Doc's Talk: As Prospect of Two State Peace Recedes, New U.S. Policies are Urgent

Sunday, February 15, 2009

As Prospect of Two State Peace Recedes, New U.S. Policies are Urgent

Settlement Report | Vol. 19 No. 1 | January-February 2009
By Geoffrey Aronson
January-February 2009 Settlement Report

Israel’s assault on Gaza, after the breakdown of a six month cease-fire with Hamas, offers the most recent evidence of the breakdown of the diplomatic process ushered in by the Oslo agreements in 1993 and the declining prospect of a peace agreement based upon its principles. It is yet another signal that, beginning with Ariel Sharon’s “disengagement” from Gaza in 2005, the focus of the Israel Palestine conflict is now urgently centered on the Gaza Strip, and more broadly, on the contentious relationship between Israel and Hamas. The election of Barack Obama offers the international community the opportunity for some new thinking about how to re-energize its unfulfilled commitment to end the occupation and create a sovereign, independent Palestine at peace with Israel. The selection of former senator George Mitchell, a mediator of international standing, as Presi−dent Barack Obama’s special envoy is widely viewed as an inspired choice. As Mitchell begins a much needed reas−sess−ment of the U.S. led effort to strengthen Abu Mazen and weaken Hamas, he inherits a policy based upon the following principles:

-- denying Hamas’s role in Palestin−ian affairs, demanding its adherence to the Quartet principles (recognition of Israel, foreswearing the use of force, and accepting the Oslo Annapolis agreements); refusing to accept its rule in Gaza, and opposing national political reconciliation;

-- acquiescing in practice to Israel’s diplomatic and security agenda on the West Bank while offering only rhetorical objection to the system of checkpoints and settlement construction;

-- supporting Israel’s security agenda in Gaza, and the draconian Israeli and Egyptian restriction of imports sufficient only to meet minimal humanitarian needs, and supporting reconstruction aid on condition that it strengthens Abu Mazen and weakens Hamas;

-- continuing the West Bank effort to strengthen Abu Mazen by acting as paymaster to the Palestinian Authority (PA), supporting a “counterinsurgency” strategy against Hamas, and prodding Israel to make marginal concessions to PA security services as part of a “performance based” effort aimed at moving toward Palestinian independence and an end to occupation.

Continuing U.S. support for policies that fail to acknowledge the real changes among the principle players risks making Washington increasingly irrelevant to the march of events. Israel and Hamas in particular are pursuing agendas that differ markedly from those promoted by the international community. In the absence of a revitalized and re-oriented American-led effort, their confrontation will define the policy choices of the future. It may still be possible for the international community to bring an end to Israel’s occupation and to enable the creation of a unified Palestinian state next to Israel under secular Palestinian leadership that enjoys the support of both Israeli and Palestin−ian majorities. To do so, however, will require a dramatic departure from prevailing assumptions and policies.

The ongoing battle in Gaza has made the environment for such an effort far more difficult. Israel increasingly focuses on Hamas as its primary Palestinian threat and principal Palestinian interlocutor, rather than Fateh and Abu Mazen. The latter in Israel’s view have been “domesticated” by the peace process. Their interests, therefore, do not have to be seriously addressed.

Israel waged war to force the Hamas-led government and security forces in Gaza to accommodate a security agenda defined by Israel—to cease all missile strikes against Israel without conceding Hamas’s demand to open Gaza’s borders, especially to Egypt (at Rafah). Hamas, in turn, demands an end to the economic “siege” and open borders as the price of a durable ceasefire.

The Palestinian leadership in Ramallah failed to win Israeli support for its restoration in Gaza. Israel’s decision not to destroy the Hamas regime dispelled the illusion fortifying many in Fateh that Israel would support their return to power lost in the January 2005 election and the June 2007 debacle in Gaza. The war demonstrated Israel’s lack of interest in promoting its declining fortunes. This view informs Israeli policy on issues now at the center of international concern—Gaza’s border regime and reconstruction aid. Fateh, weakened by the war, should be prepared to entertain proposals that will win it a role in the provision of aid to Gaza and border operations commensurate with its reduced power. In the West Bank, European, U.S., and Arab officials continue to make the case for the need to strengthen Abu Mazen through Israeli security if not political concessions. In today’s environment, Israel is less likely than ever to follow this international agenda.

