Dr. Avigdor Haselkorn
Why would the President of the United States, Barack Obama, invest his time and prestige in reviving the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks although he must know the chances of success are slim to none? Some may argue the President has a proven record of succeeding where others failed—for instance the enactment of the health care reform bill. Also, the President policies and personal attributes have been responsible for making him one of the friendliest U.S. leaders in Arab eyes in quite some time. However, a more sinister answer is that the talks have less to do with Arab- Israeli issues than with U.S.-Israeli relations. Specifically, with the Obama Administration’s desperate efforts to block an Israeli preemption of Iran’s nuclear program. Indeed, with removing, or at least neutralizing, the one Israeli leader most likely to order such an attack—Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
It is safe to assume that U.S. intelligence has concluded that among Israel’s leaders, in power or in serious contention, Mr. Netanyahu is the one most prone to launching a preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Presumably, this assessment is based on the oft-reported notion that the Israeli leader believes his foremost mission is to guard the Jewish people from another Holocaust. No doubt the U.S. intelligence also took note of Mr. Netanyahu’s openly expressed doubts about the feasibility of putting in place a containment regime once Iran acquires nuclear weapons. In a recent interview Netanyahu said such a response would be “a mistake.” He added: “I don’t think you can rely on Iran, I don't think you can rely on other radicals like the Taliban and al-Qaida… There is an irrationality here. And there's madness. And we should not allow irrational regimes like Iran to have nuclear weapons. It’s the ultimate terrorist threat today…”
Little wonder that soon after he took office Mr. Obama adopted a confrontational posture toward the government in Jerusalem which was widely seen as aimed at toppling Mr. Netanyahu from power. The new Israeli Government was at first shocked by Washington’s insistence on a total settlement freeze — something that has never happened in 16 years of peace negotiations. During Mr. Netanyahu’s March 2010 visit to the White House the Obama Administration went out of its way to humiliate the Israeli Prime Minister—there was no press conference, and not even a photo opportunity.
Yet, the American approach backfired. Mr. Netanyahu’s political standing at home was largely unaffected . In the U.S. fears were soon expressed that the new Obama course was undermining any leverage Washington may have had over the Likud government in Jerusalem. Worse yet, that the estrangement between the two leaders would if anything push Mr. Netanyahu to move up the date of the preemptive attack on Iran.
As a result the Obama Administration changed course. It eased its pressure on Jerusalem and took pains to herald its “unbreakable” ties to Israel. Yet its goal of containing and eventually ridding itself of Mr. Netanyahu did not change. By convening the Israeli-Palestinian talks Washington in effect is seeking to tie down Israel’s hands vis-à-vis Iran. It calculates that is unlikely that Israel will launch an attack which could inflame the Middle East while it is engaged in a diplomatic effort to make peace with the Arabs.
Moreover if the talks made headway Mr. Obama may reasonably anticipate that some of the Likud ministers will revolt to protest the “painful concessions” likely to be asked of Israel. The party may even split. As well, Mr. Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition partners may bolt out. Even if Mr. Netanyahu survives in office by bringing in the center-left Kadima party to make up for the various defections, his powers in the new government are likely to be seriously constrained.
If the talks fail, it is prudent to assume the Obama Administration hopes for a similar political payoff. For instance, even if Washington did not reach an unwritten understanding with him, it probably expects Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak to pull his Labor party out of the coalition. After all, Mr. Barak has defended Labor’s participation in the Likud government as necessary to push Israel toward peace with the Palestinians. Last September, following one of his many trips to Washington, Barak also said he did not consider Iran's nuclear program an "existential issue" because "Israel is strong."
Still, the one element that could torpedo the American scheme is the reaction of Hamas. A wave of terrorist attacks, especially suicide bombings, across Israel will likely derail the current negotiations, and force Mr. Obama to get behind the leader he is trying to oust. Yet, Mr. Obama may hope Iran, Hamas’s close ally, will tell its protégé to cool it. The Mullahs in Tehran must realize, Mr. Obama figures, that his ploy would remove the only serious threat to their nuclear weapons aspirations.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributor Avigdor Haselkorn is the author of The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons and Deterrence (Yale University Press), and has also contributed to American Thinker and Haaretz newspaper.
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