WHY SYRIA'S REGIME IS LIKELY TO SURVIVE

Elie Elhadj*

Examining the differences between the uprising in Syria and those in Tunisia and Egypt offers important clues as to why Syria's regime is likely to survive. The Tunisian and Egyptian armies refused to kill demonstrators and even supported the revolution. Syria's Alawi-led forces, on the other hand, do not hesitate to kill, as the Tadmur and Hama massacres show. The Syrian regime has been skillful at exploiting the conflict with Israel and the patience of Western powers with the dictatorship. The Syrian government has shown a strong ability to manipulate Islam for its benefit as well. While these tools do not work as effectively as they used to, they still give the Syrian government many advantages over its deposed counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt. POPULAR UPRISINGS IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT

On December 17, 2010, Muhammad Bouazizi, a 26-year-old vegetable street vendor from the poor town of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia (200 miles south of Tunis, the capital) set himself on fire in front of the governor’s office, igniting a series of popular protests and clashes with the police that engulfed the country. Bouazizi had been humiliated by the confiscation of his vendor cart, and following the municipality’s refusal to see him about the matter, he self-immolated. He died on January 4, 2010, as a result of his burns. Bouazizi’s actions sparked widespread protests against President Zine al-Abidine bin Ali’s non-representative corrupt regime, high unemployment, brutal security forces, and single political party dictatorship, among other issues. Less than a month later, on January 14, 2011, bin Ali fled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, after 23 years of rule.

The Tunisian uprising was swift, effective, and inspirational to the Arab masses everywhere. Within days, Bouazizi had motivated men in a number of Arab countries to self-immolate as a result of desperation over poverty, unemployment, repression, and corruption. In Egypt, at least five men followed Bouazizi’s example, with one dead in Alexandria. On January 25, 2011, a few days after bin Ali’s flight, thousands of anti-government protesters demanding the end of President Husni Mubarak’s almost 30-year rule clashed with riot police in Tahrir Square in the center of Cairo. The protests spread to other cities. During the first week of the demonstrations alone, the violence resulted in some 300 deaths, according to UN estimates.

By February 5, 2011, President Mubarak had announced a series of concessions. He replaced the cabinet, appointed a vice-president for the first time, and declared that he would not run for re-election for a sixth term in September 2011. He also replaced the politburo of the ruling party, including his son Gamal, and pledged dialogue with opposition parties. Earlier, on January 31, 2011, the Egyptian army declared its respect for the legitimate rights of the people, stating that it would not use force against protesters. Egypt’s new vice-president, Umar Sulayman, invited all protest groups and opposition parties for immediate negotiations on constitutional reform. Six groups, including the banned Muslim Brothers organization, met with the vice president for the first time on February 6, 2011. The participants agreed to form a joint committee of judicial and political figures tasked with proposing constitutional amendments. On February 8, 2011, it was reported that 6 million public sector workers received a 15 percent pay increase. On February 11, 2011, President Mubarak resigned, handing over Egypt’s affairs to the high command of the armed forces, headed by the defense minister.

In an Arab world ruled by dictatorial monarchs and military presidents who--unless assassinated in a coup d’état--typically remain in power for life, popular uprisings are alien. What then is the possibility that the Tunisian and the Egyptian popular uprisings will be copied in other Arab countries? This article addresses the question as it relates to Syria.

COMPARING SYRIA WITH TUNISIA AND EGYPT

Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, on one hand, and Tunisia’s bin Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak, on the other, share common characteristics but also differ in many regards. In all three countries, a politicized military is the kingmaker, the supreme power. They have in common non-representative, non-participatory governance; single political party dictatorship; a rubber-stamp parliament; politicized judiciary; the absence of press freedom; brigades of brutal security forces infamous for appalling human-rights abuses; and a presidential cult of personality. They are also alike in the rampant corruption, absence of transparency or accountability in government finances, high unemployment, and huge disparities of income--poverty for the great majority of the population and great wealth for the tiny minority of the ruling elites and their business associates who violate the law with impunity.

On the other hand, Syria’s Asad differs from bin Ali’s Tunisia and Mubarak’s Egypt in three respects. It is these differences that make a successful popular uprising leading to regime change in Damascus unlikely, at least in the immediate future. First, Syria is ruled by the Asad clan of the minority Alawi sect, unlike the former Sunni-majority-led government under bin Ali. Second, Tunisia’s secularism differs greatly from Asad exploitation of Sunni Islam. Last, the geopolitical environment dictates different domestic and foreign agendas in Damascus and Tunis, especially regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Asad regime in Syria also differs from Egypt in three respects. Again, Syria’s Alawi-minority rule differs from the Sunni majority-led government of former President Mubarak in Egypt. Second, the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Syria is relatively weak, unlike the well-organized and forceful Muslim Brothers organization in Egypt. Third, Syria is in a state of war with Israel, whereas peaceful relations have existed between Egypt and Israel since March 26, 1979.

Reducing the desire for major revolt in Syria are memories of the hundreds killed by Hafiz Asad in Tadmur in 1980 and the many thousands killed in Hama in 1982 (see below), and the fear of similar savagery in 2011. Also sobering are reminders of the civil war in neighboring Lebanon (1975-1990) and the destruction in Iraq since the 2003 U.S. occupation, with more than a million Iraqi refugees in Syria. Further, a young Bashar Asad, with a stylish British/Syrian wife, continues to give some people hope for genuine reforms.

Damascus attributes the Tunisian uprising to bin Ali’s reliance on “fair-weather foreign allies.” The Ba’th Party’s newspaper also predicted that the uprising would restore Tunisia to its historical role as a supporter of Arab national causes, especially the confrontation with Israel. Damascus’ rhetoric on Tunisia applies to Egypt as well. Asad claims that Syria is insulated from popular uprisings because he understands the needs of the Syrian people and his policies fulfill their aspirations. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal on January 31, 2011, Asad said he was very closely linked to the beliefs of his people.

Notwithstanding Syria’s government boasting that it does not rely on fair-weather foreign allies, that it has always supported Arab national causes, and that Asad is very closely linked to the beliefs of his people, just one week after bin Ali fled Tunisia, Damascus released S£16 billion (US$360 million) in fuel subsidies to state employees and retirees, granted S£12 billion (US$270 million) in assistance to more than 400,000 poor families, and rolled back price increases announced earlier on certain pharmaceuticals. On February 17, 2011, the government announced it would cut taxes on basic foodstuffs. On May 25, 2011, the price of fuel oil dropped by 25 percent (from S£20 to S£15) per liter.

While these actions may have been in the making for some time--as the government had stated--the uprising in Tunisia must have accelerated their announcement. In any event, the sudden generosity failed to buy peace. On March 18, 2011, a popular uprising erupted in the southern city of Dara’a. The uprising quickly spread to other cities as well. Tanks rolled into Banyas, Dara’a, Hama, Jabla, Jisr al-Shughour, and Homs, among others. Within a few weeks...