The war in Gaza placed Hamas at the center of a new page in the history of the century old Palestinian battle against Israel. It survived the Israeli attack and successfully defended Gaza against an Israeli re-occupation. In contrast, Abu Mazen, and more significantly Fateh, were mere spectators in this latest Palestinian battle against Israel. In the aftermath of the war, Hamas’s control of the government, bureaucracy, and security arms in Gaza is undiminished. The “movement” remains intact despite its leadership losses, and its decision making capacity has not been compromised. The integrity of Hamas’ s security forces has been impaired but there is ready evidence that they continue to exercise a monopoly of force in Gaza. They remain capable of projecting power, however feeble, against Israel. Hamas is also demonstrating an ability to provide for the burgeoning humanitarian requirements of the Gaza population, despite the continuation of the “siege.” This situation establishes a threshold far above what Hamas leaders defined as victory in the midst of the war.

Hamas’ policy goals today remain almost identical to the prewar period:

-- recognition by Israel, Egypt, and the international community as the responsible power in Gaza, without submitting to external dictats (the Quartet principles);

-- maintaining a credible “resistance option,” not to defeat Israel, which it recognizes is impossible, but rather to alter the terms of the relationship with Israel in its favor;

-- ending the siege and restoring functionality of Gaza’s borders with Israel and Egypt for imports and exports so that normal economic activity can resume;

-- opening the Rafah border with Egypt as a strategic goal in order to establish a link with the world independent of Israel;

-- resolving the prisoner exchange issue with Israel according to its suggested formula.

As George Mitchell has noted, the immediate challenges facing the new U.S. administration have been defined by the bitter contest between Israel and Hamas. The war has forced Israel to reconsider its previous policies on prisoner release and border operations. There is as yet no agreement on a cease-fire or the release of prisoners, notably the Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit, because there is no agreement on ending the draconian import export regime imposed by Israel with international support. Gaza’s borders remain all but closed because Israel longs to divide Israel and the West Bank from Gaza and end all economic ties with the area, no matter which Palestinians rule there, and because of Egypt’s determination to resist Israel’s intention to move Gaza into its economic and security orbit. Nevertheless, the prospects for fragile understandings on borders and prisoner release on terms closer to those long favored by Hamas are now better than before the war.

The diplomatic dimension of the Annapolis process has exhausted itself. The deafening silence that greeted lame-duck Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s report to Mitchell of his conditional offer of Palestinian statehood and settlement evacuation attests to Israel’s disinterest in addressing final status issues under the Annapolis banner. Israel’s uncertain election results make a credible resumption of this process even more problematic.

Little remains of the Annapolis effort except the security element managed by U.S. and European security officials in cooperation with Israeli and Palestinian security forces. During the war in Gaza, PA security forces in the West Bank performed well and according to script under extreme and unprecedented pressure in a successful effort to minimize public protest and unrest. Their motivation for doing so, however, was not so much a desire to protect Israeli interests or to safeguard Palestinians from IDF entry into the streets, as it was to demonstrate to the international community and particularly to the U.S. that Palestinians have upheld their part of the Oslo/Mitchell Commission/road map/Annapolis bargain and that they now expect a payoff in the form of more security space to call their own and real progress towards settlement evacuation, an end to occupation, and independence.
An American policy that results in the timely realization of these Palestinian national demands, which have been endorsed by the international community, is the only effective means for reviving the fortunes of secular Palestinian nationalists. Israel and Hamas have chosen another road. They are not waiting for Washington, but are creating a dynamic alternative to a moribund “peace process.”

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk