast and the official results. Leaders in the Tanzim accepted the outcome, but off-the-record criticized Abbas and the electoral process quite strongly. They felt that their faction's popularity, as evinced by their winning the majority of seats in the revolutionary council, was intentionally and illegitimately stifled during elections for the central committee.

Amidst this turmoil, Abbas's declared legislative and presidential elections would be held on January 24, 2010, and said he would not run for a second term. The declaration brought the previous crises to a new height. Many Fatah members were torn between their fear of Abbas's replacement and their criticism of his handling of the Goldstone Report and relations with Hamas.

The expected election is a complex issue with many implications, especially if Abbas indeed will not run. A more dramatic development might be his following through on his threats and resigning, causing other senior PA officials to follow his lead. But in almost every scenario, the elections will be marked by rhetoric that will prove unhelpful to resuming negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, while lending credence to a renewed struggle against Israel.

This development, which could foretell the end of the PA, will pave the road for a new intifada and call for a one-state solution. As long as the political landscape remains on the current trajectory, including holding elections and Abbas's retirement, the current PA leadership will lack the legitimacy to negotiate with Israel and the US. It will face public criticism alone, without the public help of any noteworthy Palestinian public figure, much as Abbas stood alone when he agreed to postpone discussions on the Goldstone report in the UN.

MOREOVER, THE stalemate between Israel and the PA, which is a natural result of the aforementioned crises, will lead to a fierce deterioration of the current calm. In a recent interview with the Maan News Agency, Marwan Barghouti said the "PLO executive committee, with all of its factions, should set a plan and vision for a wide popular and peaceful movement against settlements. We need the executive committee, the factions and Palestinian Legislative Council members to turn up the heat on popular demonstrations."

It is important to remember that prominent Palestinian figures had attributed the previous intifada to two equal causes: Israel and the PA. They claim that one of the intifada's major goals was to push for reforms within the Palestinian political arena. Today, the same reasons are being cited to explain the current escalation, which is indeed taking place regardless of recent developments in the peace negotiations with Israel.

If Abbas can incorporate the young Fatah leadership in the decision-making process, he, and the peace process, will receive more Palestinian public support. Barghouti's involvement in the peace process will grant Abbas more flexibility. But on the current trajectory, further concessions by Israel and the US will have limited effect.

If this is the case, what will the future look like? The boiling point might be a nonviolent intifada, characterized more by rocks and Molotov cocktails than suicide bombers, and backed by strong international judicial and diplomatic activity.

The Palestinians will utilize international objection to the settlements to demand a one-state solution, with a "one man, one vote" political system. For Israel, annexation of the West Bank and granting full and equal political rights to the Palestinians unequivocally means an end to Israel as a Jewish state.

In short, the current stalemate and the increasing tension between the Israelis and Palestinians is not due only to the ongoing building in West Bank settlements; the internal political struggle in the PA, the Fatah-Hamas crisis, the difficulties within Fatah and Abbas's declaration that he will not run for a second term as president have all contributed to the deterioration of relations in the Israeli-Palestinian-American triangle.

The writer is coordinator for programs in the Palestinian Authority at the Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies. This article was first published by the Adelson Institute for
Strategic Studies, at the Shalem Center,
www.adelsoninstitute.org
This article can also be read at http://www.jpost.com /servlet/Satellite?cid=1258027305074&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk