Israel's Options as Muslim Brotherhood Gains Power

This article appeared in Israel Hayom under the headline, "The era of the Muslim Brotherhood." However, for our purposes here I think it would be better entitled, "Israel's Options as Muslim Brotherhood Gains Power"

By Barry Rubin


The political history of the modern Middle East can easily be divided into three eras. In 1952, a military coup in Egypt signaled the start of the period in which radical Arab nationalism dominated. The 1979 Iranian revolution began the challenge of revolutionary Islamism. And then, in 2011, in the wake of more revolutions, Arab nationalism collapsed completely.

In most of the Arab world we are now in the era of the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, there is a new “Middle East,” but instead of being directed by moderation, peace, and a hunger for material prosperity, it is dominated by Islamists determined to transform their own societies and to conquer the region for their cause. The Muslim Brotherhood is overwhelmingly the most powerful organization in Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Tunisia, and very probably Libya, where its branches will control the governments. In Jordan, the brotherhood leads the opposition; in Syria, it plays an important role in the revolutionary upheaval.
Get the Israel Hayom newsletter sent to your mailbox!

There is much talk in the West, but little in the Middle East where people know it best, about how the brotherhood is becoming more moderate. Yet there is remarkably little evidence for this claim. Only self-serving statements by brotherhood leaders to Western journalists and governments make claims that the brotherhood has rejected its radical past and extremist ideology.

Look at any other data: internal statements to members and even the speeches of its leaders in Arabic; the behavior of its members in parliament, the brotherhood’s media; its support for violence; its open anti-Semitism, and its ideological discussions -- and there isn’t the tiniest reason to believe that the brotherhood is mellowing.

The alternative wishful-thinking theory is that being in power will moderate the brotherhood. Participating in elections, proposing laws in parliament, and running government departments is supposed to convert brotherhood leaders to compromise and pragmatism.

For Israelis, however, all of these claims sound precisely like the argument made during the 1990s’ peace process and regarding Yasser Arafat. This argument also didn’t work in Iran, Lebanon, or the Gaza Strip.

True, the radical regimes are more cautious in their pronouncements and don’t instantly launch wars. But that is because they are consolidating power at home and are just getting started. Even in Turkey, the Islamists in power have worked tirelessly to transform their societies, assure that they never lose power, and radicalize their foreign policies. Turkey’s break with Israel and alignment with Hamas and Hezbollah provides a vivid case study.

Take the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as an example. The brotherhood has assured the U.S. that it will keep Egypt’s commitments but repeatedly stated that it will submit the treaty to a referendum or demand changes. It also insists that it will never recognize Israel. What is likely to happen is that a brotherhood-led government would formally say that it is following the treaty while emptying it of content and breaking it altogether whenever that seems possible and profitable.

The window opened in the 1990s for potential Israel-Arab and Israel-Palestinian peace has now closed completely. In an atmosphere of growing radicalization, nobody is going to take the risk of daring to make peace with Israel. Indeed, given the regional situation they are likely to believe they have no need to do so. Once again, as in decades past, the radicals (wrongly) believe they can destroy Israel; the moderates know any moves on their part would make them targets, too.

The most dangerous scenario facing Israel is an attempt by Hamas to take advantage of the new situation and even to drag Egypt into war with Israel, the kind of strategy that appealed to the PLO in the late 1960s and into the 1970s. As in late 2008, Hamas can escalate rocket, mortar and cross-border attacks on Israel. When Israel launches a large-scale retaliation, Hamas can appeal to the brotherhood for money, weapons and volunteers.

The Egypt-Gaza border is likely to be open to all three things. Attacks across the Egypt-Israel border will also be used. Even the current Egyptian army could not or would not want to stop most of these things. Worst of all would be if Egypt was pulled into the war directly. One can cite reasons why this wouldn’t happen -- the Egyptian army knows it would lose; it wouldn’t want to throw away U.S. aid -- but miscalculations of that type have often happened in the region. And by then the army might be too weak or infiltrated by radical officers to resist.

What can Israel do to respond to the brotherhood’s new power and threat? A lot. And Israel’s government is doing them all:

• Build up Israel’s defenses along the border with Egypt.

• Work whenever possible with Egypt’s army to reduce tensions and conflicts.

• Help ensure the Palestinian Authority’s survival, despite its objectionable behavior, so that it is not overthrown by Hamas in the West Bank.

• Do everything possible to support Jordan’s stability, which seems to be reasonably strong despite terrible problems, since a revolution there would bring a very anti-Israel regime and a real danger of war.

• Maximize pressure on the Gaza Strip to ensure that Hamas there is as weak as possible, but carefully calculate military operations, despite the frustrations involved, to avoid escalation.

• Try to persuade Western countries that they are missing the truth about the brotherhood. Sooner or later, the brotherhood’s behavior will force them to wake up, as has happened many times previously.
• Build cooperation with countries threatened by revolutionary Islamism, from China, India and Singapore to Africa, and even with opposition movements in Islamist-ruled countries.

But none of these things are solutions. Only the U.S. can lead an effective response to a regional order now overwhelmingly controlled by radical Islamists. What is needed is a broad, U.S.-led alliance of all the anti-Islamist forces which cannot work together directly but can cooperate through Washington.
Those forces include European countries, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, Jordan and Israel. This would also mean a comprehensive program of overt and covert support for oppositions in Iran, Lebanon, Turkey and the moderates in Syria.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration is going in exactly the wrong direction, engaging the brotherhood and naively believing its promises.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His new book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press.

The Middle East in 2012: The Year of Living Dangerously

Posted: 16 Jan 2012 12:50 PM PST
A different version of this article has been published in the Jerusalem Post. I own the rights and prefer you to read and link to this version.

http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com/2012/01/middle-east-in-2012-year-of-living.html

The Middle East in 2012: The Year of Living Dangerously

By Barry Rubin

The region-wide upheaval known as “the Arab Spring” would make it seem that terrorism, especially Islamist terrorism, is pretty much as dead as are its thousands of victims. After all, if the protest demonstration and balloting have proven able to resolve grievances then who needs to blow people up?

And the same applies to intimidation and instability since presumably people vote, a government is elected, and democracy immediately enues.

But the Middle East is far from through with violence. Where should we look in 2012 for the greatest threats of terrorism and what will be the targets? If we think this through in advance we can better plan to avoid or minimize these problems.

Let’s start with Egypt. If the military refused to move forward with elections or turn power over to the winners (that is, the Islamists) there would be a violent response. And that’s one of the reasons why this is unlikely to happen. The moderates are not going to engage in violence, which is one reason the military feels free to repress them. The problem of crime and general anarchy has already become very serious.

Yet political violence in Egypt is very likely and it will come mainly from the Salafists. Remember that there are numerous groups and leaders, even within the al-Nur party which has done so well in the elections. Some radical Salafists will not be satisfied with the pace of progress (regress?) toward Islamism. They will target Christians, liberals, secularists, women demanding rights, tourists, and Israel. Continuing attacks on Christians are inevitable, with the goal of forcing them to submit or encouraging them to flee.

The Brotherhood has no interest in promoting violence—except against Israel—but it has a great interest in condoning violence since to oppose attacks on Christians, moderates, or others will reduce its popularity. But the Brotherhood doesn’t have to worry since the military will be blamed for violence (the bad guys) and be pressed to turn over power to the civilians, that is, the Muslim Brotherhood! Talk about having your cake and eating it, too!

A roughly similar pattern will happen in Libya and Tunisia. The West will praise “progress” toward democracy while the radical Islamists chase or intimidate anyone who pushes for moderation on key issues, much less supports secularism. The governments will from time to time condemn the murder, beating, and threats against the moderates but not necessarily do anything about it. And there aren’t too many moderates in Libya to begin with.

This might be characterized as: We won. The Americans won't save you. Shut up.

For Hamas in the Gaza Strip violence is also, thanks to the West, cost-free. Why? First, while some fighters and civilians will be killed by Israeli retaliation, Hamas doesn’t care about that. Those deaths or destruction create martyrs (urging the rest to fight harder and hate more) and the West will blame Israel. Again, killing and fighting is a win-win situation. Or letting others kill and fight since Hamas can allow smaller groups to do the attacks (Islamic Jihad; the local al-Qaida affiliate) and blame them while Hamas poses as peaceful and moderate.

And then it can always try to hope that terrorist and rocket attacks on Israel provoke enough violence to bring Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian government, and even Egyptian arm support.
In Syria, there’s no real cost for the regime to continue murdering its own people, certainly compared to the cost of giving up. And it is clear that the Arab League has no stomach for actually doing something serious.

Iraq? The violence there will continue, especially against Christians until they are all pretty much forced out of the country. The Sunni and Shia will keep fighting, to the detriment of civilians on both sides, even if the main factor determining power will be politics.

Lebanon? Hizballah will use violence against its rivals and nobody in the West will do anything effective about it. Once again, radicals murder moderates; moderates complain. The same point applies in Iran against which there are sanctions but repressing the opposition won’t make them worse.

As for al-Qaida, despite the fact that bin Ladin’s dead yet it will continue to claim victims in such far-flung places as Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, and very possibly Morocco, Gaza, and even perhaps Jordan.
Am I cynical? What I’m trying to do is to rouse people against cynicism, to realize that their countries’ policies are encouraging violence and repression because it most cases they won’t say anything about it and in a few others they won’t do anything about it. Precisely because there is now an open political struggle, the most radical Islamists will use violence against anyone who speaks up or acts up.

And the more “moderate” Islamists who the U.S. government is courting will not stop their militant brethren while benefitting from the incitement, threats, and violence they dispense. If 2011 was the year of the “Arab Spring,” 2012 will be the year for the Islamists to consolidate their gains and eliminate their domestic critics.