Doc's Talk: Experts Weigh How Gaza Fighting May End

Friday, January 02, 2009

Experts Weigh How Gaza Fighting May End

ROBERT SIEGEL, host:

Where is the fighting in Gaza actually leading and how could it end - reoccupation by Israel, the collapse of Hamas, a new ceasefire or an end to both Israeli closure of Gaza and also to Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel? Well, for every one of those hypothetical resolutions of this crisis, there is something highly implausible or inherently unstable. So, given today's realities how might it end? Well, that question now for three observers of the region, a former American diplomat, and Israeli and a Palestinian-American. First, from Jerusalem, former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, Dore Gold. Dore Gold describe an end to the Gaza fighting for us. All Things Considered: December 31, 2008

ROBERT SIEGEL, host:

Where is the fighting in Gaza actually leading and how could it end - reoccupation by Israel, the collapse of Hamas, a new ceasefire or an end to both Israeli closure of Gaza and also to Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel? Well, for every one of those hypothetical resolutions of this crisis, there is something highly implausible or inherently unstable. So, given today's realities how might it end? Well, that question now for three observers of the region, a former American diplomat, and Israeli and a Palestinian-American. First, from Jerusalem, former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, Dore Gold. Dore Gold describe an end to the Gaza fighting for us.

Mr. DORE GOLD (Former Israeli Ambassador, United Nations): Let's take the - to clear goals of the State of Israel, to bring a halt to seven years of indiscriminate rocket fire on Israeli cities. To obtain goal if the Hamas leadership decides that they just can't get away with it any longer, that Israel will use its right to defend itself. We'll use air power and if need be, we'll use ground forces to disarm them and hopefully, their leadership will take the decision to halt the operations.

SIEGEL: Can you imagine an outcome of this conflict? In order to achieve a stable ceasefire that involves negotiations between Israel and Hamas and an inevitable recognition of Hamas's status in Gaza.

Mr. GOLD: Well, there are, you know, two different levels of how Israel can communicate with Hamas. One is, it can do what it's been doing, that is through an intermediary to send a message to Hamas about the terms of our understanding. But I think we have to draw a distinction between third-party contact with Hamas and one in which we legitimize Hamas and legitimize Hamas rule. That has huge implications not just for Israel but for the whole Middle East. Remember, Hamas is the Palestinian division of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest opposition force in Egypt. Legitimizing Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip has implications for the future stability of the Egyptian government. And the same is true in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan where there's a huge Muslim Brotherhood presence. And should Hamas become legitimized in Gaza, what would that do for the future stability of the Jordanian Kingdom? I think in fact, many countries in the Arab world who are publicly objecting to Israel's self-defense operations are privately - when the doors are closed - rooting for Israel and hoping Israel puts a real damper at Hamas's capabilities because they themselves have problems with the radical Islamist groups in their own countries.

SIEGEL: Thank you very much for talking with us.

Mr. GOLD: My pleasure.

SIEGEL: Dore Gold is the former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations. We also spoke with retired U.S. Ambassador Edward Djerejian. He now directs the Baker Institute for Public Affairs at Rice University. He was U.S. Ambassador both to Israel and to Syria. Djerejian says it's important for the U.S. administration to become immediately involved in Middle East peacemaking. He's very dubious about the prospects of Israel quieting the rockets of Gaza through military force, and he says a key player in a positive outcome of all this would be the Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen or Mahmoud Abbas.

Mr. EDWARD DJEREJIAN (Director, Baker Institute for Public Affairs, Rice University, U.S.): Everything has to be done now to assure that he has the necessary security forces, the necessary economic assistance, humanitarian assistance that he has shown to be - to the Palestinian people - the solution. And that resistance is not the solution that is Hamas and Hezbollah's model that the pathway is only through armed resistance. It is my firm conviction that the majority of Palestinians want to see a negotiated peaceful settlement. But that when nothing is accomplished on the ground and we have these recurrent incidents, groups like Hamas and Hezbollah hold sway over Arab public opinion as we're seeing throughout the Arab world. There are demonstrations against established governments in place, against the United States, against Israel.

SIEGEL: Could the credibility of Mahmoud Abbas with the Palestinians, could it survive the appearance of him stepping to the fore because of this Israeli military action? And wouldn't he risk being seen as somebody who is the Palestinian preferred by the Israelis and the Americans for that matter, the Saudis and the Egyptians rather than necessarily by the Palestinians themselves?

Mr. DJEREJIAN: Yes. That's a very real danger, and it's occurring now as it has again in the past when the conflict has risen and there are a lot of casualties. The people who are representing the pathway towards a negotiated settlement are seen as being too accommodating to Israel, and they risk their political stature and position. We're already seeing inclinations of that, it's not only Abu Mazen, but it's also being attack by some, but mostly the other Arab states, like Egypt and President Mubarak, the Saudis and others. And then the more militant countries like Syria and Iran are seen as more faithful to the cause. And that is a political risk that you've pointed out that's real.

SIEGEL: Edward Djerejian, thanks a lot for talking with us today.

Mr. DJEREJIAN: Very welcome.

SIEGEL: That's former U.S. Ambassador Edward Djerejian. Now to Professor Rashid Khalidi, who is the Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University. Rashid Khalidi, how might the fighting in Gaza end? Whats an endgame that you foresee?

Professor RASHID KHALIDI (Modern Arab Studies, Columbia University): Well, there will eventually be a ceasefire, the only question is how much suffering will be inflicted on the people of Gaza before it comes about and what will be the conditions, and in particular, will the blockade of a million and half people in Gaza be lifted as a condition of it? The last calm which lasted for the better part of six months and broke down in the last few weeks did not include the lifting of the blockade and that's a major reason why this thing foundered.

SIEGEL: Can you foresee a conclusion to all this with Hamas still governing and being in charge of security in Gaza?

Prof. KHALIDI: Most analysts - Israeli, Arabs, and others - have agreed that Hamas has been probably been strengthened by these attacks. Hamas was unpopular in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip because of its stubbornness and that in fact - and failing to come to a national accord between them. The firing of rockets out of Gaza was not popular with the Gazans or with other Palestinians. But the Israeli attack has caused people to rally around the ideas that the Palestinians are under attack not just Hamas, and so Hamas has benefited from that.

SIEGEL: Ambassador Djerejian feels that the person who should be strengthened from the U.S. standpoint in all of this is Mahmood Abbas, Abu Mazen. Can you imagine him remaining or emerging as a credible figure on behalf of the Palestinians here?

Prof. KHALIDI: I mean, Israel always had it in its power to strengthen Fatah and the P.A. leadership. They systematically undermined them by continuing to raid in the West Bank, by continuing to refuse to release enough prisoners or lift the 600 some-odd checkpoints in the West Bank. These things have undermined Mahmoud Abbas who has failed to obtain even the slightest concessions from Israel in the eyes of most Palestinians, and who's a pretty much thoroughly discredited figure. So, no, I don't think that that is a likely outcome of this, unless and until Israel does some of these things which it's steadfastly refused to do. I'm not even speaking of loosening the ever-tightening bonds of the occupation or the ongoing, unceasing expansion of the settlements.

SIEGEL: Professor Khalidi, thank you very much for talking with us.

Prof. KHALIDI: You're most welcome, Robert.

SIEGEL: That's Professor Rashid Khalidi of Columbia University. We also spoke with retired U.S. Ambassador Edward Djerejian, and also with Dore Gold, the former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations.

Copyright ©2007 National Public Radio®..

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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