THE SOURCES OF IRANIAN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR

Harold Rhode

Executive Summary
 This analysis identifies patterns exhibited by the Iranian government and the Iranian people since ancient times. Most importantly, it identifies critical elements of Iranian culture that have been systematically ignored by policymakers for decades. It is a precise understanding of these cultural cues that should guide policy objectives toward the Iranian government.
Iranians expect a ruler to demonstrate resolve and strength, and do whatever it takes to remain in power. The Western concept of demanding that a leader subscribe to a moral and ethical code does not resonate with Iranians. Telling Iranians that their ruler is cruel will not convince the public that they need a new leader. To the contrary, this will reinforce the idea that their ruler is strong. It is only when Iranians become convinced that either their rulers lack the resolve to do what is necessary to remain in power or that a stronger power will protect them against their current tyrannical rulers, that they will speak out and try to overthrow leaders.

 Compromise (as we in the West understand this concept) is seen as a sign of submission and weakness. For Iranians, it actually brings shame on those (and on the families of those) who concede. By contrast, one who forces others to compromise increases his honor and stature, and is likely to continue forcing others to submit in the future. Iranians do not consider weakness a reason to engage an adversary in compromise, but rather as an opportunity to destroy them. It is for this reason that good-will and confidence-building measures should be avoided at all costs.
» 2

 What Iranians really believe, they usually keep to themselves. Instead, they tell those with power what they think their leaders want to hear. This is the concept of ketman, or dissimulation. Iranians do not consider ketman (taqiyah in Arabic) to be lying. And they have developed it into a fine art, which they view as a positive form of selfprotection.

 Western cultural biases regarding, and demanding, honesty make it easy to misunderstand Iranians. Iranians have learned to cope with adverse situations by being warm, gracious, polite, and obsequious. Westerners, especially Americans
who place a high value on candor, straightforwardness, and honesty, are often bamboozled by Iranians who know that those in the West are easily taken in by their effusively friendly, kind, generous, and engaging behavior.

 Negotiations are opportunities to best others, to demonstrate power, and to make sure opponents know who is the boss. In politics, Iranians negotiate only after defeating their enemies. During these negotiations, the victor magnanimously
dictates to the vanquished how things will be conducted thereafter. Signaling a desire to talk before being victorious is, in Iranian eyes, a sign of weakness or lack of will to win.

 When the West establishes itself as the most powerful force and shows strength and resolve, Iranians will most likely come on board. They do not want to be on the losing side. If military action is eventually required, the targeting of national symbols and leadership strongholds may be enough to demonstrate that the balance of power in Iran is quickly shifting. By applying this principle, the West may not need to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities or launch a large-scale invasion to bring down Iran’s rulers and stop the nuclear program.

 Iranians look around them and see that others in their neighborhood such as Russia, Israel, Pakistan, India, and China all have the bomb. To say that Iran shouldn’t have the bomb is considered an affront to Iranian patriotism. Using a little ingenuity, we could drive a wedge between the Iranian government and the Iranian people. We should make clear that we are not opposed to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. We are only opposed to the current government having a nuclear arsenal because it is the largest state-sponsor of terrorism in the world and does its utmost to undermine its neighbors and remove U.S. influence in the region. If the current government acquires nuclear weapons, it might very well use them.

 If the West is to succeed, Iranians must be convinced, in terms they understand, that America is prepared to establish itself as a powerful force and help the Iranian population liberate themselves from the tyranny under which they live.
» 3

Understanding Key Iranian Cultural Cues
The Iranian regime currently sits on the threshold of developing nuclear weapons, a
scenario that endangers the entire Middle East, the United States, and even Iranians
themselves. Yet this situation is by no means a new development.

Since the onset of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Iranian government has been
using every means at its disposal to terrorize the world. Governments in the West have
tried various approaches to dealing with the Iranian regime including appeasement,
negotiations, and sanctions. Yet the Iranian government has not been dissuaded from
sponsoring and implementing terror tactics, and has not been convinced to halt its
illegal nuclear program.

To the contrary, for the past 31 years the Iranian government has been further
emboldened by the West’s inability to deter the agenda of the Islamic Revolution.
The regime, today led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, continues to
widen its global axis of influence as it races toward nuclear weapons capacity at an
alarming pace.

Time is running short for the international community to prevent Iran from obtaining
nuclear weapons, which will undoubtedly be used as leverage over its neighbors in the
region as well as the West, if not detonated.

