Doc's Talk: Saudi Arabia - The Shadow of Prince Nayef

Monday, October 24, 2011

Saudi Arabia - The Shadow of Prince Nayef

Irfan Al-Alawi • October 24, 2011

With the death of Saudi Crown Prince Sultan Ibn Abd Al-Aziz early October 22 in a New York hospital, his brother, Saudi interior minister and second deputy prime minister Prince Nayef Ibn Abd Al-Aziz, now looms large in the world's attention as a possible successor to Saudi Arabia's current ruler, King Abdullah, who is now 87.

. Prince Nayef is a committed adherent of the hardliners in the Wahhabi sect and has resisted the cautious moves by King Abdullah to restrict Wahhabi dominance in the kingdom, which was founded in a marriage alliance of the Al-Saud family and the descendants of Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, for which the radical doctrine is named. To this day, the head Islamic cleric in the kingdom is Abd Al-Aziz Al Ash-Sheikh, a descendant of Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab. The aging King Abdullah's limited reforms have included increased freedom of expression; appointment of representatives of the Saudi Shia minority, which is concentrated in the oil-bearing Eastern Province, to the consultative Shura council, which advises the king; measures for more participation of women in society, including announcement of limited electoral rights for women last month; separation of educational and religious authorities; dismissal of ultra-Wahhabi judges from the Saudi court system, and cuts in financing for the institution most despised by the Saudi public, the mutawiyin or morals militia, officially titled the 'Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,' and often mis-called a morals police.

In reality, the mutawiyin are not police in the normal sense, but a mob that harasses those they accuse of less-than-absolute fidelity to Wahhabi concepts: women who may let the un-Islamic but Saudi-imposed face veil (niqab) and long cloak (abaya) slip in public; couples that may be unmarried (and sometimes are attacked by the mutawiyin even if wed); people suspected of possessing alcohol in their homes; Shia Muslims; foreign Muslims participating in the hajj pilgrimage; non-Muslims; and anyone else the mutawiyin may allege to be violating Wahhabi strictures. As interior minister, Prince Nayef is their guardian and their abuses symbolize his role in the lives of many Saudis. King Abdullah has tried to make the mutawiyin accountable for its offenses against individual and public dignity.

Prince Nayef is described widely among Saudis as an opponent of any measures intended to ameliorate the kingdom's oppressive image. He has rejected the notion that women should be permitted to drive or be granted any other liberalization of their status. He has disdained the introduction of voting in the kingdom. He has stood behind the most recalcitrant members of the Wahhabi clerical apparatus as they maintain their hold on religious life in the kingdom. He has declared that no Saudi terrorism suspect will ever be turned over to a foreign country.

Yet Prince Nayef and his son Prince Muhammad Bin Nayef, who was targeted in a mysterious suicide-bomb attack in 2009, have supervised the Saudi program for abatement of Al-Qaida terrorism. Their program for fighting violent extremism has stressed a "light" approach based on "reeducation" of Wahhabi fanatics about their deviant views. In the 2009 bombing attempt on Prince Muhammad Bin Nayef's life, the young scion was recorded in a pleasant conversation, just prior to their meeting, with the man who killed himself when he came to visit, and, it was said, to attack Prince Muhammad Bin Nayef, in Jeddah. Prince Muhammad Bin Nayef was barely harmed.

The main effect of Prince Nayef's campaign against Al-Qaida has been to "export" the Saudi cadres of the terrorist movement to Yemen, where they have organized Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP incited such actions against the U.S. as the Fort Hood massacre of 2009. Other AQAP conspiracies in the UK and U.S. have included targeting of aircraft, including the case of the "underwear bomb," employed in an attempt to bring down a jetliner over Detroit by Nigerian terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab at the end of the same year; Faisal Shahzad's placing of a truck bomb in Times Square in New York last year, and an endeavour to send bombs to Jewish synagogues in the U.S. via cargo courier services, also in 2010. In the last case, shipping numbers and addresses of the packages, in which explosives were placed, then handed to United Parcel Services and Federal Express offices in Yemen, were delivered by Prince Muhammad Bin Nayef to U.S. authorities... after the packages had been dispatched, but before they reached the U.S.

The curious ease with which Prince Nayef and his son "handle" AQAP activities bespeaks an obvious question: is Prince Nayef's role that of a combatant against terrorism, or a figure who sees his mission as one of keeping Al-Qaida away from threats against the royal family and Saudi institutions? His fervent attachment to the Wahhabi creed seems to place him in the typical Saudi role of maintaining an alliance with the UK and U.S., which market Saudi oil and arm the Saudi defence establishment, while using Western money and security guarantees to promote the doctrines of the fundamentalists.

