Sunday, February 15, 2009

Weisglass Warns of a Clash with Obama on Settlements

Settlement Report | Vol. 19 No. 1 | January-February 2009
By Dov Weisglass
January-February 2009 Settlement Report

The idleness that the Israeli government has been displaying in dealing with the unauthorized settlement outposts shows that the ministers are insufficiently aware of the severity of the diplomatic problem that Israel faces with regard to the settlements in Judea and Samaria, and to what degree the issue could entangle Israel in a diplomatic crisis that would damage other Israeli vital interests. There is no country in the world that accepts Israel’s territorial demands in Judea and Samaria, and does not see the Jewish settlements over the Green Line as an unlawful act and an obstacle to an Israeli-Palestinian peace arrangement. Even President Bush’s administration—perhaps the friendliest administration towards Israel since its establishment—was sharply opposed to any Israeli activity in Judea and Samaria that was not vital military activity.

The U.S. administration views the entire area of Judea and Samaria as a reserve of land for establishing a Palestinian state in due time. The proper existence of a Palestinian state requires, in the opinion of the Americans, an integral Palestinian territory, contiguous and with links between its different parts, not a “slice of Swiss cheese” as Secretary of State Rice put it. The settlements, in the view of the administration, particularly those located deep inside Palestinian territory, cut up and divide the future Palestinian state and prevent a future arrangement, which is also vital for Israel.

On most foreign policy issues, Israel and the administration saw eye to eye. It was only on the matter of construction in the territories that there were ongoing differences of opinion, tension and friction. In the summer of 2002 Israel committed to refrain from expanding the settlements: No lands would be confiscated for the purpose of settlements or encouraging settlers, and construction would be prevented in the settlements, with the exception of construction within the existing “line of construction” (inside the settlement itself).

In the road map, Israel repeated its commitment to cease all settlement activity in Judea and Samaria and to remove unauthorized settlement outposts. Since then, the government has indeed refrained from establishing new settlements, but unauthorized settlement outposts have been added and construction in the existing settlements has not stopped for a moment.
“I used to sit down and speak with Barak about the evacuation of illegal settlement outposts. Each time he would bring me a proposal that in exchange for the evacuation of one barrel and two tents somewhere, I would have to agree to build hundreds of housing units in the settlements.”

P.M. Ehud Olmert, Ma’ariv, January 22, 2008

“I used to sit down and speak with Barak about the evacuation of illegal settlement outposts. Each time he would bring me a proposal that in exchange for the evacuation of one barrel and two tents somewhere, I would have to agree to build hundreds of housing units in the settlements.” P.M. Ehud Olmert, Ma’ariv, January 22, 2008



Conversely, the U.S. administration has not stopped complaining that Israel has failed to meet its commitments, and demanded, among other things, to mark the boundaries of the existing settlements in order to supervise the expansion ban. For this purpose, an American delegation was scheduled to arrive in Israel, and this was a sign of anger and loss of confidence.



Bush Letter



In President Bush’s letter to Prime Minister Sharon from April 2004, the administration reached the limit of its understanding for Israel’s territorial demands: the large settlement blocs. The administration understood that regarding the new reality that has been established on the ground, it would be “impractical” to demand from Israel a full withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and any future arrangement would require taking into consideration the demographic reality created over the years. In other words: recognition of Israel’s right to the settlement blocs by virtue of action and facts on the ground, but not by virtue of right and law.
The American recognition of the Israeli demand for control of the large blocs and their continued development was accompanied by a demand that Israel refrain from any settlement activity in the areas outside the blocs. In the administration’s opinion, Israel would leave [these areas] as part of the final status arrangements with the Palestinians, and it is forbidden to build there and change the land reality.


It was the disengagement plan that prevented a public, severe crisis on the matter. The administration was impressed by the Israeli initiative, its leaders placed their trust in Sharon, believed his statement that in the final status arrangements Israel would withdraw from the territories that had been occupied, and deeply appreciated his ability to keep his word

The mitigating circumstances that existed then are no longer in force. It is difficult to believe that the new administration in Washington will be more patient and considerate than its predecessor. Israel will be called upon to uphold its commitments immediately, and if it continues to drag its feet, this will lead to a severe diplomatic entanglement.


Dov Weisglass was a key advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Yediot Aharonot, November 24, 2008

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