Doc's Talk: The Implications of Lebanon's Syria-Approved Cabinet

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

The Implications of Lebanon's Syria-Approved Cabinet

Stratfor

Summary

Five months after the Lebanese government collapsed, Lebanon formed a new Cabinet on June 13. The Cabinet greatly favors members of the Syria-backed March 8 coalition and sidelines members of the Saudi-backed March 14 alliance. The Cabinet, which was created only with Syria’s approval, indicates that Saudi Arabia’s efforts to move Syria into the Arab camp and away from Iran’s influence are running into serious problems. Analysis

After five months of political stagnation caused by a Hezbollah-engineered collapse of the Lebanese government in January, Lebanon formed a new Cabinet on June 13.

There are two important things to note about the Cabinet formation. First, the Cabinet is dominated by members of the Syria-backed March 8 coalition and contains no members of the Saudi-backed March 14 alliance, which boycotted the negotiations. Second, this government — whose sustainability is in doubt — was formed only after Syria gave its blessing. Indeed, Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s visit to Damascus on June 9 to meet with Syrian President Bashar al Assad was crucial to the formation of the Cabinet. Not surprisingly, al Assad was also the first to publicly congratulate Lebanese President Michel Suleiman on forming a government.

The distribution of the seats for those that participated in the Cabinet formation talks is roughly proportional to each party’s representation in parliament. This explains why Hezbollah emerged with three Cabinet positions, while Maronite leader Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement received six. With its allies leading the Lebanese government, Syria (and Hezbollah) has greater ability to thwart the ongoing Special Tribunal for Lebanon investigating the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. There is little question, however, that Damascus intends to use this political development to show its regional allies and adversaries that while Damascus is struggling with an uprising that so far does not appear to be losing momentum, Syria’s domestic preoccupation has not undermined its preponderance in Lebanon, a traditional bastion of Syrian influence.

At the same time, the political evolution in Lebanon introduces fresh complications to an already strained Syrian-Saudi relationship. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other U.S.-backed Sunni Arab states have long attempted to draw Damascus into their fold and away from Iran and saw an opportunity in the Syrian uprising to press Damascus on this issue while it was most vulnerable. To this end, the Saudi government has quietly provided support to the al Assad regime while more vocal critics in countries like Turkey have loudly condemned the Syrian government for its violent response to the uprising. The Saudi hope was that Syria would recognize the Arab show of support in its time of need and thus feel compelled to fall more in line with the regional Arab consensus.

But the Saudi-led agenda for Syria appears to be faltering, as illustrated by the exclusion of Riyadh’s allies in the new Lebanese Cabinet. Though Syrian and Iranian interests do not always align, Iran has a strong interest in ensuring the survival of the al Assad regime in order to maintain a strong foothold in the Levant region. Rumors have long been circulating that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is assisting Syrian security forces in cracking down on protesters. Both Syria and Iran were also likely irked by Saudi, Egyptian, Jordanian and Qatari efforts to relocate the headquarters of Hamas’ politburo from Damascus to another Arab capital like Doha as a way to undermine Syrian and Iranian influence over the Palestinian organization at a particularly fragile period in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Regardless of the politicians in question, many in Lebanon are relieved to see a government form to lift the country out of its five-month stalemate. However, given the volatility of Lebanese politics and the intervening interests of outside players like Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran, there is no guarantee that the new Lebanese government will hold together for a meaningful period of time. To formalize the new government, the Cabinet still needs to pass a vote of confidence within 30 days and present its political platform, and much can happen between now and then to break this political agreement apart.
Lebanon’s Cabinet Lineup

Prime Minister: Najib Mikati (Sunni)
Deputy Prime Minister: Samir Moqbel (Orthodox)

President Michel Suleiman’s Picks

Interior: Marwan Charbel (Maronite, also considered close to Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement)
Environment: Nazem al-Khoury (Maronite, political advisor to Suleiman)

Prime Minister’s Share

Finance: Mohammad Safadi (Sunni, moved from economy)
Economy: Nicolas Nahhas (Orthodox, Free Patriotic Movement)
Education: Hassan Diab (Sunni)
Information: Walid Daouq (Sunni)
State: Ahmad Karami (Sunni)

Change and Reform Bloc

Justice: Shakib Qortbawi (Maronite, Free Patriotic Movement)
Labor: Charbel Nahhas (Catholic, Free Patriotic Movement, former telecommunications minister)
Tourism: Fadi Abboud (Maronite, Free Patriotic Movement, reappointed)
Energy and Water: Gebran Bassil (Maronite, Free Patriotic Movement, reappointed)
Telecommunications: Nicolas Sehnaoui (Orthodox, Free Patriotic Movement)
Culture: Gaby Layoun (Catholic, Free Patriotic Movement)
Defense: Fayez Ghosn (Orthodox, Marada Movement)
State: Salim Karam (Maronite, Marada Movement)
State: Panos Manajian (Armenian Orthodox, Tashnaq Party)
Industry: Freije Sabounjian (Armenian Orthodox, Tashnaq Party)

Progressive Socialist Party

Public Works and Transportation: Ghazi Aridi (Druze, reappointed)
Social Affairs: Wael Abu Faour (Druze, former state minister)
The Displaced: Alaeddine Terro (Sunni)

Hezbollah

Administrative Reform: Mohammad Fneish (Shiite, reappointed)
Agriculture: Hussein Hajj Hassan (Shiite, reappointed)
Youth and Sports: Faisal Karami (Sunni)

Amal

Foreign Affairs: Adnan Mansour (Shiite)
Public Health: Ali Hassan Khalil (Shiite)

Lebanese Democratic Party

State: Talal Arslan (Druze; latest reports indicate that Arslan is refusing to join the government)

Syrian Social Nationalist Party

State: Ali Qanso (Shiite)

Independents

State for Parliament Affairs: Nicolas Fattouch (Catholic)

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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