Israeli Myopia

David Isaac

Staff Sgt. Gilad Shalit is set to be released on Tuesday. In exchange, Israel will release 1,027 terrorists, among them murderers sentenced to consecutive life sentences. Needless to say, ‘life sentence’ does not carry the same force in Israel as it does in other places. Those Israelis who have greeted this news with euphoria argue that Shalit has suffered, his family has suffered, and so everything must be done to release him. This myopic view ignores the suffering of those families who seek justice for the death of loved ones murdered by the terrorists about to be released.

Israelis in favor of the deal may plausibly argue that Shalit is still alive and his life takes precedence over those now dead. Nothing can be done to save them, but something can be done to save Shalit. This, too, is myopic, because it ignores those Israelis to be done to death by the unrepentant murderers back on the street.

Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Strategic Affairs, Moshe Yaalon, estimates that the deal will result in the murders of tens, if not hundreds, of additional Israelis. “[It] will be a great victory for Hamas, and from our perspective, a surrender to terror. The deal will meaningfully damage deterrence. We’re obligated to the life of Gilad Shalit and to bring him home, but we’re also obligated to the lives of Israel’s citizens.”

According to the Wall Street Journal, “In 2004, Israel exchanged several hundred Palestinian prisoners for an Israeli held captive by Hezbollah (and the remains of three soldiers). Drawing on government figures, Nadav Shragi noted in a report by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs that ‘those freed in the deal had murdered 35 Israelis’ by 2007.”

Unfortunately for those condemned to die, they do not yet have a face. Whereas Shalit’s face has been plastered everywhere for the past five-plus years. Gilad Shalit’s parents, aided by a sympathetic media and public, have pressured Israel’s government to get him home – to do whatever it takes to get him home – a natural position for any parent to take.

There is no counter to this pressure. But let’s say, for argument’s sake, we knew in advance those (let’s say 100), to be killed as a result of this deal. The parents of the hundred would establish a tent in front of the prime minister’s residence, as Gilad Shalit’s parents have done, and it would be larger, as it would have to fit 99 more families. Can one imagine the effect their emotional appeal would have on Israeli public opinion? Needless to say, there would be no such deal as the one now before us.

A recent article in The New York Times attempted to explain the Israeli attitude that makes this lop-sided exchange possible. “When Israelis say they view the seized soldier, Staff Sgt. Gilad Shalit, as their own son, they mean it,” the article said.

But from the hypothetical above, we can see that Israeli identification with Shalit would end for those parents whose sons were to die in his stead. It is impossible they would choose Shalit’s son over their own. It is true that Gilad Shalit’s parents would do anything to save their child. It’s equally true of every other parent in Israel.

In the real world, those who are to die cannot be known, so it becomes a matter involving all of Israel’s citizens, and thus a matter of national interest.

In “Government’s Duty” (The Jerusalem Post, June 7, 1985), Shmuel wrote of another mass prisoner exchange, the Jibril agreement, which took place on May 21, 1985. Over 1,000 terrorists were released for three Israeli soldiers.

Not a single national interest was served by the decision of a government elected to serve the national interest, when it decided to release 1,150 terrorists, including hundreds of convicted murderers. On the contrary, it undermined every relevant national interest. It damaged the security of the people, its morale and its sense and image of sovereignty.

It has given, directly, a new lease of life to the Arab terrorist movement. Not only those freed but, perhaps even more significantly, the youth of the whole Arab people is now absorbing a campaign of inspirational propaganda, on Israel’s moral weakness and indeed contemptibility, on the reduced risks for captured Arab heroes, on the assurance that there will always be available at least a handful of Israeli hostages from an Israel dominated by tearful mothers. …

It is worth noting that Hamas has already said that it plans to capture more soldiers. It would defy logic for them not to do so. They captured an Israeli and were rewarded with 1,000 more terrorists. Why not capture another Israeli and get still 1,000 more?

Can Israel stop the vicious cycle? Yes, by relearning a simple truth it once knew but has since forgotten. As Shmuel wrote in the same article:

For a time, Israel did stand firm in the face of terrorist blackmail, It did serve as an example to the world. And as long as it showed firmness, and wherever physically possible took military action against hijackers and kidnappers, the terrorists responded by keeping their demands within comparatively modest bounds.

The Labour government did sin on several occasions in negotiating with the terrorists, but in July 1976 its Entebbe operation raised steeply Israel’s prestige and the people’s morale.

When the Likud came to office, it proved that while it was capable, on the one hand, of carrying out the Litani military operation against the PLO, it was capable of outdoing the Labour Party in diplomatic bumbling. In 1979, it paid with 76 released terrorists for one Israeli civilian.

After 1979, the floodgates were opened. The price increased progressively. Negotiators, in effect, became couriers, delivering the terrorist leaders’ demands. From 76-to-one in 1979, we reached 380-to-one in 1985.

Only a conscious, radical change in the government’s conception of its obligations to the nation and in its behaviour can put an end to the dangerous mindset which has established itself in the management of the affairs of an embattled Israel.

A vital element in such a change is the revival and maintenance of the principle of not negotiating with the terrorists. For cases where breach of the principle is unavoidable for purposes of “exchange,” standing rules for negotiation must be laid down and must include a prohibition of negotiators’ consultation with families of prisoners.

And crucial it is that, at least, Israel apply the law which permits the imposition of the death sentence for murder.

As Shmuel writes, a death penalty in Israel exists. Its vigorous application may be the only thing to prevent future prisoner exchanges.

Israel’s leadership has shown itself time and again unable to withstand the political pressure that follows each new abduction. Prime Minister Netanyahu understands the dangers. In the 1990s he wrote, “Prisoner releases only embolden terrorists by giving them the feeling that even if they are caught, their punishment will be brief. Worse, by leading terrorists to think such demands are likely to be met, they encourage precisely the terrorist blackmail they are supposed to defuse.” Yet, when faced with the choice, Netanyahu collapsed.

The only thing left then is to deny Israel’s leadership the choice by creating a situation wherein there are no terrorists to exchange.

This entry was posted on Monday, October 17th, 2011 at 4:51 pm and is filed under Shmuel Katz. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.