The certainty of Prince Nayef's sinister reputation among the Saudi masses cannot be denied. He has declared "what we won by the sword we will keep by the sword." If Prince Nayef is elevated to the status of Crown Prince, and then succeeds King Abdullah as ruler, Saudis, other Muslims, and the world may expect a return of the kingdom to its old and worst habits. These will include suppression of internal dissent and of the forward-looking measures instituted by King Abdullah; attacks on non-Wahhabi Muslims; enhanced support for the mutawiyin as well as for jihadist adventurism in South Asia and elsewhere; and a more hostile line toward the UK and the U.S. As king, Nayef might continue to keep Al-Qaida out of Saudi territory, but it is doubtful he would act consequently against the sympathisers of the terrorists inside the Saudi elite, and their Wahhabi clerical enablers, as long as they do not threaten him, the Sudairis, and their accomplices. For the rest of the world, however, the shadow of Prince Nayef is long and menacing.

While the effects of Prince Sultan's demise may be felt across the globe, only two things may be said with certainty about it, and it brings with it disturbing uncertainties, especially involving Prince Nayef.

First, Crown Prince Sultan's death was not unexpected, since the seriousness of his illness – colon cancer – had been common knowledge for some time. But his biography included ambiguities, beginning with his age. According to an official statement, Crown Prince Sultan was 80 when he expired, although various media and related sources speculated that he might have been as old as 87.

The other certainty about the death of Crown Prince Sultan is that Prince Nayef, aged 78 and his possible successor as Crown Prince, is feared profoundly by the kingdom's subjects for his extreme, retrograde views on Islam and the governance of the Saudi state. A new Crown Prince will be designated, but Prince Nayef, although treated by many foreign observers as inevitably next-in-line after Prince Sultan, may face significant opposition. Prince Nayef represents a genuine danger to the people of Saudi Arabia and the world, if he inherits the throne from King Abdullah.

King Abdullah, a half-brother of Princes Sultan and Nayef, became monarch in 2005, with the death of the incapacitated King Fahd. Discontent between Abdullah, on one side, and the clan from which Fahd, Sultan and Nayef sprang, on the other, was already well-known in the kingdom and among foreign observers of its convoluted society. King Fahd, and Princes Sultan and Nayef, owed their power to membership in the influential set of full, blood brothers known as the Sudairi Seven, since they were all children of Princess Hassa Bint Ahmad Bin Muhammad Al-Sudairi, a favorite wife of King Muhammad Bin Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Saud, founder of the kingdom in 1932.

The Sudairis are a powerful family in the central Arabian wasteland of Nejd, where the fundamentalist, exclusivist, radical and violent Wahhabi ideology emerged almost 300 years ago. With King Fahd and Crown Prince Sultan gone from the scene, the Sudairi clique at the summits of the monarchy now consists of five, among whom Prince Nayef is second in age, but the most important.

King Abdullah, as a half-brother of the Sudairis, is not included in their preferred circle. He established an Allegiance Council in 2006-07, made up of 34 sons and grandsons of Ibn Saud, to administer the royal succession process. Most Saudis and foreign commentators interpreted the introduction of the new body as a means of diluting the power of the Sudairis, since they are a small minority within it. If the choice of a successor to Crown Prince Sultan is put in the hands of the Allegiance Council, Prince Nayef could be passed over in favour of someone else.

In 2009, Prince Talal Bin Abd Al-Aziz challenged the appointment of Prince Nayef as second deputy prime minister, warning that this could make him 'heir apparent' to Crown Prince Sultan. The naming of Prince Nayef as second deputy prime minister was seen as a concession to the Sudairis. But Prince Talal called for strengthening the role of the Allegiance Council, of which he is a member, in the succession process. Still, no possible candidate to replace Crown Prince Sultan other than Prince Nayef has been suggested.

King Abdullah's rise to the Saudi throne reflected a decline in the power of Princes Sultan, Nayef, and the rest of the Sudairis. Prince Sultan had served as minister of defence, in which position he oversaw extensive military contracting with the UK and U.S., and his son, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, was Saudi ambassador to Washington for more than 20 years, from 1983 until 2005. Prince Sultan enjoyed visiting the U.S. His son, Prince Bandar, was most famous for his cultivation of prominent Americans, his embassy parties, and his access to the White House, thanks to which Saudi Arabia gained advanced weaponry and military support.

Although a full brother to the late Crown Prince Sultan, Prince Nayef is known for very different attitudes from his.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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