Doc's Talk: Obama in Turkey: Enticing Ankara Westward

Friday, April 03, 2009

Obama in Turkey: Enticing Ankara Westward

Soner Cagaptay
April 2, 2009

On April 6 and 7, after attending the NATO and European Union summits, President Obama will visit Ankara and Istanbul as part of his European tour. The visit seeks to build on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's March 7 trip to Ankara, where she underscored Washington's commitment to a European and Western Turkey. The president's sojourn is an important step in rebuilding troubled U.S.-Turkish relations, which have cooled in the past several years as Ankara has turned away from the West. Bringing Turkey back into the Western fold will require an ongoing concerted effort by the Obama administration and, given Turkey's importance to the United States, should be a priority for Washington. Turkey's Importance to the United States
In past years, Turkish public opinion toward the West and the United States hit an all-time low. When Obama took office, those in Turkey with a favorable view of the United States were a miniscule 9 percent. This trend coincides with a shift in Turkish foreign policy away from the United States on important issues such as Russia, Sudan, Hamas, and Iran, ever since the 2003 Iraq War. Policy differences caused by Ankara's religious point of view continue to emerge between Turkey and the United States. The latest example involves Turkey's veto of Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen's appointment as NATO secretary general because he failed to apologize for cartoons published in a Danish newspaper in 2005 that were deemed offensive by some Muslims. Many Western governments defended the publication of the cartoons in the name of freedom of speech.

While some have questioned whether the new administration should devote much effort to improving U.S.-Turkish ties, President Obama's visit early in his tenure indicates that the administration understands that it cannot afford to lose Turkey. Turkey has NATO's second largest army and is Europe's sixth largest economy. Turkey borders Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and is a base for U.S. operations in Afghanistan and beyond. Ankara's possible nuisance value as a problematic, alienated former ally should be a serious concern for Washington.

Challenges for Obama
Building a strong relationship, however, will not be an easy task. Presidential efforts at strong public diplomacy, such as Bill Clinton's 1999 trip to Turkey, have positively affected Turkish attitudes toward the United States. Although the Obama visit has plenty of public diplomacy appeal, including a proposed town-hall-style meeting, the president will encounter one particularly sensitive subject, the Armenian question, during the visit.

Any statement Obama issues on Armenia will be closely monitored. According to polls, 90 percent of Turks do not think that the deaths of many Armenians during the waning days of the Ottoman Empire constituted genocide. While U.S. presidents traditionally issue a proclamation every spring commemorating the events of 1915 and recognizing the suffering that took place during World War I, they have never used the word "genocide" to describe the empire's activities. This year's presidential proclamation will be Obama's first, and its wording will be important in setting the public tone of U.S.-Turkish relations. If Obama describes the 1915 events as genocide, as some news reports suggest could happen, it will hit a raw nerve in Turkey, hurting U.S. interests at a time when Obama is hoping to win Turkish hearts and minds and secure Ankara's cooperation. What is more, such a proclamation would create a backlash in Turkey, blocking the anticipated breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian relations; analysts are suggesting that Turkey will soon establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and open its border to trade with that country. It will be impossible for the Turkish government to push for these steps if Obama were to describe the events of 1915 as genocide.

Obama will also face a challenge in winning over younger Turks, including midlevel Turkish military officers. Although U.S.-Turkish military ties have been getting stronger among the top brass as a result of cooperation against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorists, this does not appear to be the case among midlevel officers. If the United States cannot win the confidence of Turkish captains, it cannot sustain military ties with Turkey in the long term. NATO remains the key to success in this area, since it is the international institution respected most by the Turkish military. Using NATO as a platform to rebuild ties with the Turkish officer corps through special initiatives, including large-scale exchanges and training programs, will be critical to success in this area.

Rebuilding Strong Ties
Once Obama's visit is over, the administration can take a number of longer-term steps to strengthen U.S.-Turkish ties and influence Turkish policy in key areas.

Make EU accession the leitmotif of U.S. policy. The president should be applauded for going to Turkey after attending NATO and EU summits, thereby treating Turkey as part of Europe and emphasizing its NATO role. Turkey cannot be a Western country or a U.S. ally if its EU prospects collapse. Ankara's EU membership talks are stalled due to French objections, as well as the slow pace of Turkish reforms. As the president renews transatlantic ties, he might consider using his dialogue with the French president to convince Paris to adopt a more flexible position on Turkey's EU accession -- a tall order even for Obama -- though the benefit for Paris is that Turkey would lift its veto on France's return to NATO's military command structure. In addition, setting the EU as a benchmark for Turkey would strengthen the country's enfeebled liberal democratic values and forces.

Treat Turkey as more than a Muslim country. Since the Iraq War, U.S.-Turkish relations have been focused on the Muslim Middle East, particularly Iraq. This development has come at the expense of previous U.S.-Turkish cooperation in the Caucasus, Black Sea, Central Asia, and within Europe and NATO. Turkey is more than just a Muslim partner for the United States. Washington's singular focus on Middle East issues has empowered a Muslim vector in Turkish foreign policy, stimulating an exclusively Muslim identity among Turks at the expense of European and pro-Western identities. Obama has a grasp of this issue; news reports suggest the president is not going to deliver his "address to the Muslim world" from Turkey. According to the White House, Obama's Turkey stop is not linked to his campaign promise to visit a Muslim country during the first 100 days of his presidency. Washington needs to cooperate with Turkey on non-Muslim issues if it wants to keep Turkey's non-Muslim foreign policy vectors alive and various Turkish identities thriving.

Emphasize NATO as the benchmark for Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has participated in every NATO operation since it joined the alliance in 1952. When Obama builds consensus in NATO, such as a common stance on Iran, he can and should expect to find Turkey on board.

Build an economic component to bilateral ties. Although the United States and Turkey have been military and political allies for six decades, they have not built comparable economic ties. Because of this, each time U.S.-Turkish relations have faced political problems, as they did during the Iraq War, official cooperation and amity have nearly collapsed. In 2008, the U.S./European share of Turkish trade dropped to less than 50 percent, and Russia became Turkey's top trading partner for the first time. If the West and Turkey are not tightly linked economically, their political and military ties will be susceptible to the influence of Russia and Iran, where Turkish investments have grown substantially.

Partner with Turkey on energy security. One way to diversify U.S.-Turkish relations and shift the focus from the Middle East would be to join forces with Turkey to reach the energy fields of the Caspian Sea basin and to build pipelines, such as the long-projected Nabucco line, to connect Central Asia and Europe via Turkey. This strategy would decrease the West's dependence on Middle East oil and Europe's dependence on Russian energy, providing a sweetener for Turkish-EU talks.

Conclusion
Turkey is at a crossroads in terms of its international political identity. The Obama visit will be a success if the president endorses Turkey as a European country that is seen as part of the West rather than part of the "Muslim world." With political stars in Turkey aligned against the United States, a passive U.S. policy toward Ankara would only deepen the Turks' growing sense of alienation from the West. Rather, the Obama administration should take an active interest in Turkey and formulate a broad-based policy coordinated across various government agencies.

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

No comments:

The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk