Doc's Talk: Israeli military prepares for a new type of war

Sunday, December 25, 2011

Israeli military prepares for a new type of war

Ben Frankel
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20111221-the-israeli-military-prepares-for-a-new-type-of-war

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) has created a new military command – the Strategic Depth Command; this new command, and the new, commando-heavy, look of the IDF’s higher echelon, should tell us that Israel is preparing for a new type of war; adversaries of Israel who have been entertaining the thought that sheer distance from Israel would offer them some protection, may want to think again

At times it is not enough to read a given text — you have to read between the lines as well to get at the deeper meaning. This is the case with the news from Israel that the Israel Defense Force (IDF) has created a new military command – the Strategic Depth Command.

During the past five years the United States, too, has created new military commands to meet new security challenges in new theaters or domains. Thus, the U.S. Cyber Command is now responsible for developing defensive cyber policies which will protect U.S. military and infrastructure assets against cyber attacks. The Cyber Command is also working on information warfare, that is, offensive cyber measures the United States may take to undermine the military and economy of an adversary during a conflict. The U.S. Africa Command was created to address to growing presence of Islamic terrorists in the continent’s failed states, such as Somalia, and in weak states such as Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, and others. Another mission of the Africa Command is to develop policies for protecting U.S. interests on the continent in the event that climate-driven droughts and water shortages will generate mass migration of people across borders.

The IDF’s new Strategic Depth command should be considered in this light: an organizational and doctrinal response to new security challenges.

Some journalists referred to the new command as the “Iran Command,” but the challenges Israel faces in areas far from its borders are not limited to Iran. Two recent examples:

A few months ago, during the height of the anti-Qaddafi rebellion in Libya, Israeli commandos killed two Hamas operatives in Sudan. These operatives were on their way back from Libya after negotiating a deal with some rebel leaders to sell Hamas chemical warheads from Qaddafi’s arsenal. Iran was paying for the chemical weapons to be delivered to Hamas.
A couple of years ago a Syrian general was assassinated in his vacation home in north Syria. The general was in charge of Syrian-Iranian cooperation on ballistic missile and nuclear weapons, and Israel decided that that cooperation had gone far enough and needed to be slowed down.

Some may argue that Israel already has three arms doing, or planning to do, work in areas far from the borders of Israel:

The Mossad, Israel’s secret service, has been killing Hamas and Hezbollah operatives, and Iranian nuclear scientists and generals, for a decade and a half now. During the past five years the Mossad has also added blowing up Iranian nuclear labs, missile bases, and weapons storage facilities (not only in Iran, but also Hezbollah’s depots in South Lebanon), to its menu.
The IDF’s secretive 8200 Unit has successfully launched cyber attacks on Syria in September 2007, and on Iran in 2010 (Stuxnet).
The Israel Air Force will be the military arm trusted with taking out Iran’s nuclear facilities if the order to attack Iran is given.

Yet, there was a growing sense in Israeli security circles that there was a need for more. Israel has several Special Forces-type units, each with different specialties and capabilities. It has been the case, however, that these units were utilized more effectively between wars. When wars broke, these units’ heavier siblings – the army, air force, and navy – took over, relegating the specialized commando units to the margins.

Supporters of the new command pointed out that the new reality of war required a new approach, entailing a more effective harnessing of these commando units’ qualities and capabilities. For example, in the event of growing tensions with Syria, it may be a better idea to disable Syrian missile batteries by inserting Israeli commando units deep behind Syrian lines to paralyze these batteries by means other then aerial bombardment.

We should note that during the first Iraq war, in 1991, Israel was readying specialized ground forces for operation in western Iraq. Their mission was to hunt down and destroy mobile Scud missile: U.S. Air Force pilots found it exceedingly difficult to locate these missiles from the air, and Israel was growing increasingly frustrated with the nightly barrages of Scuds falling on Israeli cities (some forty Iraq missiles were launched at Israel, causing some damage to building). Israel eventually relented to American pressure and agreed not to send Israeli forces to Iraq.

In the case of Iran, there may well be nuclear labs and other nuclear-related sites which the Iranian leadership has purposely located near – or under – civilian population centers in order to deter an attack on such sites. A commando operation would be more suitable way to destroy these facilities than attacking them from the air.

To disrupt Iranian command and control in the run up to a war, Israel may find it useful to take out a few political leaders and commanders of the Republican Guard. Some of these operations may require a presence on the ground, and the new command will have at its disposal very good commando units to carry out such missions.

The new command will not rely solely on special forces. Rather, it is understood that it will also plan to use land, air, and naval forces for coordinated attacks deep in enemy territory, aiming to disrupt and destabilzie adversaries.

The creation of the new command dovetails with another interesting development at the higher echelons of the IDF. Both Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu served in the hush-hush Sayeret Matkal (the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit). The two of them have appointed — or will soon appoint — to the top positions in the IDF officers who had their formative military experience, and who rose to prominence, in the IDF’s equivalent of the Special Forces or the Navy SEALS (the special forces background of these generals is given in parentheses):
Aviv Kokhavy, head of Military Intelligence (paratroopers’ “Orev” unit)
Ram Rotberg, commander of the Israeli Navy (Flotilla 13, the naval commando unit)
Tal Russo, head of the Southern Command (Sayeret Matkal; Unit 5101 [Special Surface-Air Designation Team, also known as the Shaldag Unit]; Unit 212 [Sayeret Maglan])
Yair Golan, head of the Northern Command (paratroopers’ “Orev” unit)
Nitzan Alon, head of the Central Command (Sayeret Matkal)
Eyal Isenberg, commander of civil defense (Unit 5101)

We should also recall that the Barak and Netanyahu preferred General Yoav Galant (Flotilla 13) to succeed General Gabi Ashkenazi as the new chief of staff, but their plan was scuttled owing to problems with Galant’s conduct regarding personal real estate matters.

The IDF’s new Strategic Depth Command, and the new, commando-heavy, look of the IDF’s higher echelon, should tell us that Israel is preparing for a new type of war. Adversaries of Israel may have entertained the thought that sheer distance from Israel would offer them some protection. They may want to think again.

Ben Frankel is the editor of the Homeland Security NewsWire

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk