Doc's Talk: The Islamization process promoted by Hamas in the Gaza Strip and its social and political implications on the local, the Middle Eastern, and the inter

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

The Islamization process promoted by Hamas in the Gaza Strip and its social and political implications on the local, the Middle Eastern, and the inter

Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
Overview

1. Ever since it took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Hamas has been promoting a process of gradual Islamization, designed to further its vision of establishing a Palestinian state based on Islamic religious law ( shari'ah ). While that process is related to similar trends taking place in the Arab and Muslim world, the Gaza Strip has several unique social and political characteristics making it a fertile ground for Hamas to promote its political and religious views. This study explores the main expressions of the Islamization process in the Gaza Strip, focusing on the period since Hamas's takeover, and attempts to assess its implications in several aspects: the internal Palestinian political aspect, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the regional and international aspect.

2. The vision of establishing a radical Islamic Palestinian state is expressed quite clearly in the Hamas charter (1988). That fundamental document, whose principles are adhered to by Hamas to this day, asserts that the land of Palestine is an Islamic endowment which must be liberated from the Jews through jihad (holy war) and an Islamic Palestinian state should be established there. According to the charter, Hamas considers Islam to be a way of life rather than a religion in the modern Western sense, which separates religion from state. That makes Hamas distinctly different from the PLO and its secular ideology, a fact that is mentioned in the Hamas charter (clauses 27 and 36). 1

3. After the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, it was given an opportunity to put its radical Islamic vision and ideology into practice, establishing an Islamic Hamas-ruled political entity in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, however, Hamas is forced to maneuver between its vision and its governmental needs, which forces it to display pragmatism in its routine conduct. As a result of that, in the two years that have passed since the takeover Hamas has been implementing a process of Islamization in the Gaza Strip; it does so gradually, however, to keep from alienating the Gaza Strip population and not to draw criticism from its internal and external opponents.

4. More than just the fundamental goal of implementing radical Islamic ideology, the Islamization of the Gaza Strip, as far as Hamas is concerned, also has clearly political goals. Specifically, Hamas views that process as a means to tighten its control over the Gaza Strip and promote its interests as a de facto government. Through the Islamization process, Hamas attempts to subdue local sources of opposition to its power, mostly from Fatah, the traditional clan-based power sources, and even radical Islamic opposition which identifies with the ideas spread by Al-Qaeda and poses an ideological challenge to Hamas on the activist radical Islamic scene. As a de facto government, Hamas is obliged to take into consideration the existence of internal sources of opposition to the measures designed to publicly enforce the Islamic code of conduct. In addition to the internal Palestinian criticism from Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, Hamas must also consider the outside criticism drawn by the Islamization process, mostly from Egypt (which is well aware of the negative repercussions of having a radical “Islamic emirate” established along its border).

5. As a result of the need to maneuver between the aforementioned constraints and considerations, Hamas's policy over the last two years has been characterized by enforcing a gradual process of Islamization on the Gaza Strip population. While the process is measured and calculated, it is carried out persistently, systematically, with tremendous determination (accompanied by a great deal of self confidence), and invasively (pertaining to all areas of life). Above all that, the final goal envisioned by Hamas is the establishment of an Islamic entity in Gaza , not immediately but rather in a gradual process, turning the Gaza Strip into a stronghold of radical Islam as viewed by Hamas (and not by Al-Qaeda). It should be noted that the Islamization process of the Gaza Strip is taking root in a fertile ground, both socially (the extreme poverty and unemployment, the crowded conditions and frustration suffered by the Gaza Strip residents, some two thirds of them defined by UNRWA as refugees) and politically (Hamas's tight grip on the Gaza Strip and its weakening of secular natured sources of opposition, mainly Fatah).

6. The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 did not mark the start of the Islamization process there—it had been gradually taking place in previous decades. The process gained momentum during the first intifada (the Palestinian terror campaign 1987-1993) and was accelerated during the second intifada, since late 2000. In those years, the process was reflected in the extensive construction of mosques (most of them under the political control of Hamas); the embracement of Islamic dress and appearance codes (various types of veils for women and beards for men); the formation of a widespread infrastructure of radical Islamic organizations involved in social assistance and education, making good use of the governmental vacuum in the Gaza Strip; the education of children and teenagers in the spirit of radical Islam, both in Palestinian Authority educational institutions (now under the control of Hamas) and in non-formal educational institutions (such as summer camps, culture institutions, sports clubs).

7. As part of a deliberate policy espoused by Hamas, the Islamization process continued and was even accelerated in the two years that have passed since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip. Enforced by the Hamas de facto administration, the process encompasses all the areas of life of Gaza Strip citizens: law and legislation (passing radical Islamic laws and regulations); the establishment of economic institutions of Islamic character (a bank, an insurance company); the enforcement of an Islamic code of conduct on the daily lives of the population by the Hamas internal security apparatuses (wearing veils, banning mixed gender social gatherings, gender segregation on beaches, banning alcohol, and so forth); the significant increase in the number of mosques (most of them controlled by Hamas) in the Gaza Strip; the deepening of formal and informal Islamic education (in educational institutions, from kindergartens to universities, in summer camps); the accentuation of the Islamic character of the media (mainly Al-Aqsa TV). Operatives in Hamas's military-terrorist infrastructure, as well as operatives belonging to other terrorist organizations and networks, are indoctrinated with radical Islam, increasing their motivation to perpetrate terrorist attacks against Israel .

8. The Islamization process in the Gaza Strip supports several pre-existing trends and fundamental processes which already take place on the Palestinian scene:

a. Deepening the split between the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria : the immediate results of the Islamization process can already be seen and felt in the daily lives of the population. However, its deeper impacts on society will be seen over the long term in future generations, as a result of the radical Islamic indoctrination undergone by youngsters living in the Gaza Strip. The process helps deepen the political, social, and even economic split between the radical Islamic entity in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Authority-administered territories in Judea and Samaria . The Islamization process leads to the emergence of a new social reality in the Gaza Strip, posing substantial difficulties to any possible future attempt by the Palestinian Authority to regain political and security control of the Gaza Strip, even if the national dialogue between Fatah and Hamas does eventually result in some kind of arrangement. In the future, Hamas may attempt to duplicate the process in Judea and Samaria , even though, for now, the Palestinian Authority's intensive counter-activities have been successful in containing the threat posed to its rule by Hamas and the radical Islamic ideology it represents.

b. Threats on the Middle Eastern scene (mostly against Egypt) and on the international scene: the establishment of the Hamas-ruled radical Islamic political entity in the Gaza Strip is a phenomenon which poses a potential threat to pro-Western pragmatic Arab countries, mainly Egypt. As it develops, the Islamic entity in the Gaza Strip may become a role model for terrorist organizations and Islamic organizations not only in the Middle East but also elsewhere. The Hamas-controlled entity in the Gaza Strip may engage in acts of subversion by joining forces with radical Islamic elements which oppose the Egyptian government, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement out of which Hamas branched off. Evidence of that was seen in the exposure of a Hezbollah network in Egypt , which was involved with Hamas in the Gaza Strip and possibly also with radical Islamic elements belonging to Egypt 's Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, the Hamas-controlled entity in the Gaza Strip is a fertile ground for Iranian influence, given their joint interests, mainly the violent struggle against Israel . This is reflected in the arms, ammunition, and funds provided by Iran to Hamas, 2 even though Hamas (being of Sunni radical Islamic character) is not willing to fully submit to the dictates of the Shi'ite Islamic regime in Tehran (unlike Hezbollah).

9. The present study breaks down the Islamization of the Gaza Strip into the following categories, focusing on the two years that have passed since the Hamas takeover:

a. The social sphere:

1. Outward manifestations of the Islamization process

2. The significant increase in the number of mosques and its implications

3. Enforcing radical Islamic codes in the daily lives of the population

4. Islamic indoctrination in summer camps for children and youth

b. The governmental sphere:

1. Laws and regulations of Islamic character

2. The Islamization of education

3. Islamic commerce institutions

4. The Islamization of Hamas's media

5. The re-education of prisoners through the study of Quran

c. The military-terrorist sphere:

1.Radical Islamic indoctrination of operatives belonging to Hamas and to other terrorist organizations and networks

2. The establishment of jihadist radical Islamic networks which challenge Hamas

>> To the Full Document in PDF Format Click Here >>

1 See our March 21, 2006 Information Bulletin: “The Hamas Charter (1988): Overtly anti-Semitic and anti-West, radical Islamic in outlook, it stresses Hamas' ideological commitment to destroy the State of Israel through a long-term holy war (jihad).”

2 For details see our January 12, 2009 Information Bulletin: “Iranian Support of Hamas”.

No comments:

The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk