Doc's Talk: Saudi Public Opinion: A Rare Look

Thursday, January 28, 2010

Saudi Public Opinion: A Rare Look

David Pollock
January 27, 2010

What issues are of concern to ordinary Saudis? How does the average citizen view the state of the domestic economy? What are the prevailing public attitudes toward religious extremism? As in most countries, long-term stability in Saudi Arabia is ultimately dependent -- to one degree or another -- on popular acceptance of the current system. Even in the short term, the Saudi government, while far from democratic, is no doubt sensitive to social crosscurrents and diverse reactions to its initiatives. As a result, understanding Saudi public opinion is an important part of gauging the country's likely future direction. Opinion polls, however, are almost unknown in the kingdom, and anecdotal or indirect measures of these very delicate subjects are notoriously unreliable.

To help remedy this analytical deficiency, the following paragraphs present a rare data-based perspective on current political and social issues in Saudi Arabia, as viewed by that kingdom's own citizens. This survey reveals a moderately satisfied public -- but one that is also concerned about economic conditions. More surprising, it shows clearly that many Saudis are willing to express concerns about corruption and religious extremism. Most also want new political steps such as local elections -- but, again contrary to some Western misconceptions, this dimension of public life is not nearly as high on their agenda as other issues.

These findings are based primarily on a unique data set obtained in November 2009 by Pechter Middle East Polls, a new, Princeton-based private research organization. The data emerged from a survey conducted by a highly qualified regional commercial firm that polled a representative sample of 1,000 Saudis in the three major urban areas of Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dammam/al-Khobar. Other findings from this survey, focusing on foreign policy issues, were previously reported in PolicyWatches #1618 ("Saudi Public Backs Iran Sanctions but Split on Military Action") and #1614 ("Polling Saudis and Egyptians: Iran, Jihad, and the Economy").

Mixed Views on the Economy
As of late November 2009, urban Saudis were divided about whether the kingdom was moving in the right direction (54 percent) or the wrong direction (39 percent) On economic issues, they were significantly more pessimistic about their individual situations: 40 percent said their personal economic prospects had declined over the past year, compared with 36 percent who said they had improved; 23 percent saw no change. Looking ahead, only a quarter expected economic improvement over the next year, while half predicted their situation would stay the same.

Views on personal security were similarly mixed. Just under half of the respondents said they felt "more secure" in the past year than previously, but an equal proportion disagreed (only 6 percent said they did not know or refused to answer the question).

Younger Saudis More Optimistic
On two of these bellwether questions, respondents who were 18-24 years old (a group that comprises nearly a quarter of the kingdom's total adult population) voiced somewhat more positive views than those in the 55-and-over age bracket (around 10 percent of all adults). For example, 59 percent of the younger group said that Saudi Arabia is moving in the right direction, compared to 51 percent of the older group. Similarly, 39 percent of the younger respondents believed that their economic situation had deteriorated over the past year, compared to 46 percent of the older group.

Jeddah Residents More Disgruntled, but Not Economically
The question of Saudi Arabia's overall direction generated significant and surprising regional differences as well. In Riyadh and Dammam/al-Khobar, solid majorities viewed the kingdom's current course favorably. Responses from Jeddah, however, indicated more popular discontent: a narrow majority voiced a negative view of the country's direction. But these regional differences do not correspond to economic perceptions. In fact, Jeddah residents were marginally less likely than others to say that their personal economic situation had worsened over the past year and just as likely to expect improvement in the near future.

Most See Corruption as a Serious Problem
Overall, a majority (63 percent) of the respondents said that corruption is a serious issue in Saudi Arabia. In fact, when asked in a separate, open-ended question to name the kingdom's "most serious" problem, one-fifth cited corruption -- more than the proportion who named unemployment, and not far behind those who said inflation. In Jeddah, however, fewer than half (42 percent) of the respondents saw corruption as a major problem, compared to large majorities in both Riyadh (74 percent) and Dammam/al-Khobar (85 percent).

Nevertheless, as noted above, people in the latter two cities are somewhat more likely than those in Jeddah to be satisfied with the country's overall direction. Perhaps their citizens see some of Saudi Arabia's problems as bad but getting better, while Jeddah residents are less concerned but also less likely to anticipate much improvement.

Concerns about Religious Extremism
Just over half (54 percent) of urban Saudis said that religious extremism is a serious problem in their country, with one-quarter subscribing "strongly" to that view. These responses should be considered in the context of another, previously reported finding from this survey: one-fifth of urban Saudis expressed some support for al-Qaeda.

Unlike other issues, opinion on religious extremism was quite uniform across the three survey areas and, more surprisingly, across different age cohorts and educational categories. Gender, however, provided an interesting demographic variation: 48 percent of male respondents believe that religious extremism is a serious problem, but among women, that figure rose modestly to 59 percent.

Resumption of Municipal Council Elections
In 2005, Saudi Arabia held its first citywide (though male-only) elections for municipal councils in the three cities polled in this survey, with membership to be evenly divided henceforth between elected and appointed officials. A second round of elections, due in 2009, was postponed. In this survey, half the urban public said that those elections should have been held on time; a third disagreed. Moreover, two-thirds said local elections should now be held by 2011.

Asked what role these municipal councils should play, most respondents cited either infrastructure or economic improvements. Half said that they would approach the council about local issues such as road repair or sanitation services.

These numbers must be put in the context of other popular priorities, however. When asked in an open-ended fashion what the top national priorities should be, none of the respondents named elections or democracy. Instead, economic and social issues, including corruption, were the overwhelming favorites. Similarly, when asked what the United States should do in the region, only 13 percent cited democracy promotion as their first or second choice -- far more named economic support or action on various Arab-Israeli issues.

Perceptions of the Majlis al-Shura
Asked about their country's Majlis al-Shura, the appointed national consultative council, 70 percent of urban Saudis said that they were aware of it. Among that group, about half said the council's main role lies in the legal realm, with about one-quarter each citing economic or social functions. One in ten respondents who were aware of the council either did not know its function or said that it has no real role and is just a formality.

Policy Implications
These unusual yet highly credible findings suggest a manageable public opinion climate inside Saudi Arabia, even in regard to potentially volatile domestic issues. This is encouraging news, in terms of U.S. interests in Saudi stability as well as, perhaps, Riyadh's flexibility on some controversial topics of common concern.

At the same time, the climate for internal reform appears permissive. Saudis seem generally accepting of the gradual pace of reform so far, and appear predominantly favorable toward modest measures in that direction in the years ahead. And although they want new local elections within the next few years, they are hardly clamoring for them.

One issue that stands out as potentially problematic is corruption. Regional variations notwithstanding, concern about this subject registered at relatively high levels.

David Pollock is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on the political dynamics of Middle Eastern countries. He is the author of the Institute's 2008 Policy Focus Slippery Polls: Uses and Abuses of Opinion Surveys from Arab States.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk