Wednesday, December 07, 2011

A war of wills

Ron Tira

During their meeting at the Saban Forum, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and former Mossad head Meir Dagan agreed that Israel must not attack Iran on its own. The central rationale for this position was that an attack would not destroy Iran's nuclear program but merely delay it by one to two years. Another reason Dagan mentioned is the expected Iranian response. Both men have erroneously analyzed the situation by looking mainly at the physical outcome of an attack. Even if Iran's nuclear program were completely destroyed, it could always be built up again. Iraq, too, could have worked to rebuild its nuclear reactor after it was destroyed in 1981. However, the physical outcome of an attack is not the point.

What we are witnessing is a war of political wills. The political will of the U.S. and Israel is that Iran abandon its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran's will is to acquire them. As with many disputes, the question is whose political resolve is stronger.

On the material level, Iran resembles a paper tiger more than a powerful nation. Its economy is weaker than that of Argentina and its antiquated military would not stand a chance against any Western army. But Iran presents itself as a power. It is decisive and willing to take risks and pay a heavy price to realize its ambitions. On the other hand, the U.S. is the world's only superpower, but it acts feeble, avoids confrontation, and is hesitant to pay a price to realize its political will. Still, there is no doubt the U.S. is the stronger of the two. If the U.S. and Iran both mustered the same degree of seriousness and determination to address the nuclear issue, if both showed the same readiness to take risks and pay a price, the former would gain the upper hand and its political will would prevail.

Another decisive factor is time. Iran seeks conflict that extends over a long period because it knows that it has greater stamina than its rivals, and that it can endure until its opponents give up. The U.S. is put off by prolonged struggles and seeks to delineate clear, quick end points for its efforts. In any conflict between the two, Iran only needs to persist beyond the point that the U.S. decides the conflict has continued for too long (as happened in Iraq).

If the U.S. attacks Iran the goal will not be to destroy any number of centrifuges but to convey a diplomatic message in credible and clear strategic language, that it is serious about denying Iran nuclear weapons and is willing to take risks and pay the price for doing so. The U.S. must elucidate that it will persist for as long as it takes and not tire after a few rounds. In this way, the U.S. will spell out that it intends to prevail, and Iran will be forced to abandon its nuclear ambition.

Even if Israel attacks, more than destroying centrifuges, it would be an overtly political act. The purpose of such an attack would be to lead the Israel-U.S.-Iran triangle to circumstances in which all sides put their cards on the table. If the U.S. won't do so, then it is up to Israel to make plain that it will take risks and pay the necessary price, and that its political will is incontrovertible -- even if that means it will have to attack from time to time whenever Iran rehabilitates its nuclear program. Israeli willingness to take the Israel-U.S.-Iran triangle to this new place will create a new political reality, no matter how many centrifuges are destroyed along the way.

And one more word for Dagan: The overwhelming majority of Iran's response will be carried out through Hezbollah. The lack of internal stability in Lebanon and the instability between Israel and Hezbollah force us to assume that sooner or later, for one reason or another, Israel will find itself in another round of fighting with Hezbollah. If that is the case, Israel would be better off fighting Hezbollah over important strategic goals -- such as denting Iran's nuclear ambitions -- rather than over events of minimal strategic significance, like the border incident in July 2006.

No comments: