Daniel Nisman
Since his election, Egypt's President Mohammed Morsi has gone to
great lengths to show the disparities between his Muslim
Brotherhood-backed government and the much-loathed Mubarak dictatorship.
Israel's military campaign against the Palestinian militants in the
Gaza Strip seemed to have provided Mr. Morsi with his juiciest
opportunity yet, while climbing a few steps on the ladder toward
regional leadership in the process. In stark contrast to Mubarak's
response to Israel's 2008/9 Operation Cast Lead, Morsi has partially
opened the Rafah border crossing
and pledged unprecedented solidarity with Hamas -- itself a Muslim
Brotherhood movement. However, as each Hamas rocket over Tel Aviv brings
Israel's tanks closer toward the Gaza border for a ground invasion, Mr.
Morsi risks being embarrassed and undermined by the same faction with
whom he pledged solidarity.
On November 17, the spotlight on Mr. Morsi's emergency Arab League meeting on Gaza was shattered when a train slammed into a school bus
in the impoverished Assuit region, killing 50 school children. This
costly disaster was the latest in a series of public transport accidents
during Morsi's term, once again highlighting the dire problems of
infrastructure and law enforcement plaguing Egypt's population of 83
million. Soon after, Egyptian social networks began teeming with outrage
over state media's inadequate coverage of the disaster in favor of
covering the ongoing hostilities in Gaza.
Before the Assuit disaster, many Egyptians had begun to express
concerns with the nascent government's threatening rhetoric toward
Israel and their bolstering of Hamas. The Wafd party, amongst Egypt's
most veteran political factions, refused to attend a Freedom and Justice
Party-organized emergency meeting aimed at condemning Israel, for fears
that it would compromise Egypt's much-needed U.S. aid. Meanwhile,
Hamas' refusal to hold its rocket fire and adhere to an informal lull
during the visit of P.M. Hisham Qandil to
the Gaza Strip on November 16 was seen as a slap in the face to many
citizens, accusing Hamas of disrespecting their generous offering of
solidarity.
Qandil's visit wouldn't be Hamas' last snub toward Egypt, not by a
longshot. On November 17, Egypt intensified its efforts to mediate a
ceasefire in Gaza, when its influential intelligence chief Mohamed Adbel
Wahed hosted former Hamas politburo chief Khaled Mashaal in Cairo.
Hours after the meeting, Hamas' Gaza leadership shattered any hopes for a
ceasefire by firing an additional long-range rocket into Israel's largest city of Tel Aviv, pushing Israel's government closer to a ground incursion into the Gaza Strip.
If not stopped, Hamas' efforts to push Israel into a ground invasion
will be disastrous for Egypt. The use of tanks, troops, and heavy
artillery in Gaza's densely populated urban centers will guarantee a
surge in civilian casualties, the relative absence of which has limited
mass participation in anti-Israel protests in Tahrir Square until now. A
ground incursion would further provide cannon fodder for Morsi's
political rivals, both within the Muslim Brotherhood and in ultra
conservative Salafist parties. On November 17, the political outbidding
of these groups over the role of Sharia Law in Egypt's constitution had
boiled over, resulting in the withdrawal of Egypt's persecuted Coptic
Christian factions from the constituent assembly.
With or without a ground incursion, Egypt needs Hamas to offer a
truce before the Israeli military commits irreversible damage to its
governing infrastructure. With over 600 rocket-related targets
destroyed, the IAF has begun to target Hamas governing institutions,
including the cabinet and interior ministry. It won't be long before
Israel sets its sights on Hamas' civil police force, the very same
police force Egypt relies on to crackdown on radical Salafists and
Jihadists in the southern Gaza Strip. In the security vacuum which
ensued since Mubarak's ousting, Gazan jihadists have joined forces with
al-Qaeda linked groups in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, bombing the
economically crucial Sinai natural gas pipeline and staging repeated
attacks on Egyptian security forces.
By throwing his weight behind Hamas, it seems that Mr. Morsi may get
more than he originally bargained for. With each rocket Hamas fires into
Israel, they further undermine Egypt's image as a credible broker,
hindering Mr. Morsi's personal aspirations to restore Egypt's role as a
regional leader.
The good news is that unlike Israel and Hamas, Mr. Morsi has an exit
from the conflict in Gaza -- by simply ignoring it. The glitz and
glamour of revolutionary regional leadership must be a second priority
in order to bring Egypt back from the brink of economic collapse,
sectarian strife, and insecurity. Indeed, if Mr. Morsi wants to distance
himself from his predecessor, he can start by prioritizing the needs of
his own people.
Daniel Nisman is an Intelligence Manager at Max Security
Solutions, a geopolitical risk consulting firm based in Tel Aviv,
Israel. You can follow him on twitter @dannynis.
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