If the international community is going to succeed in aborting Iran’s nuclear agenda, a
rapid reassessment of policy is needed. The root causes of 30-plus years of diplomatic
failures must be exposed, and alternative strategies must be quickly implemented.
This analysis will not suggest precise courses of action for dealing with the nuclear
threat the world now faces at the hands of the Iranian regime. Rather, it identifies
patterns exhibited by the Iranian government and, for that matter, the Iranian people
since well before the onset of the Islamic Revolution.

Most importantly, it identifies critical elements of Iranian culture that have been
systematically ignored by policymakers for decades. It is a precise understanding of
these cultural cues that should guide policy objectives toward the Iranian government.
Many of the cultural elements found within Iran do not neatly align with values
embedded in Western-style diplomacy. Yet, if our understanding of Iranian culture does
not improve, and if Iranian values and cues are not internalized, we may find ourselves
outsmarted and bullied by an Iranian government operating under an active nuclear
umbrella.
» 4
The Resilience of Iranian Culture
Following Arab Conquest
The best way to understand the Iranian mind is to examine Iran’s storied history, and
consider how Iran has survived as a cultural and political entity since the advent of Islam.
Iranians have a strong sense of patriotism and loyalty to their country.1 Unlike most
other Muslim countries in the Arab world, Iran has existed as a cultural and political
entity for more than 2,500 years, long before the advent of Islam. Thus, Iranians have
always had a distinct sense of unique cultural and political identity.

Prior to the Arab-Islamic conquests of the seventh century, Iran had a long tradition of
conquering other nations and absorbing other peoples.

In order to protect its longstanding history, when conquered themselves, Iranians
allowed themselves to become subjected to foreign rule, yet developed a resiliency
to the politics and culture of their conquerors. Iranians essentially persuaded their
conquerors, “Come in and rule us, but do so using our ways, and assimilate into our
culture.”

In the 630s, Arab Muslims poured out of the Arabian Peninsula to conquer the world
in the name of Islam. Within 100 years they had captured the Arab world, crossed the
Straits of Gibraltar into Spain, and had expanded eastward into what is today Pakistan.

By 750, most of what we know today as the Arab world – the Middle East and North
Africa – had become Arabicized, linguistically and culturally. The local languages and
cultures were decimated. But not in Iran.2

During the 300 years that followed, the few Iranian documents and literature that came
out of the period were almost exclusively written in Arabic and are Islamic in nature.

Yet by the 900s, history notes an incredible transformation. The Persian language reemerged
as the spoken and written language of Iran, albeit written in Arabic letters and
with many Arabic words, but it was, linguistically and culturally, distinctly Persian.3

These Persian-speakers were now Muslims, but unlike their neighbors to the West, they
did not become Arabs.

To understand how this transformation occurred is to understand the resiliency of
the Iranian people. As a former conqueror, the Iranian population included senior
government officials who had the experience of ruling empires. The nomadic Arabs who
conquered Iran did not have experience ruling large territories and foreign peoples. They
needed help.
Unlike most other Muslim countries in the Arab world, Iran
has existed as a cultural and political entity for more than
2,500 years, long before the advent of Islam.
» 5
Persians stepped in and taught the nomads how to rule, and to do so in the Iranian style.
As a result, Persian culture was able to absorb its invaders and teach its conquerors how
to rule. Gradually, the new rulers became culturally Persianized, even if they were Arabs.
Within approximately 150 years of the Arab-Islamic conquests, Persian/Iranian political
culture became dominant in much of the eastern part of what we today know as the
Middle East, and in the eastern Islamic world which extended deep into today’s India.

In approximately 750, Abu Muslim, of the northeastern Iranian province of Khorasan,
led a revolt against the Arab-Islamic Umayyad dynasty that was ruling the Islamic
world from Damascus. Abu Muslim installed a descendent of the Muslim prophet
Muhammad’s uncle Abbas as the new caliph. The Persians essentially put the Abbasids
in power and taught them how to rule a large empire using Persian political culture as
their guide. The Islamic capital was moved from Damascus eastward to Baghdad, a city
much closer to the Iranian cultural orbit.4

Persian political culture soon began to dominate the capital of the Islamic Empire
in Baghdad. And the sophisticated and cunning Iranians, who were responsible for
creating the Abbasid dynasty, similarly developed a new Islamic culture based on a
synthesis of the dynasty’s Arab rulers5 and Persian culture. As such, Iranian culture was
able to successfully withstand its Arab conquerors. The Abbasid dynasty would reign
500 years until 1258, when the Mongols sacked Baghdad.

Major Principles of Iranian Culture
Many of the Iranian cultural concepts that were identified in classical Islamic times are
present in Iran to this day. Understanding these concepts provides insight into how to
deal with contemporary Iran’s government and its people.
What follows are a series of important principles or aspects of Iranian culture, with
vignettes and episodes that illustrate these principles in action. It is important to note
that both humor and proverb provide deep insight into a culture, and Iranian culture is
rich in both.

1. Respect for Power, Hero Worship
Iranians expect a ruler to demonstrate resolve and strength, and do whatever it takes
to remain in power. As such, it is the prerogative of Iranian rulers to be magnanimous
or cruel. Iranians fear but respect cruelty as a tool of maintaining power. Rulers are
expected to be cruel, and Iranians have a long tradition of placating their rulers.
The Western concept of demanding that a leader subscribe to a moral and ethical code
does not resonate with Iranians. Telling Iranians that their ruler is cruel will not convince
the public that they need a new leader. To the contrary, this will reinforce the idea that
their ruler is strong.
» 6
Iranians respect power. What Iranians don’t respect is weakness. It is when a ruler
appears weak that Iranians quickly turn on him, and look for another ruler to “worship.”6
It is only when Iranians become convinced that either their rulers lack the resolve to do
what is necessary to remain in power or a stronger power will protect them against their
current tyrannical rulers that they will speak out and try to overthrow leaders.

Khomeini retrieves the honor of Iran and of the Muslim world and
humiliates the U.S.
For centuries, it appeared to the Muslims that the non-Muslim world had been
conquering and dividing up the Muslim world. The West had thus humiliated
the Muslims, who proved powerless to stand up for themselves. The greatness of
Ayatollah Khomeini, from a Muslim point of view, was that he was able to make
the West answer to his dictates, in particular, humiliating the U.S. and restoring
the Islamic world’s honor.

Khomeini provided a model to the Muslim world, which observed carefully as
America submitted to Khomeini’s demands, particularly during the 444-day U.S.
Embassy hostage crisis.

While America and the West had the opportunity to restore their own honor
and respect, and stop Khomeini in his tracks, they did not. The Western display
of weakness encouraged Khomeini to escalate the situation and continue to
humiliate America.

That is why so many young Muslims – both Shiite and Sunni – affixed Khomeini’s
picture everywhere throughout the Muslim world. Khomeini restored Islam’s
honor. And Iran is continuing to follow Khomeini’s model today through
its dogged pursuit of nuclear weaponry and its undermining its neighbors.
Moreover, Iran’s regime is strengthened by what is, at best, the West’s weak
response.

Iranians respect power. When a ruler appears weak, Iranians
quickly turn on him, and look for another ruler to “worship.”
» 7
Iranian students in 1978: “Death to the Shah, Long Live Khomeini,
Who is Khomeini?”

During the earlier and mid-stages of the Iranian Revolution when the Shah
was still in power, an American studying at a university in a religious city in Iran
related the following story:

He asked his fellow students which of six Grand Ayatollahs7 their families
followed – including the as-yet-publicly-unheard-of Ayatollah Khomeini. The
students either feigned ignorance or mentioned the name of the well-known,
non-political, Chief Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariat-Madari.8
Shortly thereafter, people began rioting in the streets against the regime. After
the Shah proved either unable or unwilling to put down the riots, these same
Iranian students began demonstrating in the streets, chanting, “Death to the
Shah, Long Live Khomeini.”

At the time of the revolution, the Shah proved he was weak because he did
not put down the riots, and this grand ayatollah named Khomeini kept saying
publicly what he planned to do after the Shah left. The Shah and his allies either
did not or could not stop Khomeini from talking.

The students, who felt the current shifting, believed they had better jump on
Khomeini’s bandwagon to protect themselves. What these students shouted at
these demonstrations meant little to them emotionally. What really mattered
was that they not end up supporting the losing side.

Somewhat surprisingly, these same students, after demonstrating for Khomeini,
contacted the American studying with them and asked him, “Who is Khomeini?”
The students wanted to know about Khomeini, for whom they had just
demonstrated, and remembered that the American had previously mentioned
Khomeini’s name. They assumed he knew more about Khomeini than they did,
so they contacted him. Iranians saw that power was shifting and, in typical
Iranian fashion, quickly gravitated to the new strongman, even though most had
no idea who he was.

From the Western point of view, this teaches us a great deal about the Islamic
Revolution of 1978/79. While it appeared that the country genuinely supported
Khomeini, most did not even know who he was.

In the Islamic Revolution of 1978/79, Iranians saw that power was
shifting and quickly gravitated to Khomeini, the new strong man,
even though most had no idea who he was.
» 8

2. Respect for Iran’s History
Iranians are proud of their 2,500-year history and want to see their nation’s pride
restored. Iranians feel humiliated that their beloved country is vilified abroad, and a
large number know that their tyrannical, terrorist rulers are the reason their country is
seen as a pariah. They want to be able to travel the world freely, as citizens of a highlyrespected
country, as they had done under the Shah.

Yet this desired return to normalcy is unlikely under the current regime. Positive change
is unlikely to occur until Iran is ruled by a regime that seeks freedom for the Iranian
people, ends its support for international terrorism, and supports an inclusive polity
where every Iranian has an opportunity to succeed.

Nevertheless, as long as the current leadership is perceived as the strongest power in
the country, Iranians will not rise up to overthrow their rulers. And unfortunately, the
balance of power within Iran is unlikely to shift without support – probably both overt
and covert – from the outside.

How Iran became Shiite
Before the Safavids came to power in Iran in the early 1500s, all of the states surrounding
Iran were ruled by Sunni Turks who adhered to the (relatively liberal) Hanafi law school.
By choosing Shi’ism, the Safavids – who were themselves Turks – provided Iran with
another layer of protection against the surrounding states and thereby gave Iran
another way to preserve its unique cultural and political identity. Even more amazing
is that most of Iran, which had been overwhelmingly Sunni prior to the Safavids,
converted to Shi’ism within 100 years.

Has the Iranian government made the Iranian people anti-Muslim?
Even though the regime calls itself Islamic, many mullahs loathe the regime because
they believe it is destroying Islam. It is estimated that more than 75 percent of the
mullahs oppose the regime but do not do so actively because public opposition might
get them arrested or worse.

Today, many mullahs are afraid to walk the streets in religious garb because drivers
“accidentally” go through puddles and splash dirty water on them, or throw things out
the window at them and drive away. When mullahs travel on buses or walk the streets in
clerical garb, the other travelers often subject these mullahs to scorn and harassment.
» 9

3. Compromise and Good-Will as Signs of Weakness
To those in the West, compromise and gestures of good-will are seen as useful tools
displaying reasoned thinking, to accomplish mutually beneficial results. Iranians
internalize these concepts very differently.

In Iran, compromise is seen as a sign of submission and weakness. Compromise actually
brings shame on those (and on the families of those) who concede. By contrast, one who
forces others to compromise increases his honor9 and stature, and is likely to continue
forcing others to submit in the future.

Good-will and confidence-building measures are interpreted as a lack of strength or
resolve. To Iranians, these measures are seen only as concessions, in the most negative
connotation of the word.

One coming from a position of strength will only make a concession if he is absolutely
sure that doing so will actually consolidate and therefore increase his power. If one
believes that his adversary will gain even the slightest advantage through such a
measure, he will never concede an inch.

Iranians loathe weakness. Iranians do not consider weakness a reason to engage
adversaries in compromise, but rather as an opportunity to destroy them. It is for this
reason that measures of good-will and confidence-building should be avoided at all
costs.

Talking with the Iranians
In late 2006, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq and the U.S. commander of the Multi-
National Force in Iraq held talks with the Iranian ambassador to Iraq. From the
Iranian cultural vantage point, the fact that the U.S. was willing to sit down with
Iran was proof that the U.S. was weak and looking for a way out of Iraq. The
Iranians responded by escalating the attacks against the U.S. inside Iraq. These
attacks only subsided when the Iranians saw America show resolve militarily by
responding with great force. Only then did they back down.
Iranians do not consider weakness a reason to engage adversaries in
compromise, but rather as an opportunity to destroy them.
» 10

Later, when the Obama administration signaled its desire to sit down to
negotiations with the Iranians, the Iranians hardened their stand on the nuclear
issue. Talking before winning shows weakness, and the Iranian government
interpreted Obama’s attempts at dialogue as a sign of weakness. What we in
the West see as good-will, the Iranians understand as weakness, so they had no
incentive to soften their positions. And when Iranians smell weakness, like others
in the Middle East, they go in for the kill.
Iran’s diametrically opposite reactions toward the U.S. and the USSR
following responses to acts of Iranian aggression

During the 1978-79 revolution, why did the Iranians react so vehemently and
violently against the Americans, who though not Muslim believe in God, yet
kowtowed to the Soviets who were atheists?10

The Iranians feared the Soviets. When harmed, Russians have a reputation
for killing people. Americans, on the other hand, have a reputation for trying
to negotiate. Our leaders and diplomats often say, “Oh, what have we done
to offend you? How can we put it right? Perhaps we can make some kind of
compromise?” Iranians see the typical Russian reaction as exhibiting strength.
They see America’s reaction as exhibiting weakness.

When the Iranian terrorists took U.S. diplomats hostage in 1979,11 they originally
expected to hold them for a few days, hoping to sabotage meetings then taking place
in Algiers between U.S. National Security Advisor Brzezinski and Iranian Prime Minister
Bazargan. President Carter and his advisors called for negotiations to “end the crisis.” The
Iranians understood the American reaction as fearful. No one asks to negotiate before
he wins. The “student” terrorists saw they had a good thing going and extended the
hostage crisis for 444 days. Muslims around the world admired them for humiliating the
Americans and restoring Iran’s – and the Muslim world’s – honor.

When and why did the hostage-holders release the American diplomats? Iran
put the hostages on a plane less than an hour before Ronald Reagan became
president. The hostages left Iranian airspace when Reagan raised his hand and
took the oath of office. The Iranian “students” believed Reagan was a cowboy and
feared he would “level” Tehran.
Iran released the U.S. diplomats it had held hostage for 444 days
an hour before Ronald Reagan became president. They believed
Reagan was a cowboy and feared he would “level” Tehran.
» 11
Interestingly, during the hostage crisis, a group of Iranian terrorists also occupied
the Soviet embassy in Tehran. But they quickly left, because Moscow informed
Tehran that if the Iranians did not leave the Soviet Embassy within hours, Tehran
would be bombed.

In both the American and Soviet cases, what determined Iranian actions was
the credible threat of force versus a position of compromise, not Shari’a laws
regarding Christians and atheists.

4. Ketman/Taqi yah: Masking One ’s True Thoughts –
Dissimulation12
Iran is a “top to bottom” society. The flow of information emanates from above and
almost never from below. Leaders tell the population what they are expected to do, and
the population falls in line. Iranians do not reverse the flow of information. Unless their
leaders appear weak, the people do not stand up and tell their leaders the truth.
What Iranians really believe, they usually keep to themselves. Instead, they tell those
with power what they think their leaders want to hear. This is the concept of ketman,
or dissimulation. Iranians do not consider ketman (taqiyah in Arabic) to be lying.
And they have developed it into a fine art, which they view positively as a form of
self-preservation. Through the rampant use of this device, it is nearly impossible to
determine what Iranians really believe.

It comes as no surprise that when Iranians think they aren’t being observed, they often
do the opposite of what they may have just said they believe. As a result, Iranian rulers
have almost no way of knowing what people think, and must resort to manipulation and
force to keep themselves in power.

Ketman makes it very difficult to measure public opinion, because the primary
consideration of people being interviewed is whether and how the interviewer could
hurt them. Iranians will only say what they truly believe when they are absolutely sure
they will not suffer adverse consequences.

The Onion
It is not surprising that Iranians love the symbolism of the onion to describe their
culture. The core of an onion is surrounded by many layers. For more than 2,500 years,
Iranians have surrounded themselves like an onion with layers and layers to protect
their core. The core is so well protected through layers of obfuscation that Iranians
themselves often may not know what their core beliefs are regarding many issues.
» 12
5. Dealing wi th Ketman/Taqiyah
Western cultural biases regarding, and demanding, honesty make it easy to
misunderstand Iranians. Iranians believe that history has been unkind to them, and
have learned to cope with adverse situations by being warm, gracious, polite, and
obsequious. Westerners, especially Americans who place a high value on candor,
straightforwardness, and honesty, are often bamboozled by Iranians who know that
those in the West are easily taken in by their effusively friendly, kind, generous, and
engaging behavior.

Iranians put a great deal of thought into determining what they think we want to hear.
Furthermore, when obvious contradictions are pointed out that Iranians don’t want
to address, they usually just stare back as if they do not understand or see the logical
inconsistencies.

Iranians oftentimes will express empathy and sympathy with beautiful and kind words.
But these words will usually not be backed by any action and can often be rendered
meaningless. Iranians are very skilled at lulling individuals into traps and pulling the
wool over unsuspecting eyes.

It is because of ketman that Iranians themselves attach little meaning to words, which
are often empty, and place much more emphasis on action. Westerners should similarly
judge Iranians primarily by their actions, and place diminished reliance on statements.

Compartmentalizing reality: Iranian Ambassador on ABC’s “Nightline”
Shortly after the Iran-Iraq War started, Ted Koppel of ABC’s “Nightline” program
invited Iranian Ambassador to the UN Mansour Farhang to appear on his
program and explain Iran’s stance on the war. Farhang had spent many years in
the U.S. and was well acquainted with American culture.

Farhang accused the Iraqis of violating international law by having invaded
Iran. Koppel responded indignantly, asking Farhang, “How dare you talk about
violating international law? You are now holding 51 American diplomats
hostage, in flagrant violation of international law. Farhang responded without
batting an eyelash: “Your diplomats are our guests.”

From Farhang’s facial gestures, a viewer would have had no idea that Farhang
thought he was lying. And there was nothing Koppel could do to make him say
otherwise.
Iranians put a great deal of thought into determining what they
think we want to hear.
» 13
6. Trust, Loyalty
When the Shah’s regime began to totter, many people who had been loyal to the Shah
for years went over to the side of the Islamic Revolution. They did this overnight, hoping
to protect themselves, their families, their investments, etc.

It is extremely difficult to know precisely where an Iranian’s loyalty lies. What matters
most to Iranians is survival. Iranians will often make bargains as a means to protect
themselves, not as a means of aligning with likeminded individuals.

Iranians are typically not willing to sacrifice much, let alone their lives, for an idea or for a
leader. (And when they do, it is almost always as part of large groups.)

Opinions and deeply-held beliefs are secondary. Most Iranians are prepared to
diametrically change their opinions the moment they perceive it to be in their interest to
do so.
Being pro-Shah and pro-mullah at the same time
Before the revolution, an American noted that a certain family in Tehran hung pictures
on the living room wall of themselves with the Shah and the Shah’s wife. This family
had many American friends. When the mullahs took over in 1979, this family remained
in Iran. This seemed strange since, to the outside observer, their wall pictures and
friendships with Americans were recipes for trouble with the new regime.

About five years later, another American visited this family in Tehran and dined at their
home. The American visitor was told by their mutual American friend about the pictures
that had been on the wall. The American visitor noticed that there were photos on the
wall of this family with senior mullahs, taken about 10-15 years previously.

After dinner, while drinking coffee in the salon, the American visitor casually mentioned
that their mutual American acquaintance had described a very different set of pictures
on the wall. The family members laughed and said, “Tell our mutual American friend
that the pictures now hanging on our walls were in a very safe hiding place during the
previous regime. And tell him also that the pictures he remembered from before are in
that very same hiding place.”

Iranians, in short, believe they must be ready for anything and these pictures were proof
that whatever happened, this family could demonstrate that they supported whoever
was in power. Iranians have developed a fine sense of being able to know the exact
moment to display whatever pictures or other evidence they need to prove fidelity.
Curiously, this is similar to the old American political adage often heard in Washington:
“I have one set of principles. But if you don’t like them, I have another.”
» 14
7. Keep Your Options Open: Have Friends in Every Camp
Rulers can change their minds in an instant. Coups can happen without notice. For this
reason, it is good to have connections – and especially relatives – among all groups
vying for power.

It is not uncommon to observe several sons of a single family aligned with various
groups. One son may be in a religious seminary, others in various opposition groups,
and still others in the bazaar (in the business world). On the surface, it might appear that
these sons hold views that are diametrically opposed to each other. But Iranians see this
as hedging their bets. Regardless of who comes to power, their family and interests are
protected.
The importance of having connections everywhere
A young Iranian was studying engineering in an American university. He had a brother
who was studying to become a mullah in Qom, another brother working with their
uncle in the bazaar in Tehran, and another in the Tudeh – i.e., the Iranian Communist
party. Still another was very active in an opposition group in Los Angeles. When
asked how it was possible that brothers and extended family members seem to be in
almost every camp, the student laughed and in a moment of candor said, “You don’t
understand us. Like any good Iranian family, we hedge our bets. None of us believe in
anything in particular. All we care about is our own security. By having someone in every
camp, we know that whoever ends up ruling our country, our family will be protected.”

8. The Art of Negotiation
Negotiations are opportunities to best others, to demonstrate power, and to defeat
opponents. Iranians do not see bargaining as an opportunity to establish win-win
situations. Contracts are little more than pieces of paper Iranians will sign, if these
papers can advance their interests. Their signatures are not guarantees that they will
carry out the terms of the contract.

In politics, Iranians negotiate only after defeating their enemies. During these
negotiations, the victor magnanimously dictates to the vanquished how things will be
conducted thereafter. Signaling a desire to talk before being victorious is, in Iranian eyes,
a sign of weakness or lack of will to win.
With Iranians, offering to come to the negotiation table before
winning can escalate violence and invite demands for further
concessions.
» 15
Iranians will usually attempt to capitalize on a perceived weakness. When dealing with
Iranians, it is important to understand that offering to come to the negotiation table
before winning can escalate violence and invite Iranian demands for further concessions.

The art of “besting”: Business dealings with Iranians
American businessmen in Iran in the 1970s learned that Iranians often violate
signed contracts. If a contract called for twelve monthly payments for work
performed over a year, the Iranians typically refused to pay the last payment if it
was due after the work was completed. Taking them to court didn’t help.

Some smart Americans then devised a creative way – using what they had learned
about Iranian culture – to get all of their money in later contracts. The Americans
divided up the sum they wanted for the contract into eleven payments and added
in a little more money for good measure, with the twelfth payment essentially a
bonus for them, knowing that they would likely never receive it. This guaranteed
that the Americans got paid what they wanted, and allowed the Iranians to
believe they were besting the Americans. Two can play this game.

9. Patience : An Essential Element in Iranian Life
Iranians are known for the production of beautiful rugs. Rug-making is an art and
each rug can take months or even years to complete. Patience is therefore an essential
component of rug-making. There is no timeline. The rug is simply finished when it is.
As a result, Iranians have learned how to wait and steadily prepare to reach their goal. By
contrast, Western culture calls for delivering instant results. In the Iranian view, the one
who can wait out an opponent usually wins.
10. The Game of Chess as a Window into the Iranian Mind
Many centuries ago, Iranians either invented or adopted the game of chess as their
national game. This is a game of skill where players calculate at least two or three moves
ahead, and similarly calculate the moves that will be made by their opponents.
Iranians are therefore excellent planners and have a keen ability to compartmentalize
thought. In a conflict, they think several moves ahead, and carefully consider the moves
their adversaries will make in response. Iranians are great game planners and do their
best to leave as little as possible to chance.
Iranians adopted the game of chess as their national game. In a
conflict, they think several moves ahead, and carefully consider the
moves their adversaries will make in response.
» 16
A chess move to protect the Iranian flank: The Iranian government’s
attempt to return assets to a former senior Iranian official who is well connected to senior U.S. government officials

Many former high-ranking officials under the Shah escaped to the West in 1979.
The assets of these officials were nationalized by the Islamic Revolutionary
regime. Many of these officials kept out of the limelight, and stayed away from
Iranian politics either within Iran or abroad until the mid-2000s.

In the mid-2000s, one of these former officials related the following story: This
official had begun to meet with people well-connected in both the American
and European governments. As senior Iranian officials began to learn of these
meetings, Iran’s current government officials sent documents through mutual
acquaintances that demonstrated that the family properties had never actually
been nationalized, and that the assets of this official living abroad still belonged
to him. Moreover, the Iranian government made it clear that it was even
prepared to buy the property and transfer the money in dollars abroad.

Why did senior Iranian government officials do this? Because they wanted to
ensure that if things go wrong for them in Iran, that they have good contacts
outside the country that might be able to provide them a soft landing. The
Iranian government officials did not offer to return the property to its rightful
owner because it was “the right thing to do.” These current officials were simply
looking for ways to “prove” that they had been working with the opposition
all along, should the current Iranian regime fall. As every Iranian knows, it is
important to have allies/contacts in all camps.

Additionally, by dangling the possibility of the return of these properties to
their owners living outside the country, the Iranian government also neutralized
them. Many of these exiled Iranians realized that if they spoke out against the
current regime, they might lose the opportunity to regain their Iranian assets.
In one chess move, the Iranian government managed to neutralize its potential
enemies and set up a situation that can protect them from possible revenge,
should their government fall.

11. The Purpose of Holding Meetings
Meetings hold enormous symbolism for Iranians. The fact that a meeting takes place
matters much more than what is said at such a meeting. Meetings confer legitimacy
and offer prestige. When Westerners request a meeting with a particular Iranian, it is
perceived as a granting of legitimacy and power that they otherwise might not have.
The fact that a meeting takes place matters much more than what
is said at such a meeting. Meetings confer legitimacy and offer
prestige.
» 17
12. Working Together/Cooperation
Though they often profess great loyalty to causes and people, at the core Iranians do not
trust each other and they don’t trust outsiders. Iranians, therefore, have great difficulty
working together. This is one of the primary reasons it is difficult to create a united
Iranian opposition movement. Getting Iranians to work together can be like “herding
cats,” i.e., it is nearly impossible.

