July 31, 2009 | 1907 GMT
Sratfor
Summary
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came under criticism from yet another prominent Iranian hard-liner July 31, in this case from Guardians Council chief Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati. The criticism highlights the ongoing flux the Iranian political system is undergoing. Analysis
Guardians Council (GC) head Ayatollah Ahmed Jannati became the latest Iranian hard-liner to criticize Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad over the appointment of controversial Ahmadinejad friend and relative Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie as first vice president. “Such appointments hurt your supporters … [a] key position should not be given to a person who is not respected,” Jannati told the main prayer congregation at Tehran University on July 31. Jannati spoke even though Ahmadinejad has rescinded the vice presidential appointment of Mashaie, whom Ahmadinejad instead made his chief of staff and top adviser.
Jannati is the second-most powerful ayatollah within the Iranian political establishment who supports Ahmadinejad after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The GC has legislative oversight, vets candidates for public office, and supervises elections. Together, Jannati and the GC were responsible for ensuring Ahmadinejad’s victory in the June 12 presidential election; their support for Ahmadinejad did not begin to waver until the controversy surrounding the vice presidential appointment and the president’s move to fire intelligence chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei. Jannati and Mohseni-Ejei hail from the same hard-line ideological sect led by Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi. (Ahmadinejad is also affiliated the sect.)
The hard-line hostility to Ahmadinejad — especially from clerics — is not as much about opposition to the president as it is about rallying around the Khamenei, whom Ahmadinejad defied for a week over Mashaie’s appointment to the vice presidency. The ultraconservatives already feared for their positions in the wake of the electoral crisis, with many conservative clerics from the seminary city of Qom expressing opposition to the outcome of the vote. With Ahmadinejad defying the supreme leader, they are all the more terrified of the implications for the stability of the political system and their privileged position within it. Heightening these fears, the military — with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps at the forefront — is using the ongoing imbroglio to enhance its position.
But the ultraconservatives are not the only ones under pressure. Ahmadinejad is at the center of the complex domestic melee, casting into doubt his ability complete his second term even before he takes the oath of office Aug. 6. A very influential conservative group associated with powerful speaker of parliament Ali Larijani warned Ahmadinejad earlier in the week of July 26 against disobedience to the supreme leader, saying that if the president didn’t change course, he risked impeachment. According to the Iranian Constitution, parliament can impeach the president, but the GC can overrule the move. The Expediency Council reserves the right of arbitration after that point. Given that Ahmadinejad has had problems with each of these institutions, impeachment — while not likely — is certainly not out of the question, and would become more likely if matters continue to escalate.
This would explain the president’s July 31 comments, in which he tried to counter perceptions of a rift between him and the supreme leader, referring to his relationship with Khamenei as one between a father and a son. He went on to accuse his opponents of trying to create tensions between the president and the supreme leader, describing them as “devils” who would not succeed in their efforts. Notably, Ahmadinejad is not talking about pragmatic conservatives like Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani or the reformists — both of those groups already opposed Ahmadinejad as well as the supreme leader for his support for the embattled president. Instead, Ahmadinejad is hitting out at his own fellow hard-liners. The Iranian president is particularly targeting Larijani, whom the supreme leader views as a potential third alternative to both Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani, which would explain the appointment of Larijani’s younger brother Hojateleslam Mohammad Sadegh Rafsanjani as the new judiciary chief.
Clearly, the Iranian political system is in a state of hyperflux. It is, however, too early to predict an outcome with any degree of certainty as there are a number of moving parts in play. STRATFOR will closely monitor the domestic situation in Iran, especially as this directly bears on the Islamic republic’s behavior on the foreign policy front. This is highly significant given that the West has set a deadline of mid-September for the Iranians to come to the table on the nuclear issue. A number of elements will shape events moving forward, including:
1. The fate of the controversial former Mashaie (who has been deemed too “liberal” by Ahamdinejad’s ultraconservative allies); will the president the president remove him from the posts of adviser/chief of staff as his hard-liner allies-turned-opponents are demanding?
2. Whether Mohseni-Ejei will get reappointed in a different capacity by Khamenei.
3. Whether the IRGC-dominated security establishment speaks regarding the accelerating crisis, considering that corps is currently the second-most powerful stakeholder in Tehran after the clerics, and given that its influence is rising in the wake of the rift among the clerics.
4. Khamenei’s Aug. 3 formal approval of Ahmadinejad’s relection, followed by an oath-taking ceremony Aug 6.
5. Any moves by the judiciary as the younger Larijani assumes its leadership on Aug. 16 and by parliament, where 210 out of 290 members of parliament recently came out in support of the fired intelligence chief.
6. The fate of Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the outgoing judiciary chief and pragmatic conservative opponent of the president, who has been considered as possible successor to Khamenei in the event of the supreme leader’s death.
7. Any efforts by Rafsanjani and his pragmatic conservative faction to try and exploit the intrahardliner schism.
Whatever the upcoming weeks bring, it is unlikely that the rupture created within the hard-liner camp can be healed simply by Ahmadinejad’s moves to make-up with Khamenei. The president simply appears to have burned too many bridges with many of those who supported his bid for a second-term.
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