Doc's Talk: Implications of the Gaza Conflict

Wednesday, January 07, 2009

Implications of the Gaza Conflict

Michael Singh

The breakdown of the tenuous and ill-fated ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and Israel's subsequent incursion into the Gaza Strip not only pose a challenge to the outgoing and incoming U.S. administrations but also mark a portentous moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the clash may end in a stalemate, it could also alter the political dynamics in the Levant, depending on developments on the ground and the terms of an eventual ceasefire.. On one hand, a perceived victory for Hamas could strengthen its domestic position, ease its international isolation, and increase the regional influence of its backers in Damascus and Tehran. On the other hand, concerted action by regional states and the international community could yield a sustainable ceasefire that weakens Hamas, strengthens the Palestinian Authority (PA), and boosts prospects for eventual peace diplomacy while ameliorating the regional dynamics that contributed to the outbreak of violence.

Achieving a Sustainable Ceasefire

Whatever tactical course it plots, Israel harbors no illusions about the trap Hamas is setting for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza. Hamas will likely emulate Hizballah's 2006 tactics of withstanding the Israeli onslaught, inflicting as many casualties as possible on the IDF, all the while sheltering its forces in populated areas in a cynical effort to increase civilian casualties. With these actions, Hamas will likely seek to score a strategic victory -- even if it suffers a tactical loss -- by bringing international opprobrium on Israel, further undermining the PA, and forcing a ceasefire that will increase the group's legitimacy, break its isolation, and give it room to rebuild for the next round of fighting.

To forestall such an outcome, Israel must seek a ceasefire that corrects the shortcomings of the previous "calm": namely, the lack of consequences for Hamas's frequent ceasefire violations, inadequate provisions to prevent the smuggling of arms into Gaza, and the implicit reinforcement of Hamas's hold on the Strip through the absence of any PA role in the arrangement.

Three elements will be critical to achieving such a ceasefire. First, Arab states must press Hamas to stand down. This will require them to show fortitude in the face of domestic protests and verbal attacks by leaders such as Hizballah chief Hassan Nasrallah. Particularly important in this regard will be Egypt; as Israel's standing intermediary with Hamas, Egypt will play a key role in negotiating a ceasefire, and as the only country besides Israel that borders Gaza, it will also play a central role in an agreement's enforcement. Cairo will need to use its influence with Hamas leaders and its leverage as the sole route in and out of the Strip to compel the group to accept and respect a more durable ceasefire. Egypt's incentives for doing so are strong: an escalation of the Hamas-Israel conflict may cause an influx of Gazan refugees across the border, a potential source of instability for Egypt.

Second, the international community will need to take a disciplined approach to the ceasefire negotiations and stand firmly behind the resulting agreement and assist in its enforcement. Active U.S. diplomacy will be needed to avoid a misguided wave of European and Arab outreach to Hamas, which would reward the group for its violence by easing its isolation. Washington will also need to press its allies to avoid equating the actions of Hamas, which rejected a renewed ceasefire and has targeted civilians indiscriminately, with those of Israel, which is responding to Hamas's attacks and has been taking care to minimize civilian casualties. Allowing Hamas's actions to go unpunished, or even worse, allowing the group to improve its position as a result of them, would give succor to terrorists worldwide.

Once a ceasefire is reached, international support will be required to ensure its enforcement. Although international monitoring of the ceasefire has been suggested, it is not evident that this step would be apt. Monitoring is useful in preventing misunderstanding or building confidence between two parties who are otherwise committed to a ceasefire, but it is unlikely that it would have a significant effect on the calculations of a terrorist group such as Hamas. Instead, the international community's role in enforcement should focus on assisting Egypt, the PA, and Israel in countering the smuggling of weapons into Gaza. An effective countersmuggling approach will need to encompass measures to both detect and prevent the movement of weapons as well as steps to punish states or entities involved in supplying or transporting them to Hamas.

Finally, a sustainable ceasefire must bolster the PA's role in Gaza. Even a tough ceasefire formally negotiated between Israel and Hamas could have the perverse effect of tightening the group's de facto control of the Strip. This can be avoided by involving the PA in both ceasefire negotiations and enforcement, for example by taking up Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's proposal to hand control of the Rafah crossing to the PA. Military action alone cannot achieve peace in Gaza; steps to restore a government in Gaza dedicated to coexistence with Israel will be vital to long-term stability in the region.

Looking Beyond a Ceasefire

Once the fighting has stopped and a ceasefire is in place, the broader challenges raised by Hamas's actions will need to be addressed by the United States, Israel, and responsible Arab states, whose interests in this regard largely coincide.

First, greater focus will need to be placed on elements of the peace process other than the political negotiations that command the lion's share of diplomatic attention. If the PA is to ward off Hamas in the West Bank and resume its rule in Gaza, the PA must have in place effective economic, political, and security institutions. Likewise, the Gaza experience will increase Israel's reluctance to make territorial or other concessions that could expose even larger numbers of its citizens to rocket attacks emanating from the West Bank. Israel and the PA will need to seek cooperative arrangements that ease this threat while avoiding any infringement on future Palestinian sovereignty.

Second, Arab states must reject efforts by groups such as Hamas and Hizballah to practice both politics and terrorism. These groups have exploited the state for their purposes -- participating in elections to gain influence and leverage -- while undermining the state by openly challenging its leaders and institutions. Arab leaders should cut off financial flows to such groups and deny terrorist leaders official audiences or visas. On the flip side, in the face of extremist challenges Arab states should step up efforts to support leaders such as PA president Mahmoud Abbas and Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora both diplomatically and financially.

Finally, the conflict in Gaza should give new impetus to international efforts to isolate Iran and Syria. Iran provides arms and funding to both Hizballah and Hamas, which in pursuing their own agendas also satisfy Tehran's to the detriment of both Israel and its Arab neighbors. Arab states -- as well as the international community -- must hold the Iranian regime accountable for its efforts to destabilize the region by more vigorously participating in U.S.-led sanctions efforts. For its part, the Obama administration, if it goes ahead with plans to engage with Tehran, will need to avoid the diplomatic trap of negotiating with Tehran over security in the Levant, thereby ceding to the Iranian regime the hegemonic influence to which it aspires.

Michael Singh is a Boston-based associate fellow at The Washington Institute and former senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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