Doc's Talk: Spotlight on Iran

Sunday, May 23, 2010

Spotlight on Iran

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

Highlights of the week

*

Reactions in Iran to nuclear agreement: Iranian withdrawal or victory?
*

Subsidies to be phased out: subsidy reform trial launched in three provinces starting this week
*

Recent data on AIDS in Iran: increase in AIDS cases through unprotected sex
*

Fight against reformist opposition leaders takes to video games
*

Pictures of the week: killer of shah’s last prime minister returns to Iran on release from French prison
Reactions in Iran to nuclear agreement: Iranian withdrawal or victory?

The agreement signed this week between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, under which Iran is to transfer 1200 kg of low-enriched uranium in exchange for nuclear fuel for the Tehran research reactor, has provoked diverse and contrasting reactions among Iran’s political establishment and media.

The daily Keyhan touted the agreement achieved between the three leaders as a “victory” for Iran. An editorial written by editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari says that Tehran’s statement reflects an Iranian achievement, since it guarantees that if the West fails to meet its obligation to provide nuclear fuel to Iran, the latter will receive back the enriched uranium kept as “collateral” in Turkey. Furthermore, Iran’s willingness to uphold the agreement is contingent on its acceptance by the Vienna Group, representing Western countries. Even if the West does accept the agreement, which Shariatmadari finds unlikely, it will be an acknowledgement by the West of Iran’s right to use peaceful nuclear technology and to enrich uranium. Shariatmadari claimed that Iran did not back down from its position by signing the agreement, and that the uneasy reactions to Tehran’s statement in the US and in Israel reflected the Iranian achievement. Iran wins the battle whether or not the Vienna Group accepts the agreement: if it does, it will thus renounce the claims it formerly brought up against Iran; if it does not, it will be proof that the nuclear program is just a pretext for the West to act against Iran (Keyhan, May 18).

The conservative daily Resalat also expressed support of the agreements reached between Iran on one hand and Turkey and Brazil on the other. An editorial published by the daily says that the agreement leaves the West no excuse to continue acting against Iran. It reflects Iran’s transparency with regard to its nuclear program and its good intentions, allowing it to take back the initiative on the nuclear issue and demand a similar transparency by the West (Resalat, May 18).

Mardom Salari, a daily affiliated with the moderate reformist camp, expressed somewhat mixed support of the agreement. The daily welcomed Iran’s accelerated diplomatic activity with regard to the nuclear issue in recent weeks, expressing hope that the agreement would make it possible to lift some of the sanctions against the country. The daily wondered, however, why Iran had not engaged in such diplomatic activities before the Security Council passed three resolutions against it. An editorial published by the daily one day after the agreement was signed further states that it remains to be seen to what extent it reflects Iran’s full right to continue uranium enrichment (Mardom Salari, May 18).

Reactions in Iran to nuclear agreement

On the other hand, Ahmad Tavakoli, the chairman of the Majles Research Center, strongly criticized the agreement, saying that it does not guarantee Iran’s national interests. In an interview to Fars, a conservative news agency, Tavakoli (considered one of President Ahmadinejad’s opponents in the conservative camp) said that Iran’s promise to transfer its enriched uranium to Turkey was not conditioned upon obtaining guarantees from the West to provide it with nuclear fuel in exchange. He noted that Iran does not need to agree to the West’s proposal at any cost just to lead the negotiations with it out of the dead end. Tavakoli expressed his concern that the West would not fulfill its part of the bargain and continue to demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment, and that Turkey might refuse to give back the enriched uranium to Iran under pressure from the West. Tavakoli also warned against the strengthening of Turkey’s regional status at the expense of Iran’s following the agreement. Regarding the Majles’ position on the agreement, Tavakoli said that the Majles does not object to the Western proposal, but only under certain conditions: transferring the uranium only after the West provides Iran with some of the nuclear fuel, swapping the enriched uranium for nuclear fuel in several stages and not all at once, and suspending the sanctions imposed on Iran. He noted that the president must present the agreement to the Majles and explain why he chose to agree to the West’s proposal. According to Tavakoli, the agreement shows that, like former president Khatami, Ahmadinejad is not immune to pressure (Fars, May 17).

Criticism was also voiced by the conservative daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami, affiliated with the chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. An editorial titled “Victory or Retreat” states that the agreement is a withdrawal from the conditions set by the Supreme Leader for accepting the Western proposal: uranium enrichment on Iranian soil, simultaneous exchange of enriched uranium for nuclear fuel, and letting Iran decide on the quantities of enriched uranium and nuclear fuel exchange under the agreement according to its needs. What is more, the proposal accepted by Iran is worse than previous proposals it had rejected, since under the new proposal Iran is required to transfer 80 percent of its enriched uranium in exchange for 120 kg of nuclear fuel, when under previous proposals it was only required to transfer 75 percent of its uranium in exchange for 200 kg of nuclear fuel. It is not clear, the article says, why Iran needs the agreement given its ability to enrich uranium to 20 percent according to its needs. The agreement is therefore a withdrawal rather than a victory, and Iran must not accept it (Jomhuri-ye Eslami, May 18).

Subsidies to be phased out: subsidy reform trial launched
in three provinces starting this week

President Ahmadinejad has announced this week that the subsidy policy reform will start in the second half of the current Iranian year (fall 2010). In an interview to a TV channel in southern Iran, the president said that the reform is Iran’s biggest economic program for the past 50 years, and that it will lead to resource conservation and a more just distribution of the country’s revenues.

The president said that the annual energy consumption in Iran is now about 100 billion dollars, four times the world average. Removing the subsidies, the president said, will make it possible to considerably reduce energy consumption and increase investments in development projects. According to Ahmadinejad, the government will deposit the welfare payments in the accounts of Iranian citizens who are supposed to receive them under the subsidy policy reform, two months prior to the launch of the reform and after the government has gathered the necessary data. He expressed hope that the implementation of the program will not lead to any negative consequences (various news agencies, May 13).

Meanwhile, Welfare Minister Sadeq Mahsouli announced last week that a subsidy reform trial will be launched this week in three provinces: Ilam, North Khorasan, and Gilan. As part of the reform trial, residents of those three provinces were asked to register online and give their bank account details to receive the funds they are entitled to under the reform. The minister unveiled a special website (www.refahi.ir) created for the reform implementation, which allows residents to give their bank account information. According to Mahsouli, residents can only give their bank account details through the Internet—those without Internet access at home can register at government Internet service centers located in the various cities and villages. Registration instructions will be issued in the coming days through Iran’s official TV.

Mahsouli added that 95 percent of households that have filled out the necessary forms for the subsidy policy reform already have a bank account required for the government deposit. Those who have not yet opened a bank account must do so within the next two weeks at any bank in the country (various news agencies, May 15).

According to the subsidy policy reform, which will be implemented gradually over the course of five years, the government subsidies currently given to all Iranians for fuel, natural gas, electricity, water, and bread will be removed. They will be replaced by welfare payments in cash to those in need, according to data provided this past year by Iranian citizens to the state authorities. Iran’s current subsidy policy has been the target of strong criticism both by Iranian politicians and economists and by international financial institutions. Relative to GDP, Iran’s subsidies are among the highest in the world, leading to numerous negative consequences, such as over-consumption, waste of energy resources, and inefficiency in economic production processes.

The homepage of the website (www.refahi.ir)
The homepage of the website (www.refahi.ir)

Despite the broad-based agreement on the need for a reform, this past year Iranian politicians and economists have expressed concerns that a hasty implementation of the reform will lead to a sharp increase in inflation and will deliver an even more severe blow to the weak segments of society. In recent months, the implementation of the reform plan (which has already been approved by the Majles and the Guardian Council) has been the subject of a fierce political debate between the government and the Majles. However, the two bodies have recently reached a compromise allowing the government to start the implementation of the program.

Recent data on AIDS in Iran: increase in AIDS spread through unprotected sex

Last week, Iran’s Health Ministry published recent data on the number of AIDS cases in Iran. According to the data, nearly 21 thousand Iranians are diagnosed with the disease, 92.6 percent of whom are men and 7.4 percent are women. Nearly 40 percent of AIDS patients are aged 25 to 34. Over 3600 people have died from the disease so far.

The Health Ministry data also shows that the disease was contracted through infected needles in 69.8 percent of cases, sexual intercourse in 8.9 percent of cases, infected blood transfusions in 1.2 percent of cases, mother to child HIV transmission in 0.6 percent of cases, and undiagnosed causes in 19.5 percent of cases. The causes of infection appear to be changing, and the Health Ministry data suggests that about 18 percent of those diagnosed with the disease in the past year contracted it through unprotected sex. No new cases of AIDS infection through blood transfusions have been reported this year (Mehr, May 6).

The Health Ministry data supports the assessment of Iranian health experts, according to which there has been a change in AIDS transmission patterns in Iran, and that compared to previous years, most reported new cases involve unprotected sex rather than using infected needles by drug addicts or infected blood transfusions.

http://portal.intranet.behdasht.gov.ir
http://portal.intranet.behdasht.gov.ir

According to various estimates, the actual number of AIDS cases in Iran is considerably higher than official data suggests, and may be as high as 60 to 100 thousand. In recent years, Iranian experts have warned about a third possible AIDS outbreak in the country as a result of unsafe sex and low public awareness. The first outbreak of the disease occurred in 1986, when several patients received infected blood transfusions imported to Iran. The second outbreak occurred in 1995 and mostly affected drug addicts. The authorities’ awareness of the need to fight the disease and their recognition of dangerous sexual behavior as a significant cause of AIDS contraction in Iran have significantly increased in recent years. For years, officials claimed that blood transfusions and infected needles were the only causes of transmission. There are currently several dozen safe sex counseling center in Iran; however, without adequate health education, many in Iran are still unaware of those centers.

Fight against reformist opposition leaders takes to video games

In recent weeks, several bloggers and news agencies have reported a new video game called “The Battle against the Leaders of Incitement”, recently released on CD in Esfahan Province. The purpose of the game is to hit the three reformist opposition leaders (Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karoubi, and Mohammad Khatami) by using fighter jets. The player controlling the fighter jet has to evade missiles launched at him by opposition leaders.

It is unclear who is responsible for creating and distributing the game. Aftab News agency reported, however, that the production and distribution of audio and video equipment—mostly in the provinces—is monitored by the internal security services (Aftab News, May 11).

The background music for the game is a song called “My Schoolmate” (Yar-e Dabestani-ye man), considered one of the most popular protest songs of the reformist student movement in Iran. Bloggers affiliated with government supporters recommended the game and even posted a download link for it. One of the bloggers, Agha Jun Salam (http://mahroz.parsiblog.com), who recommended the game as well, defined the three opposition leaders as Iran’s enemies, posing a serious threat to the country, seeking to eliminate the Islamic republic, and being worse than the infidels

http://nofuzi.blogfa.com/post-44.aspx
http://nofuzi.blogfa.com/post-44.aspx

It is not the first time that video games are used for political purposes in Iran. In recent years, the authorities have also stepped up their involvement in distributing video games. In February 2009, it was reported that the Institute for the Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults (IIDCYA) was planning to establish centers for online video games where young people could play Iranian-made games. The establishment of such centers is designed to make it easier for the authorities to deal with the numerous unlicensed and unmonitored video game centers operating in the country, providing access to imported video games at least some of which fail to meet proper Islamic criteria.

In 2006, the Cultural Revolution Supreme Council decided to establish the National Foundation for Video Games. Supervised by the Islamic Guidance Ministry, the foundation publishes lists of “improper” video games, including games that contain violence, sex, alcohol and drug use, offense to Muslims and Islam, spreading secular views, and so forth. The establishment of the foundation is designed to make it possible to plan and supervise all the activities pertaining to the cultural, artistic, and technical aspects of video game production in Iran.

The authorities’ use of video games to promote the regime’s objectives is evident, for example, in the distribution of a video game about the Islamic revolution, whose development was announced in early 2009, or the distribution of a game called “Special Ops” about the Iranian nuclear program (summer of 2007). That game has eight levels and follows the attempt of a commander in Iran’s special intelligence forces to save two nuclear scientists captured by the US in Iraq.

Pictures of the week: killer of shah’s last prime minister
returns to Iran on release from French prison

This week, France has released from prison Ali Vakili Rad, an Iranian national who in 1991 assassinated Iran’s former prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar, the last prime minister under the shah’s regime, escaped to France in 1979 and was killed at his Paris residence by a squad consisting of three assassins dispatched by the Iranian Intelligence Ministry. Two of the assassins, Mohammad Azadi and Faridoun Boyer-Ahmadi, managed to escape through Switzerland. Vakili Rad was caught in Switzerland, extradited to France, and sentenced to life in December 1994.

Vakili Rad’s release came two days after the release of French citizen Clotilde Reiss, a teacher held in Iran on charges of espionage since July 2009. About two weeks ago, France freed another Iranian citizen whose extradition was demanded by the US for the alleged illegal purchases of electronic equipment from American companies, for military use. The governments of France and Iran denied that the release of the two Iranian citizens and the French citizen were part of a prisoner swap.

No comments:

The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk