Islamists and the Revolution

Khalil al-Anani
Al-Ahram Weekly

Those who described Arab revolutions as "post-Islamism" have spoken too soon. Although the revolutionaries were not into religious slogans and Islamists did not deploy in force at first, it was only a matter of time before the revolutions took on an Islamist turn. dmittedly, those who sparked off the revolutions were mostly non-Islamists. In Egypt, the first wave of revolutionaries came from the upper crust of the middle class. But to pretend that this year's Arab revolutions are secular is to subscribe to the main wish and argument of the Arab elite.

The wish is for Arab societies to work a miracle and somehow achieve democratisation through peaceful (except in Libya) action.

The argument is for the Arabs to show the world that Islam and democracy are compatible, despite everything Orientalists have said.

It is time for a reality check. Let's admit that religion was present in the heart of the Arab revolutions. Religion was part of these revolutions both in the political and cultural sense. A few examples may be helpful here.

Many of the religious currents were present in the Arab revolutionary scene from the start, timidly at first and then in full force. Once the Islamists (who are the usual scapegoat of despotic regimes) realised that what was going on was more than a demonstration, they threw their lot into the battle.

The Islamists kept a low profile during the revolutions for tactical reasons. For one thing, they were aware that the West would react with alarm to their presence. In Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, the revolutionary youth has praised the Islamists for fighting to protect the Arab revolutions in difficult times, when the regimes were hanging on for dear life.

Participation in the Arab revolutions was not confined to one Islamist faction. In the Egyptian case, the Muslim Brotherhood took part in the revolution, so did the remnants of Jihad (Safwat Abdel-Ghani, several middle- ranking Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya officials), Jihadist Salafis (Fawzi El-Said, Hisham El-Oqdah), media-savvy Salafis (Safwat Hegazi, Mohamed Yosri, Mohamed Abdel-Maqsoud), and independent Islamists (Selim El-Awwa, Amr Khaled, Muizz Masoud). In Tunisia, followers of the Nahdah Movement took part in the revolution. In Libya, Abdel-Hakim Belhaj, a former jihadist and a co-founder of the Fighting Libyan Group, led the final assault on Tripoli. In Yemen and Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood still plays a clear role in protests against the regimes of Ali Abdullah Saleh and Bashar Al-Assad.

From a cultural point of view, religion was not far from the surface. Mosques were used as a mobilising ground for the masses. Political rallies, if you may recall, often started from mosques, such as Omar Makram in Cairo, Qaed Ibrahim in Alexandria, Al-Shohadaa in Suez, and Al-Omari in Deraa. In Libya and Yemen, the same is true. One of the most haunting images from Tahrir Square, right before Mubarak stepped down, was that of Muslims and Christians praying and chanting hymns together.

Religion was not absent from Arab revolutions, which is perfectly normal given the religious makeup of Arab societies. For years, the despotic nature of Arab regimes excluded the Islamists from the political scene. In Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria, Islamist currents have been barred from political life. Yemen, in which the Islamists were allowed to participate into politics, seems to be the only exception.

It makes sense, therefore, for the Islamists to want to be part of the post-revolutionary scene. This is why we saw more than a dozen Islamist parties forming in Egypt since the revolution, including Salafi and Sufi ones.

One must also keep in mind that over the past 10 years or so, Arab societies have increasingly taken on an Islamic veneer. In a sense, we've replaced the Islamisation of movements with the Islamisation of society at large. In other words, the political ban on Islamic currents didn't prevent Arab societies from adopting the habits and customs one normally associates with Islamists.

Arab societies, especially the upper layers of the middle and lower classes have adopted the mannerisms of religiosity that French scholar Olivier Roy calls "the objectification of religion". One cannot help but notice the increased instance of women donning the niqab, or face veil; the mounting popularity of independent preachers; the rising demand on Islamic schools with a modern curriculum; and the growing influence of religious-leaning television stations. Among the youth, many seem to parade their religiosity with the enthusiasm usually reserved for fashion.

In the past decade, Islamisation, or a superficial interpretation thereof, has penetrated into various aspects of life in Arab societies more than Islamic movements had done in the preceding three decades.

The presence of Islamists the public sphere is beyond question. What is yet to be seen is how others will react to it.

My guess is that as the Islamists become more integrated into the new political frameworks, their doctrinal and ideological cohesion may suffer. Already the political discourse of the Salafis and Jihadists is undergoing a major change. Ultimately, the process of integration will alter not only their notions but also their methods.

To this day, the Islamists seem to lack the savvy and poise of more experienced politicians. This is true of all newcomers to the political scene, religious or not. And, considering the political barrenness of the past few decades, there is nothing surprising about that.

In my opinion, we need to start working on the normalisation of ties between Islamists and Arab societies. Otherwise, our whole quest for democracy could be stalled.