MAGHAZI REFUGEE CAMP, Gaza Strip — From the time he was a boy, Ali
al-Manama dreamed of joining the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, the
military wing of the Islamic Hamas
movement. His commitment intensified when his father, a Qassam fighter,
was killed by an Israeli drone in 2001 as he fired mortar shells over
the border. Ali joined up at 15, relatives said, and by 23 had risen to
be a commander in this neighborhood in the midsection of this coastal Palestinian territory.
On Friday, at the funeral of a fellow fighter, Mr. Manama leaned over
the body and said, “I’ll join you soon, God willing,” recalled a cousin
who spoke on the condition that he be identified only by his first name,
Mahmoud.
His wish to die fighting and become a martyr — and the honor it would
bring in his community — was fulfilled Saturday morning at 7:30, though
the missile struck him not while he was in active combat, but while
talking on a cellphone that Israeli intelligence might have used to
track his whereabouts.
“He had been telling us all week about all the achievements of Qassam,” Mahmoud said. “When he heard about the rockets in Israel, he would be very proud.”
Mr. Manama was one of as many as 15,000 Qassam fighters who are
responsible for most of the rocket blitzes that have blanketed southern
Israel and reached as far as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in the five days
since the brigade’s operations commander, Ahmed al-Jabari, was
assassinated, experts say.
Highly organized and increasingly professionalized yet still secretive
and cultlike, Qassam is emblematic of Hamas’s struggle to balance its
history as a resistance movement and its governing role in Gaza since
2007.
Israel has blamed the growing number of civilian casualties in Gaza on
the fact that Qassam and Hamas are inextricable, and military
storehouses are woven into residential neighborhoods. Most Qassam
fighters have day jobs — as police officers, university professors,
ministry clerks, and Mr. Manama’s relatives said he had been sleeping at
home even during last week’s widening war.
Mr. Jabari in recent years had both increased the military branch’s
political power and become a popular hero whose visage adorned posters
and billboards throughout the Gaza Strip.
With an expanding arsenal and financing provided by Iran, Syria, Sudan
and other foreign sources, Qassam expanded and matured under Mr. Jabari,
adopting clear training regimens and chains of command. Last year he
even negotiated with Israel to return an Israeli sergeant, Gilad Shalit —
whose kidnapping he had engineered five years earlier — in exchange for
1,000 Palestinian prisoners.
Yet Qassam remains a fundamentalist jihadi enterprise whose culture and
goals — terrorizing and obliterating Israel — resemble those of ragtag
militia cells.
“The point of departure shouldn’t be that we have a state and within a
state we have institutions and within the institutions you have a
division of labor,” cautioned Shaul Mishal, a professor of political
science at Tel Aviv University who wrote a book on Hamas. “Hamas maybe
dreams about being a state, and Qassam, sometimes they delude themselves
that they are an army, but at the end I think their basic perception is
that they’re part and parcel of a community. It’s blurred boundaries
between the political activities and the military operations.”
Named for a Syrian who was killed in 1935 while battling the British
occupation of what was then known as Palestine, the brigades made their
first strike on Jan. 1, 1992, killing a rabbi in the former Kfar Darom
settlement, not far from here. It has grown over two decades into by far the largest and strongest of Gaza’s many militant factions
— though others have also been lobbing rockets into Israel in recent
days and months — with a strong sociological pull on the Gaza
population.
The welcome banner over the entrance to this refugee camp is signed by
the Qassam. Mosques are decorated with Qassam slogans and pictures of
its more than 800 fallen fighters. Those who know active brigade members
use them as conduits with the Hamas authorities, to speed passage
through the Rafah crossing into Egypt or help resolve problems with the
police.
When a fighter dies, his comrades show up in force on the third and
final day of tent-sitting and set up a projector to show a film about
his achievements. Qassam also takes responsibility for ferreting out
suspected collaborators with Israel, like the one it took credit for executing in a public square on Friday.
“It’s no longer a secret that the Qassam has the final word in Gaza,”
said Adnan Abu Amr, dean of journalism and political science lecturer at
Umah University in Gaza. “He who has a relation with a commander of
Qassam, he considers himself the holder of a diplomatic passport. You
have a password that opens all doors.”
Jonathan Schanzer, author of the 2008 book “Hamas vs. Fatah: The
Struggle for Palestine,” said Qassam has had four distinct phases. The
first was a single-minded focus on suicide bombings, until Yahya Ayyash,
the engineer of that strategy, was killed in 1996, when the cellphone
he was holding was blown up remotely.
Leading up to the start of the second intifada in 2000, Hamas joined
forces with its rival Fatah faction and the brigades expanded suicide
bombings but also began using rockets they called Qassam.
Over the last decade, Mohammed Deif — who was severely injured in 2003
but technically remains Qassam’s commander — upgraded and expanded
rocket production and import, and Mr. Jabari professionalized
operations, culminating in the Shalit deal.
With the death of Mr. Jabari, a charismatic figure influential with
Hamas leaders inside and outside Gaza, “They are off balance for sure,”
Mr. Schanzer said. “Every time this happens it forces change, it forces
adaptation.”
But Qassam “has long operated in a decentralized structure, so that if
its leadership is decapitated it will always find new leaders to rise
up,” he added. “It’s compartmentalized. They work in cells. So even if
he was the leader, there are other leaders.”
A 2009 paper published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
contains an organizational chart of the Qassam Brigades showing Gaza
divided into six geographic areas, each with its own commander reporting
to Mr. Jabari. Each also has separate artillery, antitank and
antiaircraft units as well as snipers, engineers and infantry, according
to the paper, titled “Hamas in Combat,” with forcewide units handling
communications, logistics, smuggling, weapons, intelligence and public
affairs.
“Almost by any definition they have become more institutionalized,” said
Nathan Thrall, an analyst who covers the Palestinian territories for
the International Crisis Group. “They more or less have been keeping a
calm in Gaza. A very imperfect calm, and one that has escalations every
three or four or five months, but they are the party that Egypt has gone
to to ensure that things don’t get out of control.”
Mr. Abu Amr, who has followed Qassam closely since its inception, said
most fighters join at the age of 16 or 17, and spend about a year in
religious indoctrination, security education, and finally combat
training before secret induction ceremonies in which they take an oath
on the Koran. But Gaza is a 150-square-mile strip with 1.5 million
people who know one another’s business, and parents are proud when their
sons enlist.
Banners and plaques, in homes and on streets, display the brigade’s
signature seal: an M-16 rifle in front of Jerusalem’s Al Aqsa Mosque,
with a green Hamas flag and green copy of the Koran. “No God but Allah,”
it says. “You did not kill them, it’s God who killed them.”
After the current conflagration began, Mr. Abu Amr’s only son, Mohammed,
15, changed the profile picture on his Facebook page, to Mr. Jabari
from Cristiano Ronaldo, the soccer star of Real Madrid. And what if
Mohammed, the eldest of Mr. Abu Amr’s six children, decides that he,
like Ali al-Manama, wants to be a fighter?
“It will be hard for me — I will be sad, and his mother as well,” Mr.
Abu Amr said, aware that martyrdom is both the aspiration and the
expectation of those who take the oath. “But there are something called
the hard choices. He’s not the first and he’s not going to be the last
one. My only condolence will be that he has gone for the sake of a
national cause.”
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: November 20, 2012
An article on Monday about the increasing discipline, professionalism and influence of the Izzidine al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza, which are responsible for most of the rocket blitzes that have hit southern Israel in the latest round of fighting, misspelled the given name of the dean of journalism who is also a political science lecturer at Umah University in Gaza. He is Adnan Abu Amr, not Adner.
Correction: November 20, 2012
An article on Monday about the increasing discipline, professionalism and influence of the Izzidine al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza, which are responsible for most of the rocket blitzes that have hit southern Israel in the latest round of fighting, misspelled the given name of the dean of journalism who is also a political science lecturer at Umah University in Gaza. He is Adnan Abu Amr, not Adner.
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