Doc's Talk: Iran: Using Oil as a Weapon

Friday, September 10, 2010

Iran: Using Oil as a Weapon

Timeline: Iran’s Impact on Oil Prices

Iran’s ongoing nuclear program, opposed by almost all of the international community, has contributed significantly to higher oil prices[1] by creating numerous fears among those in the oil industry. Oil traders, for example, are concerned that Iran’s nuclear ambitions will lead to a war that will interrupt the supply of Middle Eastern oil. An even greater fear is that Iran would pursue a war strategy of attacking non-Iranian vessels in the Straits of Hormuz to disrupt the shipment of oil from other Gulf countries.

Forty percent of the world’s internationally traded oil travels through the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf.[2] Traders ask for higher prices to hedge against the possibility of a disruption in the oil supply. This “risk premium” does not account for future price changes should a disruption in the supply of oil actually occur; rather, it reflects the probability that oil may increase in value in the near future. If Iran were unable to export its usual production of oil due to war, this too would raise prices.
Current policies of the Iranian government not related to nuclear energy have also helped keep the price of oil high. The Iranian government’s opposition to any increase in the oil production of nations belonging to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has raised prices by limiting the supply of available oil from OPEC nations.[3]

Iran has attempted to use its oil wealth to undermine the value of the U.S. dollar by discouraging the use of the dollar for foreign oil company payments,[4] even though the dollar is the traditional currency used for oil deals. According to the National Iranian Oil Company, 85 percent of Iranian oil is purchased using euros or yen.[5] Despite this effort, the effect on the value of the U.S. dollar remains minimal.[6]

Oil as a Weapon in Wartime

Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, stated in a June 2008 interview that in case of war, Iran would seek to establish military control over the Straits of Hormuz and the transportation of oil from the region.[7] "If there is a confrontation between us and the enemy from outside the region,” Jafari said, “definitely the scope [of the confrontation] will reach the oil issue."[8]

Iran pursued a similar military strategy during the phase of the Iran-Iraq War between 1981 and 1987 that was dubbed the ‘Tanker War’[9] when Iraq and Iran attacked oil tankers belonging to each other; Iran also attacked tankers belonging to any country supporting Iraq.[10] As a result, shipping in the Gulf region dropped 25 percent during this period.[11] The effect the war had on oil prices is hard to quantify. The price of oil reached a peak in 1982 before the attacks on shipping became wide-scale and the price declined thereafter.[12] Moreover, the effect may be different if war were to occur now because of changes in the oil market since the 1980s.[13] With today’s rising oil price, disruption in Persian Gulf shipping could lead to a further significant price increase.

Regional instability caused by Iran-backed terror groups is another problem. Such groups may participate in any Iranian response to an attack.[14] The July 2006 war between Israel and the Iran-backed terror group Hezbollah caused the world price of oil to rise. [15]

Iranian-sponsored terror groups include Lebanese-based Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Syrian-offshoot Palestinian Fatah al-Intifada and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC). [16] Iran provides these terrorist organizations money, training, and arms.[17] Jafari, the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, has specifically stated that Hezbollah may participate in an Iranian-orchestrated counter-response to an attack on Iran’s nuclear installations.[18]

Iran’s geostrategic location and role as world oil supplier puts it in a strong position to influence oil prices, as demonstrated by the fact that:

* It is estimated that the cumulative effect of Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East have led to a $10 to $15 per barrel increase in the price of oil;[19]
* Iran is the second largest oil producer in OPEC.[20] Iran exports 2.6 million barrels of oil per day;[21]
* 20 percent of the world’s oil and 40 percent of the world’s internationally traded oil travels through the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf;[22]
* The Straits of Hormuz are 34 miles (21 kilometers) wide at their narrowest point.[23] At this section there are two mile-wide channels (one in each direction) for tanker traffic and a two mile-wide buffer zone, making the straits extremely vulnerable to blockade.[24]

Iran’s Effect on Natural Gas Prices

* Iran has the second largest proven natural gas reserves in the world after Russia, with an estimated 974 trillion cubic feet of proven reserves.[25]
* 62 percent of Iran’s natural gas fields are undeveloped.[26]

There have been rumors in the natural gas industry that Iran is part of an attempt to create a natural gas cartel similar to OPEC.[27] The suggested members of a future cartel are the countries currently participating in the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, a technical assistance and cooperation organization formed in Iran that includes Russia, Iran, Qatar, Algeria and Kazakhstan.[28] Its first meeting was held in Tehran in May 2001.[29] See below for a timeline detailing Iran’s effect on world oil prices during the last several months.

Timeline: Iran’s Impact on Oil Prices

July 11, 2008: Oil jumps $5 to $147 a barrel due to concerns about oil supplies from Iran, Nigeria, and Brazil.[30]

July 9, 2008: Oil rises by $1 after Iran test-fires nine medium range missiles.[31]

July 4, 2008: Oil drops by $1 after Iran says it will respond to a proposal made by the five permanent Security Council members and Germany regarding its nuclear program.[32]

July 1, 2008: Oil prices increase after an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report is released and tensions between Israel and Iran increase.[33]

June 30, 2008: Oil rises $3 to $143 a barrel after Iran threatens to blockade the Straits of Hormuz if attacked.[34]

June 25, 2008: Price of oil dips below $138 a barrel after Iranian official denies rumors that an attack on its nuclear facilities has occurred.[35]

May 16, 2008: Oil reaches $127 after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announces that Tehran is studying a plan to reduce oil output.[36]

Feb. 24, 2008: U.S. crude oil prices hit a record high of $101.32 after Iranian Oil Minister Gholamhossein Nozari rejects Western entreaties for an increase in oil production.[37]

Nov. 19, 2007: Venezuela and Iran advocate raising the price of oil and divesting from the U.S. dollar at an OPEC meeting. President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, backed by Iran, tells OPEC to become an "active political agent" and threatens that oil would reach $200 if the U.S. attacked Iran.[38]

Oct. 26, 2007: Oil prices close at a record $90.46 a barrel as the U.S. imposes sanctions on Iran for its support of terrorism and issues warnings about its nuclear program.[39]

July 31, 2007: Oil prices increase as the Iranian press reports that the Islamic Republic does not support higher oil production.[40]

May 29, 2007: Oil prices fall by $2 to $63.15, due in part to talks between the U.S. and Iran. [41]

Apr. 04, 2007: The price of oil falls $1.30 to $64.64 after President Ahmadinejad agrees to release 15 British nationals detained two weeks earlier.[42]

Feb 19, 2007: The U.S. sends a second aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf and threatens to kill or arrest Iranians working with insurgents in Iraq. Fear of a future conflict with Iran increases the oil price and “risk premium.”[43]

Sep. 19, 2006: Oil prices in Asia pass the $64 mark with apprehension in the commodities market. Oil traders are worried about Iranian threats to cease inspections of its nuclear facilities.[44]

Apr. 11, 2006: Disruptions in the oil supply from Nigeria, and speculation over a U.S.-Iran military conflict elevate oil prices. [45]

Jan. 29, 2006: Oil prices climb as the international community clashes with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. President Ahmadinejad threatens production cuts if punitive measures are taken against Iran. Fears of Iran’s potential reaction add $10 risk premium to oil prices.[46]

Dec. 29, 2005: Oil prices rise in response to a comment by the Iranian deputy oil minister? that OPEC should cut output in the following month.[47]

Aug. 02, 2005: Oil futures and the price of crude oil reach new highs after Iran threatens to restart its nuclear activities.[48]

June 28, 2005: Oil prices rise 70 cents to $60.54, an increase of more than 1 percent, following the election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[49]

Mar. 15, 2005: Iran disagrees with a Saudi Arabian plan to increase oil production in order to ease prices. Instead, an Iranian official states that high prices are “not in our hands.”[50]

Feb. 15, 2005: Oil prices briefly rise more than $1 following conflicting reports of an explosion, later revealed to have been innocuous, near a nuclear power plant in southern Iran.[51]

Jan. 30, 2005: Iran announces OPEC’s decision to raise the target oil price. The Iranian oil minister states that political factors, such as perceived U.S. threats over Iran’s nuclear program, caused the price rise. “Any threat or ballyhoo can lead to price increases,” says the minister.[52]

June 4, 2004: The Iranian oil minister says that the American “occupying force” in the Middle East contributes to the rise in oil prices.[53]
Nov. 15, 2004: Oil prices reach their lowest levels in almost two months after Iran, in talks with Britain, France and Germany, agrees to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.[54]

Footnotes:

[1] “Main risks to crude oil supply lie in Iran, Nigeria, Gulf of Mexico,” AFX Asia, June 21, 2007; “Wall Street outlook lower on rising oil prices, Microsoft patent ruling,” AFX Asia, Feb. 23, 2007; Surowiecki, James, “Troubled waters over oil,” The New Yorker, Feb. 19, 2007, retrieved on July 27, 2008 from http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2007/02/19/070219ta_talk_surowiecki; Herbst, Moira, “Oil, Guns, and Iran,” Business Week, March 29, 2007, retrieved on July 27, 2008 from http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2007/db20070328_663022.htm

[2] Hargreaves, Steve, “Sizing up Iran’s oil threat,” CNNmoney.com, July 10, 2008 retrieved July 13, 2008 from http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/10/news/international/iran_oil/index.htm?section=money_topstories; Webb, Claire, “Record oil prices: Iran and the Strait of Hormuz,” Times Online (UK), July 3, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article4262388.ece

[3] “Iran says OPEC will not be pressured by oil consumers,” AFX Asia, Sep. 19, 2007.

[4] Schreck, Adam, “Under pressure from the U.S., Iran seeks to reduce its dollar intake,” The Associated Press, Oct. 11, 2007.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] “Iran to control Gulf oil route if attacked,” gulfnews.com, June 28, 2008, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/06/28/10224437.html

[8] Ibid.

[9] Cohen, Ariel, James Phillips and William Schirano, “Countering Iran’s oil weapon,” The Heritage Foundation, Nov. 13, 2006 retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iran/bg1982.cfm#_ftn5

[10] Sciolino, Elaine, “From air and sea, Iran-Iraq ‘tanker war’ heats up,” The New York Times, Sep. 3, 1987, retrieved on July 27, 2008 from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE3DA123BF930A3575AC0A961948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1

[11] Webb, Claire, “Record oil prices: Iran and the Strait of Hormuz,” The Times Online (UK), July 3, 2008, retrieved on July 27, 2008 from http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article4262388.ece

[12] “Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988),” globalsecurity.org, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm

[13] Cohen, Ariel, James Phillips and William Schirano, “Countering Iran’s oil weapon,” The Heritage Foundation, Nov. 13, 2006 retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iran/bg1982.cfm#_ftn5

[14] Engelhardt, Tom, “Why the US won’t attack Iran,” The Asia Times, July 11, 2008, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JG11Ak04.html

[15] “Israel assault on Lebanon and Gaza continues,” CBC News, July 14, 2006, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2006/07/13/israel-lebanon.html; Fattah, Hassan M. and Steven Erlanger, “Israel blockades Lebanon; wide strikes by Hezbollah,” The New York Times, July 14, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/14/world/middleeast/14mideast.html?pagewanted=print

[16] O’Brian, James M., “Exporting Jihad: Iran’s Use of Non-State Armed Groups,” The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, March 22, 2006. Paper presented at the 47th Annual International Studies Association

[17] “Country Reports on Terrorism 2007,” United States Department of State Publication, April 2008, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf, 172

[18] “Iran to control Gulf oil route if attacked,” gulfnews.com, June 28, 2008, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/06/28/10224437.html

[19] Surowiecki, James, “Troubled waters over oil,” The New Yorker, Feb. 19, 2007, Retrieved on July 27, 2008 from http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2007/02/19/070219ta_talk_surowiecki; Herbst, Moira, “Oil, Guns, and Iran,” Business Week, March 29, 2007, retrieved on July 27, 2008 from http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2007/db20070328_663022.htm

[20] “Iran: OPEC almost unable to cool oil prices,” Fars News Agency, July 2, 2008, retrieved on July 27, 2008 from http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8704121303

[21] Henderson, Simon, “Facing Iran’s Challenge: Safeguarding Oil Exports from the Persian Gulf,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 7, 2006, retrieved on July 27, 2008 from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2477

[22] Hargreaves, Steve, “Sizing up Iran’s oil threat,” CNNmoney.com, July 10, 2008 retrieved July 13, 2008 from http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/10/news/international/iran_oil/index.htm?section=money_topstories; Webb, Claire, “Record oil prices: Iran and the Strait of Hormuz,” Times Online (UK), July 3, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article4262388.ece

[23] “U.S. sub, Japanese merchant ship collide,” AP, January 8, 2007, retrieved on July 27, 2008 from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16533096/

[24] Ibid.

[25] “Iran: natural gas,” Energy Information Administration website. Retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/NaturalGas.html

[26] Ibid.

[27] “Russia and other energy exporters are forming a gas cartel,” APS Review Gas Market Trends, Nov. 20, 2006.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] “Oil price rises after Iran fears,” Reuters, retrieved July, 27, 2008 from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/06/25/10223594.html

[31] “Oil rise following Iran missile test,” Bloomberg, July 9, 2008.

[32] “Oil sheds over $1 to drop below $145,” Reuters, July 4, 2008.

[33] “Oil rises after slipping from earlier record,” gulfnews.com, July 1, 2008, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/07/01/10225173.html

[34] “Oil hit new record at $143 sparked by Mideast tensions,” gulfnews.com, June 30, 2008, http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/06/30/10224947.html

[35] “Oil dips below $138 after rising on Iran attack rumor,” gulfnews.com, June 25, 2008, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/08/06/25/10223594.html

[36] “Money behind Iran’s move to review production level,” Reuters, May 16, 2008.

[37] Thomas, Nathalie, “No respite over crude as Iran vows to support OPEC oil cut,” The Scotland, Feb. 24, 2008

[38] Dan Murphy, Christian Science Monitor, "OPEC's lost sway over oil prices," Nov. 19, 2007, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1119/p01s01-wogn.htm

[39] Mufson, Steven, “Strike on Iran Would Roil Oil Markets, Experts Say,” The Washington Post, Oct. 26, 2007, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/25/AR2007102502840_pf.html

[40] “Oil up on expectations EIA will report further crude draw, OPEC comments UPDATE,” Forbes, July 31, 2007, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2007/07/31/afx3969610.html

[41] "Oil Prices fall more than $2 a barrel after Nigeria president inaugurated, Iran-U.S. talks," International Herald Tribune, May 29, 2007, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/05/29/business/NA-FIN-MKT-Oil-Prices.php

[42] Schneiderman, R.M., “Oil Prices Expected To Remain High,” Forbes, Apr. 04, 2007, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.forbes.com/markets/2007/04/04/oil-iran-greatbritain-markets-equity-cx_rs_0404markets15.html

[43] Surowiecki, James, “Troubled Waters Over Oil,” New Yorker, Feb. 19, 2007, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2007/02/19/070219ta_talk_surowiecki

[44] Lumpur, Kuala, “Crude prices rise, pass US$64 mark on renewed Iran jitters; delays in BP platform startup,” The International Herald Tribune, Sep. 19, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/09/19/business/AS_FIN_MKT_Oil_Prices.php

[45] Kollewe, Julia, “Fears of US conflict with Iran send oil prices to record highs,” The Independent, Apr. 11, 2006,

[46] Stewart, Heather, “Iran crisis 'could drive oil over $90'”, The Guardian, Jan. 29, 2006, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/jan/29/iran.oilandpetrol

[47] Xydias, Alexis, “European stock indexes fall as oil climbs,” The International Herald Tribune,” Dec. 29, 2005, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/28/news/bxstox.php

[48] Peltz, James F., “Oil Futures Set Record; Gas Soars; The death of King Fahd contributes to supply fears, pushing crude to a new high of $61.57,” The Los Angeles Times, Aug. 02, 2005, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/02/business/fi-oil2

[49] Mouawad, Jad, “Oil Settles Over $60 a Barrel as Iran News Rattles Market,” The New York Times, June 28, 2005, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500E7D71631F93BA15755C0A9639C8B63

[50] Mouawad, Jad, “For OPEC, Iran talks are a first in 34 years,” The International Herald Tribune, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/03/14/business/opec.php?page=2

[51] “Iran and Syria sign defense pact to face mutual ‘threat,’” The Guardian, Feb. 18, 2005, in Taipei Times, retrieved July 27, 2008 from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/02/18/2003223489/print

[52] “OPEC agrees to suspend oil price band,” Jan. 30, 2005, Iranian.ws, http://www.iranian.ws/cgi-bin/iran_news/exec/view.cgi/12/5518

[53] “Iran’s oil minister says political crisis contributes to rising oil prices,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, June 4, 2004

[54] Sciolino, Elaine, “Europeans Say Iran Agrees to Freeze Uranium Enrichment,” The New York Times, Nov. 16, 2004, retrieved July 27, 2008 from www.nytimes.com/2004/11/16/international/middleeast/16iran.html

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk