The Qatari code of silence

WikiLeaks documents prove that the U.S. has known for years that Qatar has been bankrolling Hamas • Tiny Persian Gulf state's involvement in recent Israel-Hamas conflict has managed to turn it into major player in international politics.

Boaz Bismuth and Eli Leon

Former Emir of Qatar Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani with Hamas political leader Khaled Mashaal in 2002 | Photo credit: Reuters

The emirate of Qatar has rightfully "earned" the headlines it has been generating since the onset of Operation Protective Edge. Qatar, a dot on the global map and a bubble of natural gas, which happens to have a vote in the United Nations, managed to position itself as a major player in the Middle East. Its cease-fire proposal, which has the backing of Turkey and the blessing of Hamas, even got the Americans excited.

The irony, however, is that Qatar is part of the problem created by Hamas, and not the solution. The levels of monstrosity demonstrated by Hamas during this current conflict can be, to a significant extent, credited to Qatar. The Gulf emirate with the bottomless wallet it seems, funds more than just museums, universities, and soccer teams -- it also bankrolls extremist Islamic terrorist organizations.

Does this make Qatar immune to terrorist attacks? That is a good question. In the meantime, the Muslim Brotherhood can only welcome the Qatari support of Hamas, while we are left to wonder how the free world failed to notice the fact that the firefighter is also the one fanning the flames.

The accusations made against Qatar by government officials in Jerusalem over the years have not been entirely baseless, as we have recently learned. Diplomatic correspondence leaked to WikiLeaks revealed the extent of the ties between the Qatari government and terrorist organizations, proving that it has been funneling cash to Hamas, Hezbollah, and even al-Qaida for years.

The protocol of hearings held by a congressional committee of inquiry that probed the circumstances leading up to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks show that Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, who was thought to be the mastermind behind the attacks, traveled to Qatar with his family after fighting in the conflict in Bosnia in 1992.

After a short stay in Pakistan, Mohammed moved to Qatar, on the recommendation of an official who at the time served as the minister of Islamic affairs. During his stay, Mohammed oversaw a number of engineering projects in the Qatari Energy and Water Ministry.

Despite his frequent trips abroad, which were devoted to planning jihadist-motivated terror attacks, Mohammed kept his position in the Qatari government until he was smuggled into Afghanistan in 1996 with the assistance of that same minister. Qatar helped Mohammed flee after the United States issued a warrant for his arrest over his involvement in terrorism, including his role in the first attack on the World Trade Center back in 1993.

Mohammed was alleged to have transferred money to the bank account of Mohammed Salameh, one of the men who planned the attack. The man who initiated the plot was Ramzi Yousef, Mohammed's nephew.

In a communique written up by the American embassy in Doha dated March 24, 2009, diplomats noted that Qatar's importance as a regional transit hub was growing thanks to the new international airport that was constructed in the emirate. U.S. embassy staff predicted that Doha would serve as a conduit of illicit goods and technology as it is transported throughout the region. The American diplomats believed there was a chance for renewed U.S.-Qatari cooperation in combating illegal smuggling, given that most of the smugglers were not Qatari nationals.

According to the documents obtained by WikiLeaks, Qatar's fingerprints could be found on numerous terrorist plots worldwide, not all of them related to Islamic extremism. The papers indicate that on numerous instances, North Korea smuggled technology through Qatari Airways, a serious violation that explicitly contravenes international sanctions that have been placed on the communist dictatorship. It was claimed at the time that the Qataris lacked the necessary experience and training to adequately deal with these smuggling attempts, even though they certainly had the money to fund an effective security apparatus for just such a task.

'We don't totally understand'

The WikiLeaks cables reported that U.S.-Qatari cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts was "at a low level, despite the improvement." American diplomats noted that Qatar would continue to act as an "inconsistent" partner in the struggle against terrorist funding, and that it would only take action if prodded.

Qatar, the document noted, has "reservations" about the war against the funding of terrorism "for reasons that we don't totally understand." The Americans believed that Qatar was hesitant to offer its full cooperation in the campaign to clamp down on terrorist funding for fear that it would encourage extremist organizations to target it in the future."

The cable noted that due to its enormous wealth and small land mass, Qatar would never serve as a focal point of jihadist activity. Still, Qatari citizens are permitted to financially contribute to terrorist causes, and the Qatari government's hands are tied in forbidding such activity.

Another U.S. embassy dispatch, dated March 5, 2009, includes a protocol of a conversation between Qatar's top prosecutor and the American ambassador to Doha. The two men discussed the vulnerable state of American military personnel, whose presence in Qatar made them a target for terrorists. The American envoy is quoted as telling the Qatari official, Dr. Ali al-Marri, that his planned meeting with the U.S. attorney general would be postponed until the Qatari and U.S. governments drew up an "effective" plan for anti-terror cooperation.

Another cable references a media report which stated that the Qatari government permitted a former inmate at Guantanamo Bay to depart Qatar and visit Britain, where authorities had him arrested despite explicit commitments by Qatar not to permit him to leave its soil. American embassy officials believed that the Qatari attorney-general was personally involved in permitting the former prisoner, Jarallah al-Marri, to leave the country.

In response, the U.S. diplomats offered their recommendation that Attorney-General Eric Holder refuse to meet with his Qatari counterpart in light of the high probability that the Qatari government deliberately concealed information about al-Marri's departure from the country. After another inquiry, it was learned that al-Marri visited Britain on another occasion.

The numerous cables and dispatches point to one indisputable conclusion -- the Americans clearly knew of Qatar's involvement in funding terrorism and did nothing about it, displaying complete indifference even though they had the information in their hands. This was initially discovered during the George W. Bush administration, and the situation has persisted during the two-term presidency of Barack Obama.

Another diplomatic cable mentioned the "Qatar Charitable Society," an organization that is considered the largest fundraising body in the emirate and which has offices in the Palestinian Authority. After 9/11, the American Treasury and the FBI reached the conclusion that the organization maintained ties with al-Qaida, and that it served as a front for terrorist organizations.

Another communique offers details of a meeting between Chase Untermeyer, the American ambassador to Qatar, and Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim al-Thani, and his entourage. The meeting took place on Dec. 1, 2005. The Qatari foreign minister was reminded by the American diplomat of his government's obligation to financially assist the Palestinian Authority. The foreign minister replied that Doha had sent to Ramallah 100 "military vehicles."

The Qataris mentioned that they were interested in opening up a bank that would operate in PA-controlled areas. They were also interested in pushing forward a railroad project that would link Gaza and the West Bank. The foreign minister said that he would travel to the Gaza Strip in January 2006, and that Hamas should be permitted to take part in the upcoming elections.

The Americans knew of the warm ties that Qatar's leadership fostered with Hamas. In a communique dated Feb. 15, 2006, the U.S. embassy reported a three-hour meeting which took place between the emir of Qatar and Hamas' political leader Khaled Mashaal. As the Qatari foreign minister described the meeting to the Americans, Mashaal was treated to a lecture on diplomacy and international relations by the emir. The Qatari foreign minister predicted that Mashaal would be named prime minister after the elections in the Palestinian Authority.

"The U.S. is not our enemy," Mashaal is quoted as saying by the emir of Qatar. The Hamas chief told his Qatari interlocutor that the Islamist group would cooperate with PA President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah movement in the establishment of a unity government, which was supposed to include a female minister as well as a representative of the Christian community. Hamas would not be invited to take part in the government.

A diplomatic cable dated Feb. 26, 2006, reports the contents of a conversation between Karen Hughes, Bush's undersecretary of state for public diplomacy; the Qatari foreign minister; and the wife of the emir of Qatar, Mozah bint Nasser. The two Qatari dignitaries tried to explain to Hughes that the U.S. was wasting its time in Iraq.

"What you should try to do is start a good story, and you have the chance in Palestine," Nasser told Hughes. "It could change your image in the Arab world. I've been hearing the rhetoric about Hamas. But you have to try them, to give them a chance. His Highness [the emir] is a big friend of Hamas and can play a great role there. At least Hamas will be trusted on the Arab street."

Another cable dated Nov. 6, 2007, mentions the low-key commercial ties between Israel and Qatar, and how that relationship seemingly contradicts Qatar's warmth and hospitality toward Mashaal.

By pledging economic aid to either Fatah or Hamas, depending on which Palestinian faction won the elections, Qatar succeeded in persuading Hamas to take part in them. Its performance in the elections catapulted the Islamist organization to power and paved the way for its seizing control of the Gaza Strip the following year.

After Hamas' victory, the U.S. government asked Qatar to sever its financial ties with Hamas, which Washington classifies as a terrorist organization. The emir refused, insisting on keeping his word to Mashaal.

Another U.S. diplomatic communique that was obtained by WikiLeaks read: "If we put aside the personal views of the emir, a large percentage of Qataris do not accept the fact that Hamas is a terrorist group, and they are continuing to assist the organization."

A cable written on Dec. 21, 2009, is devoted to a visit by the Qatari prime minister, Hamed bin Jasmin al-Thani, to Washington. The Qatari premier promised American officials to extend financial assistance to the PA. In his discussions with then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the prime minister even agreed to bring up Qatar's ties to the Hamas leadership, which Doha viewed as critical in its efforts to bring about a stable, lasting peace in the Middle East.

As per the language of the cable, the Qataris refused to consider cutting off contacts with Hamas. After the emir of Qatar was asked by the Bush administration to support the 2006 elections, the emir believed it would be disrespectful to isolate Hamas after it convinced the organization's leadership to participate in elections that were supported by the U.S.

The document also noted the growing importance of American-Qatari cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism, with a special emphasis on Washington's concerns over the assistance that Qatar provides to Hamas by means of its charitable organizations.

The emir's speech in Lebanon

The U.S. was quite disturbed over the moral support lent to Hamas by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, who for years conducted his activities from Qatar before returning to Egypt in 2011. A communique dated Nov. 25, 2009, refers to a Qatari response to questions submitted by American treasury officials regarding al-Qardawi.

The American envoy warned the Qatari foreign minister of the damage that was likely to be incurred by the Islamic Bank and the Qatari economic sector due to the government's support for al-Qardawi, who himself was involved in the financial sector. The American ambassador tried to persuade the Qatari government to strip al-Qardawi of his financial holdings, but the Qatari minister replied that al-Qardawi "doesn't work like a terrorist." The minister then drew a distinction between censoring al-Qardawi's statements and "sending the wrong message regarding financial standards." American officials believe that al-Qardawi had ties with the banking sector, and that he utilized those ties in order to funnel aid to Hamas.

Iran also merits mention in the WikiLeaks documents regarding Qatar's ties to terrorism. A cable dispatch that was dated Nov. 19, 2009 noted the Qatari government's intention to improve relations with Iran, with whom it shares one of the world's largest natural gas fields. According to the cable, American diplomats anticipated that Qatar would continue to support "problematic" elements like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria while at the same time working to cultivate and strengthen its relations with the U.S. and its neighbors. To this end, Qatar would use the Al-Jazeera network as an unofficial tool to advance its foreign policy, the communique noted.

The U.S. diplomatic cables reveal that Qatar worked to sabotage international intervention against terrorism on many occasions. Acting at the behest of Kuwait, the Qataris used their position on the U.N. Security Council to thwart an investigation against three figures involved in financing terrorist organizations. Qatar also teamed up with Russia in preventing an inquiry into a member of the Syrian Baath Party who was suspected of providing financial assistance to al-Qaida. The Qataris were apparently worried about the sensitivity of the matter given their relationship with Syria.

One particularly intriguing cable, which was dated Aug. 22, 2006, details the Qatari emir's visit to Lebanon during the Second Lebanon War. After seeing firsthand the areas in south Beirut that were bombarded by Israel, the emir held a joint press conference with the Lebanese president, Emile Lahoud.

"The Lebanese people and the Lebanese resistance achieved the first Arab victory, which is something we have yearned for," the emir is quoted as saying. The emir reiterated his opposition to the demand that Hezbollah decommission its weapons, which he believed would make Lebanon an easy target for Israel. "That," the emir said, "is inconceivable."

Up until Operation Protective Edge, Qatar managed to continue playing its double game. For years, it has hosted Israeli diplomats on its territory, while at the same time it has strengthened economic and political ties with Hamas and it has also urged Mauritania to cut off ties with Israel. This is an emirate that has managed to come out looking clean in the eyes of both Iran and the U.S.

That may sound strange, but the WikiLeaks cables prove that it is not entirely illogical.