Martin Sherman
Jewish Journal
Consider the following facts regarding Israel’s parliamentary history:
(a) For 20 of the 28 years between 1977 and 2005 — from
when Likud first won elections on a platform of “Greater Israel” until a Likud-led government withdrew unilaterally from Gaza, in stark contradiction to its electoral pledges — the Israeli prime minister came from the ranks of Likud.
(b) When Likud first came to power, the entire Sinai Peninsula was under Israeli control, and any suggestion of evacuating the Jordan Valley, dividing Jerusalem or withdrawing from the Golan was unthinkable.
c) Yet today, a third of a century since Menachem Begin’s dramatic electoral victory, the above are either already faits accomplis or acceptable topics in mainstream political discourse.
Clearly, this demonstrates that while the “right-wing” consistently wins elections, it never truly gets power — something that can only be explained by the existence of extra-political factors that influence and distort political outcomes. These factors have virtually nullified the Israeli democratic process.
Thus, Yitzhak Rabin, elected in 1992 on the basis of a series of hawkish “nays,” radically switched his policy in midterm to dovish “yeas,” which begot the Oslo fiasco.
More dramatically, Ariel Sharon, elected on a platform opposing unilateral withdrawal, later adopted precisely such a policy rejected by voters at the polls.
Two common explanations for these cases of flagrant disregard of electoral pledges must be summarily repudiated.
The first is that they were the result of international — particularly United States — pressure.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In the case of Oslo, the entire process was covertly (mis)conceived by Israelis without any international coercion. Indeed, the PLO, co-signatory to these unfortunate accords, was still listed as a terror organization by the U.S. government at the time. Likewise, disengagement was not a product of American pressure; in fact, Washington initially opposed it and had to be convinced by Sharon of its merits.
The second is that dovish policies of territorial concessions contain some far-sighted wisdom that makes the post-election abandonment of more hawkish platforms inevitable.
Indeed, it is astonishing to see ostensibly “hawkish” politicians adopting, once elected, “dovish” policies they previously repudiated. These policies have proved disastrous, which makes further adherence to them incomprehensible.
So, if the most dramatic political initiatives of the last two decades cannot be attributed to international pressure, the far-sighted wisdom of Israeli leaders or the preferences of the Israeli electorate, to what can they be ascribed?
The answer lies in Israel’s sociological structure, rather than its political mechanisms. Specifically, it lies in the composition of Israel’s civil-society elites who control the legal establishment, dominate mainstream media and hold sway in academia (at least in the social sciences and humanities — where the politically correct overrides the factually correct.)
These groups comprise a trinity of influence that dominates the socio-political process in Israel, sets the direction of the national agenda, and imposes its views on elected officials and the public.
For example, the legal elite can impede any assertive initiative the electorate may wish to implement; the media elite can promote any concessionary initiative the electorate may be loath to implement; and when the stamp of professional approval is required, the academic elite is ever ready to provide it.
One needs little analytical acumen to see that these were the mechanisms that generated — and still sustain — the major political initiatives of the last two decades.
Accordingly, understanding the genesis of political realities in Israel requires understanding the worldview and cost-benefit analyses of these powerful elites.
For them, peer group approval from abroad is far more important than approval from Israeli citizens. Invitations for keynote speeches at high-profile conventions, appointments at prestigious institutes and lucrative grants for research are far more likely to be awarded to those empathetic to the Palestinian narrative rather than committed to the Zionist one.
This generates a Weltanschauung that is not merely a political opinion formed by a rational evaluation of facts, which could be amended should the facts change.
Instead, it is an almost cultlike psycho-sociological syndrome, strongly linked to a sense of self-worth, peer-group status, social acceptability, professional prestige and even to sources of livelihood. Raising doubts about the validity of conventional wisdom can bring heavy penalties — personally and professionally.
Inevitably, this prevents its adherents — and those under their influence — from portraying the Arabs in general, and the Palestinians in particular, in their true light.
Any accurate portrayal of their cruelty and corruption, their brutality and backwardness, would make the dominant elites’ worldview look ridiculous and irresponsible, which would in turn gravely undermine any policy advocating a Palestinian entity barely a mile from the national parliament, overlooking Ben-Gurion airport, adjacent to the trans-Israel highway and atop crucial water resources.
These elites thus portray the Arab/Palestinian side more favorably, and the Israeli side more negatively, than reality warrants — otherwise there would be no justification for, nor sanity in, handing over areas of vital strategic importance to Arab/Palestinian control.
This political worldview’s influence on Israeli policy has grave consequences for the preservation of Israeli security and democracy.
First, security: The aversion to depicting the real nature of the Arab world prevents Israel from creating international understanding for the dangers it faces — and the security imperatives they necessitate.
Second, democracy: These elite-induced policy reversals constitute a powerful disincentive for participating in the electoral process — indeed for considering it worthwhile at all. For what is the point of voting a party into power if it ends up implementing precisely what the voters rejected? And once the electorate loses faith in democratic governance, what is there to prevent the onset of alternative forms of governance?
Contending with this phenomenon is no easy matter in a democracy, and the operational details of a strategy to address it are beyond the scope of this essay.
However, whatever form such a strategy might take, it would need to begin with an accurate articulation of the problem; its objective would be to expose those responsible for these dangerous distortions, unveil their myopia and/or their malice, undermine their standing and erode their status. This is the only way to neutralize their influence and contain the enormous damage that they inflict on the nation.
Martin Sherman is the 2009-2010 visiting Israeli Schusterman scholar at USC/HUC-JIR and the academic director of the Jerusalem Summit. He lectures at Tel Aviv University, served in Israel’s defense establishment and was a ministerial adviser to the Yitzhak Shamir government.
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