Each opposition group leader sees himself as a little Shah, and almost always
badmouths or belittles the others until a single force emerges as most powerful.
This situation can be immobilizing to policymakers in the West because it becomes
exceedingly difficult to know whom to believe and whom to support.
That said, there is a way to make Iranians cooperate. If the Iranians are clearly shown that
the strongest powers in the West – the U.S. and its allies – support a particular leader or
group, history demonstrates that Iranians will almost assuredly flock to that leader.

13. Western Strength
When the West establishes itself as the most powerful force and shows strength and
resolve, Iranians will almost assuredly come on board. They do not want to be on
the losing side. If it looks like the West will help to establish one opposition group or
individual as leader, Iranians can be expected to jump on the bandwagon.

It is important to note, however, that when confronted with Western power, Iranian
leaders, given the nature of their culture, would almost assuredly “modify their views”
in an attempt to protect themselves. Faced with American strength, Iranian leaders
can be expected to instantly change and oppose exactly what they claimed to support
beforehand.

If the West wants to bring about a different type of regime in Iran, it must support those
forces inside Iran which demonstrate by their actions that they support Western values
and freedoms. At that point, the West is likely to find that Iranians living outside Iran will
help provide whatever financial, technical, and political assistance may be necessary to
change the regime.13

Military action may be used as a complimentary tactic to help accomplish the goal
of regime change. If military action is eventually required, the targeting of national
symbols and leadership strongholds may be enough to demonstrate that the balance
of power in Iran is quickly shifting. By applying this principle, the West may not need to
bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities or launch a large-scale invasion to bring down Iran’s rulers
and stop the nuclear program.

As Iranians spend a lot of time trying to determine whether a particular party actually
wields power, any confrontation – military or diplomatic – is to be avoided until one is
clearly prepared to use overwhelming force. Otherwise, any victory will be pyrrhic at best.
» 18
How did the Iran-Iraq War end?
One week before Khomeini called for an end to the Iran-Iraq War, the USS Vincennes,
an American naval ship stationed in the Persian Gulf, mistakenly shot down an Iranian
civilian airplane, killing all 278 people on board. For the U.S., this was a terrible tragedy.
The U.S. government apologized profusely for having made such a horrible blunder. For
Khomeini and most Iranians, however, this was a sign that the U.S. was now prepared
to exercise its power. Most Iranians were absolutely sure that the U.S. had intentionally
shot down the plane. To them, this act “proved” that America was showing strength and
resolve.

About a week later, Khomeini publicly announced an end to the bloody, eight-year war,
saying that Iran had to swallow this “poison” in order to prevent dire consequences for
the country. From an Iranian point of view, the Vincennes incident proved that the U.S.
was willing to use power mercilessly and Iran had therefore no choice but to give in to
the apparent American demand to end the war.

14. Modern Disdain for Islam
Today, even religious figures who love Islam are watching the younger generation of
Iranians live the most un-Islamic lifestyles they can get away with. For example, the
rage in Tehran among teenagers is to come to parties and take off their outer clothes,
revealing amazingly suggestive outfits. They then engage in activities which are un-
Islamic to say the least. When asked about Islam, a large number of youngsters, who are
very well-informed about the latest trends outside Iran,14 laugh; and when they feel safe,
explain that they are at best indifferent to Islam and at worst disdainful of their religion.
Iranians love to tell anti-Muslim and anti-mullah jokes. Many see Islam as an Arab
imposition on Iran. Iranians look down on Arabs and call them lizard-eaters and/or
rodent-eaters.
One week before Khomeini announced an end to the Iran-Iraq War,
the USS Vincennes, an American naval ship stationed in the Persian
Gulf, mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian airplane, killing
278 people. Most Iranians were absolutely sure that the U.S. had
intentionally shot down the plane in a show of strength.
» 19

The sudden emergence of the Baha’i faith
In the 19th century, the Baha’i faith emerged in Iran. Their prophet, Baha-ullah who
was an ex-Shiite, claimed that God sends prophets in every age. This is an anathema to
traditional Islam. Traditional Muslims believe that Muhammad was the final prophet;
God would send no others after him. The Baha’is disagree.

Converting to the Baha’i faith is apostasy according to Muslim law, which is punishable
by death. But as the Baha’is won militarily, significant numbers of Iranians converted
to the Baha’i faith. When the tide turned and the Shiites started winning, people reconverted
to Shi’ism, often claiming that they never had converted to the Baha’i faith in
the first place.

To read more, click here