Iran's MAD Gambit

Dr. Avigdor Haselkorn

Twice in a span of one month, Israeli government ministers had claimed that Iran was working on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). First, in early February, deputy prime minister and minister for strategic affairs, Moshe Yaalon said that a blast last November at a missile base of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) hit a system “getting ready to produce a missile with a range of 10,000 kilometers (6000 miles).”

Later that month Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz said in a CNBC interview that Iran was investing billions of dollars to develop inter-continental ballistic missiles. "We estimate that in 2-3 years they will have the first inter-continental ballistic missiles that can reach the east coast of America." Predictably, the New York Times was quick to cite “American officials” as saying they believed the “assertions were at best premature, and at worst badly exaggerated…the officials said that Iran might harbor the ambition of having missiles that could reach the United States, but that it was not close to achieving that goal.”
Accordingly, the Israeli statements were politically motivated. Jerusalem, the Times reported, “was trying to make the point that the Iranian nuclear program is a threat not only to Israel but to other nations.” Yet this is hardly the end of the story.
Even the skeptics are not disputing the information that the Iranians are laboring to manufacture an ICBM. Thus, the questions should be what are Iran’s motives and what are the implications of its effort to acquire such weapons rather than just focusing on how close it is to having an operational ICBM.
Undoubtedly the pursuance of an intercontinental missile capability is meant to boost the Iranian regime’s domestic standing. As well, it is geared to enhance Iran’s regional prestige and political clout. But more importantly, an Iranian ICBM effort provides the telltale sign that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. It is simply inconceivable that Tehran will undertake such a costly and technologically challenging project just to deliver a conventional payload to the American continent. Never mind that such a payload would have to be especially small given the distance the missile would have to travel. An ICBM venture would make no strategic, economic or operational sense unless the Iranians are aiming to equip the missile with an unconventional warhead.
Indeed, the way Iran is going about developing its ICBM is a carbon copy of the route it took in its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. In the latter case Tehran, while developing missiles capable of reaching Israel, armed its proxy-- the Lebanese terror organization Hizballah--with a vast array of rockets aimed at Israeli citiesto provide a makeshift deterrent against an Israeli attack on its nuclear sites. In the words of Yadallah Javani, politburo chief of the IRGC last November “The Islamic Republic of Iranhas some means and possibilities in areas very close to the Zionist regimeand can easily give a response to Israel to make its leaders repent their action." Not surprisingly, some of the rockets supplied by Iran could reportedly reach Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor undoubtedly to directly counter any Israeli threat to Iran’s facilities.
Now Iran is acting similarly with regard to developing its intercontinental delivery capability. As in Lebanon, it has created stopgap deterrents that range from the establishment of terror cells in Latin America and Canada to open threats to target U.S. bases and forces deployed in theater in case of conflict. For example last June, Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh said that about 70% of the U.S. bases in the Middle East are no farther than 300 to 400 kilometers away from Iran, suggesting all of them are within the scope of the IRGC's short- and medium-range missiles. “The Americans have reduced our labors,” he told Iran’s Fars News Agency, “Their military bases in the region are in a range of 130, 250 and maximum 700 km in Afghanistan which we can hit with these missiles.” As before, the idea is to assure that Iran’s progress toward acquiring an unmistakably ominous capability is not impeded-- in this case by Washington.
Acquisition of an ICBM capability would severely undermine America’s credibility in the region especially the offer made by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton back in July 2009 to extend a “defensive umbrella” over the Middle East vis-à-vis Tehran. In a word, the possession by Iran of intercontinental missiles would wreck the foundation of America’s regional alliances.
In contrast, the addition of an ICBM component to its strategic weapons mix would enhance the reliability of the nuclear shield Iran is likely to provide its allies-- all united by their hatred of America and Israel—once it gets the bomb.Already, Iran’s Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari declared in September 2010 that the Iranian Navy's presence on the high seas and international waters (like its recent sailings into in the Mediterranean) is part of Tehran's strategy for “defending its interests abroad.”
Iran’s freedom of action is also likely to grow. It could even engage in deliberate provocations in support of its allies. For example, Tehran could stir up trouble on its border with Iraq or in the Gulf in a bid to stretch U.S. forces thin in case of a future North Korean-U.S. crisis. Besides, neutralizing America’s strategic commitment could not but increase the odds of an attack on Israel.
Finally, acquisition of nuclear-armed intercontinental missiles would mean Iran has adopted a Samson-type strategic posture vis-à-vis the U.S. Doubtlessly hoping to capitalize on their oft-proclaimed penchant for martyrdom, the mullahs are seeking a deterrence posture akin to a poor-man’s Mutual Assured Destruction (or MAD). They aim to put Washington on notice that endangering their political survival would also spell doom for the U.S. (that is at least as long as the U.S. remains vulnerable to even a rogue ICBM attack). After all, if an obscure terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda at the time was able to single-handedly bring the U.S. financial system to the brink of collapse in all of one day, and by employing nothing more than counter-conventional means, a nuclear hit on New York City or Washington D.C. could debase the seat of “world arrogance” for good.

Through its ICBM gambit Iran is thus pursuing a master plan aimed to deal with the two Satans—the Great one (America) and the Little one (Israel)--simultaneously. The new missile capability would enable Tehran to brandish a deterrent –i.e. defensive-- strategy globally so as to allow it the prosecution of regional hegemony offensively.

FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Dr. Avigdor Haselkorn is the author of The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons and Deterrence (Yale University Press).