Doc's Talk: Days of rage in Egypt

Sunday, January 30, 2011

Days of rage in Egypt

Victor Kotsev

TEL AVIV - "It is unclear what is stirring beneath the surface of Egypt," wrote influential American think-tank Stratfor three weeks ago, analyzing the internal situation in Egypt in the wake of the church bombings that shook the country at the time. This is even more true today, after three days of sweeping protests against the government of President Hosni Mubarak. As of Thursday, different reports claimed that the death toll in the clashes was somewhere between four and seven, with numerous wounded and at least 860 arrested. Reliable data is difficult to come upon, since the situation is dynamic, government officials are tight-lipped, journalists have reported facing restrictions, and social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook have been partially disabled at times.

By Thursday night, some human-rights groups were reporting more than 2,000 arrested.

The demonstrations started on Tuesday - a holiday in honor of the police. They were inspired by the events in Tunisia, where authoritarian president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was ousted this month in a popular uprising. According to The New York Times, the protests were driven by "Egyptian youth" rather than by the traditional opposition [1] - another parallel with Tunisia.

"We want to see change, just like in Tunisia," one demonstrator, 24-year-old Lamia Rayan, said, quoted by the Associated Press. Following the example of Mohamed Bouazizi, whose self-immolation set off the revolt against Ben Ali, a number of people have attempted to set themselves on fire in Egypt in recent days and weeks.

Early Tuesday, the demonstrations were largely peaceful, and the police showed unusual restraint. However, after tens of thousands of protesters calling for Mubarak's resignation poured into Cairo's Tahrir (Liberation) Square in the afternoon, this changed and clashes subsequently erupted in several cities.

In the next days, the demonstrations continued, albeit in lesser numbers. Violence was reported in many places, with rumors of particularly heavy clashes on Thursday in the city of Suez. Also on Thursday, Egypt's foremost democratic reformer, Nobel Peace Price recipient Mohamed ElBaradei, returned from self-imposed exile in Austria to lead the protests.

Friday is expected to be a critical day. As a rule in the Muslim world, Friday is a particularly propitious day for demonstrations, since most men gather in mosques for midday prayers, and can fairly easily be incited to take to the streets by the clergy. The Muslim Brotherhood, arguably the most powerful opposition movement in the country, had so far refrained from throwing its full weight behind the protests.

However, on Thursday evening this changed, and the group announced that Friday "will be the general day of rage for the Egyptian nation". This is an ominous sign, further boosted by the presence of ElBaradei as a leader of the secular wing of the opposition.

It is hard to predict what exactly will happen. Many observers remain confident that Mubarak, with the help of his well-organized security services, will weather the storm. On Tuesday, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described his government as "stable", even as she called for restraint and reforms.

That the Egyptian president will come out on top seems to be also the conclusion of most analysts in neighboring Israel, where the affair is attracting a lot of attention, even as the government tries to stay away for it (excessive comments can lend support to conspiracy theories about Israel's meddling in the internal affairs of Egypt).

Still, an Israeli cabinet minister commented for the Israeli Ha'aretz daily newspaper on Thursday on condition of anonymity: "[Mubarak's] regime is well-rooted in the military and security apparatus ... They will have to exercise force, power in the street and do it. But they are strong enough according to my assessment to overcome it."

Israeli tourist groups, moreover, continue to arrive in Cairo - a positive sign that the government is not too worried for the moment.

On Thursday, one tourist, Dov Nahari, shared with Ynet that from the ground, reports in the international media seemed overblown. "We were a bit fearful while watching TV in Israel, but we overcame our fears," he said. "We are standing now before the pyramids and the Sphinx along with thousands of tourists from all over the world, so this fear has been completely allayed ... There are cops everywhere, but everything is great."

Some analysts, however, are less certain. For example, in a report on Thursday, Stratfor draws parallels to the situation to that in Iran in 1979. Marc Lynch writes in his Foreign Policy blog: "The scenes in Cairo [Tuesday] stand as a sharp rebuke to any analytical certainty. The Egyptian regime was fully prepared, its security forces on alert and deployed, the Internet disrupted and al-Jazeera largely off the table... and yet tens of thousands of people still poured into the streets and put together one of the largest demonstrations in contemporary Egyptian history."

Indeed, Mubarak is facing unprecedented levels of discontent. Such gross violations were reported during the parliamentary elections last November [2] that the main opposition parties (including the Muslim Brotherhood) withdrew from the second round and were consequently left without representation. The attacks on Christian churches a month ago underscore the tensions and radicalization inside the country. [3]

The poverty levels are appalling. In the past two years, the global economic crisis impacted Egypt adversely, and the current government was widely seen as too slow to react. According to Ha'aretz, "Egypt's population of some 80 million is growing by 2 percent a year. Two thirds of the population is under 30, and that age group accounts for 90 percent of the jobless. About 40 percent live on less than $2 a day, and a third is illiterate."

On top of this, there is a succession struggle in the country as 82-year old Mubarak tries to arrange the transition of power after he steps down. There are rumors that his original plan to have his son Gamal succeed him encountered heavy resistance from the army, and he has been looking for a compromise.

Stratfor believes that there is a hidden force behind the demonstrations, and this side plot motivates one of the think-tank's main hypotheses. According to Stratfor:

What we have to find out is who is behind this. It could be the military wanting to stage a coup to keep Gamal Mubarak out of power. They would be doing this to preserve the regime, not to overthrow it. They could be using the demonstrations to push their demands and perhaps pressure Hosni Mubarak to leave voluntarily ... It could also be the Muslim Brotherhood organizing quietly. Whoever it is, they are lying low, trying to make themselves look weaker than they are - while letting the liberals undermine the regime, generate anti-Mubarak feeling in the West, and pave the way for whatever it is they are planning.

Not everybody would agree with this interpretation; the analysis of The New York Times sings the praises of "an unpredictable third force, the leaderless tens of thousands of young Egyptians who turned out to demand an end to Mr Mubarak's 30-year rule."

Regardless, it is important to pay close attention to the structure of the demonstrations and the cohesion between the different groups that make up the protesters.

There is another parallel with Iran (besides Stratfor's reference to 1979) that might help us understand what is going on in Egypt. In a story for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting titled Why Tunisia can but Iran can't (Asia Times Online, January 21, 2011), Ali Reza Eshraghi argues that in 2009, Iran's government avoided the fate of Ben Ali because in the Islamic Republic, there was no clear enemy and no unity in the opposition. "Paradoxically," he writes, "it is the widespread and divergent nature of dissatisfaction that allows the regime to carry on."

Whether Egypt will follow the path of Iran (2009) or Tunisia (2011), may thus depend in large part on whether the protesters will be able to form a broad coalition united behind well-defined goals. Both the secular and the religious opposition have issued conciliatory statements, but it is uncertain how much they trust each other, or how much their agendas can overlap. The decision of the Muslim Brotherhood to join the fray with full force could be a crucial test for their unity and a make or break moment for the protests.

Notes
1. Egyptian Youths Drive the Revolt Against Mubarak, The New York Times, January 26.
2. How the Egyptian Elections Were Rigged: An Up-Close (And Personal) Look at the Madness, The New Republic, November 29, 2010.
3. Egypt and the Destruction of Churches: Strategic Implications, Stratfor, January 4, 2011.

Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst based in Tel Aviv.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk