Doc's Talk: Iranian Support of Hamas

Sunday, January 18, 2009

Iranian Support of Hamas

IICC

Overview

1. Israel 's disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 created a new situation which accelerated the establishment of the area controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It enabled it to translate its increased power on the ground into gains in internal Palestinian politics was well. It won a landslide victory in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, formed a government in March 2006, and took over the Gaza Strip by force in June 2007, neutralizing Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.

Iranian Support of Hamas

Iranian Support of Hamas

Ismail Haniya, prime minister of the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, and Iranian Leader Khamenei (Iranian TV, December 10 2006).

Ismail Haniya and Iranian president Ahmadinejad (Islamic Republic News Agency, December 10, 2006 ).

Overview

1. Israel 's disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 created a new situation which accelerated the establishment of the area controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It enabled it to translate its increased power on the ground into gains in internal Palestinian politics was well. It won a landslide victory in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, formed a government in March 2006, and took over the Gaza Strip by force in June 2007, neutralizing Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.

2. Following its takeover of the Gaza Strip, Hamas established a radical Islamist entity which is still being formed. The Hamas entity, with Iranian and Syrian support, conducts its own internal and foreign policies, wages a continual terrorist campaign against Israel , and is seriously at odds with Egypt and pro-Western Arab countries. In addition, it is isolated in the international arena and increasingly separated from the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria , led by Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah.

3. After Israel 's disengagement, and more intensely in the year preceding Operation Cast Lead, Hamas accelerated its military buildup . One of its objectives was to make it possible to continue its strategy of terrorism (“resistance”) against Israel by using, at this stage, rockets as its main weapons (inspired by the achievements of Hezbollah strategy Israel during the second Lebanon war). Another was to give Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip defensive capabilities which would enable their military forces to survive, deter Israel from taking action in the Gaza Strip, and make it difficult to take it over or conquer parts of it. 1

4. Because of its internal and external difficulties, which increased after its military takeover of the Gaza Strip, Hamas had even greater need of external strategic support to ensure its political survival and advance its military buildup. Its natural choice was the Iranian-Syrian axis . Since the beginning of the second Palestinian terrorist campaign (the second intifada) in October 2000, Iran and Syria had provided extensive support for Hamas and Palestinian terrorism in general. 2 In addition, although Hamas is Sunni Muslim and Iran is Shi'ite, they shared a broad common denominator: the perception that terrorism (“resistance”) was the main Palestinian strategic tool, both objected to the Israeli-Palestinian Authority negotiations (the Annapolis process) and both had long-standing, deeply rooted hostility toward the United States and the West. 3

5. Iran , for its part, has a clear strategic interest for helping Hamas reinforce its control of the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that Hamas, as opposed to Hezbollah, is not willing to fully subordinate itself to Iranian dictates. For Iran , a radical Islamic entity in the Gaza Strip is an important strategic asset against Israel 's southern border, in conjunction with the threat posed by Hezbollah along Israel 's northern border. In both cases, Iran regards using rockets as an effective way of exhausting Israel 's home front, both routinely and during a future regional crisis. Therefore, it has established large rocket arsenals for Hezbollah and Hamas, at the same time has developed their military capabilities, although at different quality levels (for Iran , Hezbollah is clearly preferable to Hamas).

6. Moreover, Iran regards Hezbollah (which has gained considerable political influence in Lebanon ) and Hamas (which took over the Gaza Strip and gained influence in the Palestinian Authority) as two important sources of power which it can use to promote its strategic goals, at the center of which is its striving toward regional hegemony . Using Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Iranian-Syrian axis can increase its influence in the Arab and Muslim world, pose a serious challenge to Mahmoud Abbas, harm the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and export the Iranian brand of radical Islam to other Sunni countries, especially Egypt (which regards Hamas control over the Gaza Strip as an Iranian threat to Egypt and the entire region). From the Iranian point of view, its sponsorship of Hamas is considered as a means of establishing an Iranian foothold in the heart of the Sunni world

7. The meeting of interests between Hamas , Iran and Syria led, over the past two years, to massive Iranian support for Hamas (and Syria , where the “external” Hamas leadership has settled). Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei is personally involved in directing the strategic support provided to Hamas by Iran . In practice, support is provided by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, headed by Qassem Suleimani , 4 and by Iran 's Ministry of Intelligence and Security, headed by intelligence minister Mouhsen Hussein Azahi .

Iranian Channel 1 TV, March 18, 2007
Right: Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani, Qods Force commander since 1998, in uniform.
Left: In a rare interview, Qassem Suleimani talks about a comrade killed during the Iran-Iraq war
(Iranian Channel 1 TV, March 18, 2007).

8. Iran aid to Hamas during the two years which preceded Operation Cast Lead were the following: weapons , including hundreds of 122mm Grad rockets, with ranges of 20-40 km, and advanced anti-tank missiles; technological knowhow which made it possible for Hamas to manufacture lethal Hezbollah-inspired IEDs ( Shawaz projectiles); advanced training in Iran for hundreds of operatives from all the terrorist organizations; several hundred million dollars a year for Hamas's political and military wings; political and propaganda support ; as well as efforts to prevent the lull arrangement, to encourage terrorist attacks, and to oppose Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (the Annapolis process).

9. In retrospect, it can be seen that without the massive support provided by Iran , it would have been extremely difficult for Hamas to engage in its military buildup, which peaked during the past year. It is reasonable to assume that without such support Hamas would not have been so aggressive in its rocket fire against Israel and its defiant political stance vis-à-vis Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, which led to open schisms with both ( Egypt is fully aware that Iran's strategic considerations are behind its sponsorship of the Hamas entity in the Gaza Strip). The policy of firing increasing numbers of rockets to sabotage the Egyptian-brokered lull arrangement was what led, finally, to the its unilateral abandonment of the lull arrangement and Operation Cast Lead.

10. Iran has explicitly stated that the war in the Gaza Strip is one aspect of a wider campaign for the future of the Middle East being waged between the “resistance” camp and the forces of “arrogance” (the United States , the “Zionist regime,” the West and waning liberal democracy.) During Operation Cast Lead the Iranian regime, both directly and through Hezbollah, encouraged Hamas to keep fighting , and on December 28 the Iranian Leader even said that every Palestinian killed in battle would be a shaheed. At the same time, the Iranian regime waged a hate campaign against Israel and Egypt , sent humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, but was also very careful not to be drawn into direct involvement in the turmoil in Gaza . After the battles are over, regardless of whatever arrangement is achieved, the common Hamas-Iranian-Syrian interests will lead to a joint effort to rehabilitate and restore Hamas's military-terrorist infrastructure and capabilities (as Iran and Syria rehabilitated and expanded Hezbollah's terrorist infrastructure after the second Lebanon war).

11. Regarding the Egyptian initiative for a ceasefire, Hamas spokesmen made it clear that Hamas would not agree to stop the smuggling. Moreover, Abu Usama Abd al-Mu'ti , Hamas representative in Iran , appealed to “Islamic countries” (i.e., Iran ) to send military equipment to the Gaza Strip to help Hamas. He said that since the United States had established an airlift for Israel , “observant Muslims” had to send weapons to the fighters in Gaza (Press conference held at the Islamic Propaganda Organization in Tehran ,” Islamic Republic News Agency, January 13, 2009 ).

12. As opposed to Lebanon , however, Iran will face greater difficulties in supporting Hamas in the Gaza Strip once the dust settles. That is because Iran has no direct access to the Gazan border (as opposed to good access to Lebanon though its wide-open border with Syria ), and an arrangement may be reached at the end of the fighting that will lead to closer supervision along the Egypt-Gaza border. As in the past, both Iran and Hamas are expected to be creative to overcome the difficulties and to ensure a renewed flow of weapons to the Gaza Strip, especially long-range rockets, which will renew the rocket threat and Hamas and Iran's ability to threaten the million people living in Israel's south. They also aspire to include new zones in the range of fire, up to at least 60 km, i.e., Tel Aviv.

13. The following is a short summary of the main components of the support and aid Iran provided to Hamas during the past three years, which enabled Hamas to establish its military-terrorist infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and accelerate the processes which led to the collapse of the lull arrangement and Operation Cast Lead. The Appendix presents a selection of Arab responses to Iran 's support for Hamas and conclusions drawn by the Arab regimes in the Middle East .

>> To the Full Document in PDF Format Click Here >>

1 For further information see our April 9, 2008 Bulletin entitled “Hamas's military buildup in the Gaza Strip (Updated April 2008)” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_080408.pdf .

2 For the support Iran and Syria gave the Palestinian terrorist organizations during the second intifada, see our April 2003 Bulletin entitled “ Iran as a State Sponsoring and Operating Terror / April 2003,” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia//ENGLISH/IRAN/PDF/APR_03.PDF .

3 The collaboration between Sunni Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Shi'ite Iranian regime, is not obvious. Radical jihadist Sunni groups, such as Al-Qaeda and the global jihad do not collaborate with Iran and even sometimes oppose it. However, for Hamas, the strategic considerations of its confrontation with Israel are stronger than religious differences with Iran . When Musheir al-Masri, Hamas representative in the Palestinian Legislative Council, was asked if Hamas would accept aid from Iran , he said that it would, despite their ideological differences. He said that Iranian aid was “a thousand times preferable than relying on the Americans and Zionists…” ( Al-Zaman , Iraq , July 7, 2007 ).

4 For further information about the activities of the Quds force in Lebanon and other countries, see our April 2, 2007 Bulletin entitled “Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards as the main tool to export the revolution beyond the borders of Iran” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_e0307.pdf .

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk