Doc's Talk: Israel's Great Game‏

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Israel's Great Game‏

Ira Sharkansky
Date: Mon, Apr 26, 2010

For those of us more interested in world affairs than sport, "The Great Game" was the competition between British and Czarist Empires for Afghanistan and other parts of Central Asia, with implications for India and access to the sea, that prevailed through much of the 19th and into the 20th centuries.

Israel now has its Great Game. It consists of responding to international and domestic demands for "solution" and "peace" with respect to the century-long conflicts over Israel's place in the region. Any optimism apparent in Israel is microscopic compared to the rhetoric currently fashionable in the White House and among those who follow its lead. Since the mighty efforts of Prime Minister Ehud Barak and President Bill Clinton in 2000, and more recently the fragmentation of the Palestine National Authority, it appears that Israeli officials are going through the motions because they must. While some Israeli politicians accuse their colleagues of being short sighted or stingy, the louder clamor, coming from politicians and commentators across the political spectrum is, "Impossible."

What makes it impossible?

Rivalry among the Palestinians, with extremists encouraged by Iran against the background of radical Islam, with the loud cooperation of Syria and the lesser noise of Turkey, as well as other occasional participants. All this makes it impossible for any Palestinian leaders to face their people directly and explain the need for compromise.

As far as we can tell from reports coming out of negotiations in 2000, and the efforts of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2008, Palestinian leaders are unable to accept anything less than their expansive demands of a state with the borders of 1967, plus a capital in Jerusalem, and the rights of refugees to return to what is now Israel.

Israel has changed since 1967, and some 50,000 Israeli Jews are living in settlements scattered throughout the West Bank, beyond the line of the security barrier. More than 200,000 others live in areas of Jerusalem and major settlements close to, but east of the 1967 borders.

Palestinians have rejected Israeli offers to provide them with territory equivalent to size of the pre-1967 area of the West Bank, with parts of pre-1967 Israel making up for what Palestinians would lose to the large Israeli settlements, plus a place for their capital in Jerusalem, and a partial solution for the refugees.

There is good reason to believe, based on the comments of prominent Hamas figures, as well as frequent speeches from Iranians and others, that Fatah's mantra of 1967 borders, Jerusalem, and refugees is a fiction for a party that could not survive if--Allah forbid--the Israelis agreed to all of its demands.

So Tom Friedman, Barack Obama and many others are right in saying that Israeli settlements are an obstacle to peace. But they miss the larger point when they claim that the settlements are the major obstacle, or even a significant obstacle.

As far as we know about the negotiations of 2000 and 2008, they never got to the issue of settlements beyond those close to the 1967 borders. Would they be abandoned? That is no longer likely, due to the reception Palestinians gave to the abandonment of settlements in Gaza. Would they be granted something like ex-territorial status, with the residents granted rights as Israelis while living in Palestine? Would they be islands of Israel within Palestine, protected by Israeli security personnel? Or would all of those possibilities fall to the notion of Palestine as free of Israelis.

Roger Cohen is right when he says that Israeli angst is one of the obstacles to peace. But he misses the point in claiming it an important obstacle, given the nay sayers who speak for so much of the Arab and Muslim communities, and the failure of any Palestinian leaders to say anything that suggests flexibility.

Israel itself is the principal obstacle for Islamic theologians and Arab ideologues who are guarding the flank of Palestine, and have a following among Palestinians who others call "moderate."

So Israel's Great Game is largely pretense. Currently the conversation between Jerusalem and Washington is about more goods allowed into Gaza, the release of some Palestinian prisoners, and the removal of some check points in the West Bank, as inducements for some kind of negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian (Fatah) officials.

The game being played by Palestinian moderates is also a shame. Mahmoud Abbas spends his time in conferences, many of them in the capitals of Muslim and Western governments, marked by handshakes, photos, and the platitudes of peace and justice. Another one of those meetings is scheduled for the White House.

If Arabic words meaning "flexibility" or "compromise" figure in those meetings, they have eluded the media reports.

Will negotiations occur? Will the participants show any flexibility? Will they get to issues of water, sewage treatment, and other knotty issues that never seem to have been the subject of previous negotiations?

And what about the 250,000 or so Palestinians living in East Jerusalem? The assumption is that they will become Palestinians. But no one to my knowledge has raised the issue of a referendum. Maybe the people would prefer their status quo, with assured access to employment in Israel, as well as Israeli health insurance and social services.

If anyone is really serious about ending this game, there is a great deal of work to do.

So far, we have not gotten beyond opening gambits, Obama rhetoric, and all those who sign on to his slogans.

The White House demands Israeli flexibility, so Israeli officials scurry hither and yon among themselves to produce yet another list of trivial concessions, while holding to what they are not ready--or not yet ready--to concede.

Instead of any effort to educate his people about the essence of give as well as take, Mahmoud Abbas, the aging leader of Fatah, still in office 15 months beyond the end of his term, has asked President Obama to impose a solution on Israel.

The Great Game of Russia and Great Britain petered out without clear resolution with the end of the Czars and the weakening of Great Britain in The Great War.

Israel's Great Game is puttering along on an appropriately low flame, waiting for the end of the Obama presidency.

--
Ira Sharkansky (Emeritus)
Department of Political Science
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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