Doc's Talk: The Hamas Challenge: What Should Be Done?

Monday, July 07, 2014

The Hamas Challenge: What Should Be Done?

INSS Insight No. 569

Kobi Michael , Udi Dekel

Background

The abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers has returned the issue of Palestinian terror and the military threat from the Gaza Strip to the top of the public agenda. As a result, there is a strong demand to change Israel’s strategic approach to Hamas and to terror and violence in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The government of Israel has leveraged the kidnapping in order to make it clear to the Israeli public and the international community that Hamas is a terrorist organization and that there should be no tolerance of a hybrid organization that plays on two fields, one political and the other terror-based, and that has an independent military terrorist wing. The Israeli government contends that internal Palestinian reconciliation lends legitimacy to terrorism and to incitement and hatred discourse. Therefore, the government has a political objective – to dismantle internal Palestinian unity based on the reconciliation agreement, and a military objective – to deal a hard blow at Hamas and its infrastructures, at least in the West Bank.

The Struggle against Hamas in the West Bank

The murder of the three teenagers is considered a heinous act of terrorism that revealed the establishment of Hamas’ civilian, terrorist, and political infrastructures in the West Bank. During the search for the kidnapped youths and their abductors, Israel gained legitimacy to pursue vigorous action to dismantle these infrastructures. The measures undertaken by Israel were accepted by the international community, in spite of its twofold position – identification with Israel’s pain, along with a demand that Israel refrain from expanding its operations and avoid harm to uninvolved civilians.

Demonstration by Hamas supporters in East Jerusalem, July 4, 2014, AFP/Getty Images

While all signs and findings point to the fact that the abduction was carried out by a cell belonging to Hamas, there is no evidence that the order for the attack came directly from the Hamas leadership (in Gaza, the West Bank, or abroad) or that the timing of the kidnapping was determined by the military or political leadership. Thus far, Hamas has not taken responsibility for the attack, which may complicate Israel’s ability to achieve international legitimacy for striking a hard blow at the movement’s infrastructures, leaders, and operatives in the Gaza Strip and may restrict its freedom of action.

There are limits to Hamas’s ability to perpetrate terrorist attacks in the West Bank because of a significant IDF military presence in the area, boosted by operations by Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces. This was the case, at least, until the reconciliation agreement. In addition, Hamas’ Gaza branch has limited influence in the West Bank because of the separation between the sectors. At the heart of Israel’s operational concept for confronting terrorism is the idea of continuous action to dismantle the terrorist infrastructures in order to prevent the creation of terror-enabled organizations and capabilities. In this context, there is no political or operational obstacle to pursuing Hamas terrorist operatives, dismantling Hamas cells and headquarters, or restricting the group’s civilian, economic, and social activity, particularly that of the dawa, in an ongoing and uncompromising fashion.

After the abduction, hundreds of Hamas operatives were arrested, and the offices and institutions of the dawa were targeted specifically. This indicates that for reasons that have not yet been revealed, Israel’s defense establishment had reduced the pressure on Hamas in the West Bank and allowed it to restore terrorist infrastructures and terror-supporting institutions. If Hamas operatives in this sector had been arrested and interrogated prior to the kidnapping, perhaps the result would have been different.

In a June 29, 2014 speech at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Prime Minister Netanyahu emphasized that Israel will not give up its presence in the West Bank or its security control, even with a political settlement with the Palestinians. In addition, Israel believes its military presence in the West Bank and the ongoing effort to dismantle Hamas infrastructures may actually strengthen the PA, led by Mahmoud Abbas, prevent infiltration of jihadi terrorists, and provide a wide scope for support of and security cooperation with the PA.

What Should be Done about Hamas in Gaza?

Hamas in Gaza is at a low point: the new regime in Egypt has adopted a strong negative position toward it, Iran has turned its back and is busy with Syria and Iraq, Turkey’s support is limited, and the distress of Gaza’s residents is growing. The smuggling of weapons has almost ceased, even though Hamas has succeeded in establishing an infrastructure to manufacture long range rockets with a range that reaches the greater Tel Aviv area.

While Hamas has grown weaker, Islamic Jihad has grown stronger in Gaza. Its numbers have risen, and it is equipped with medium range rockets with a range of 40-70 km. With its radical agenda, irresponsibility, and disregard of the Gaza population, Islamic Jihad is challenging Hamas control, and cooperation with global jihadis who are even more extreme has intensified.

Since the Hamas takeover of Gaza seven years ago, Israel has debated between three ways to deal with the organization: 1. accept its rule in Gaza and consider it responsible for all terrorist acts emanating from there; 2. prolonged action to weaken Hamas rule and capabilities in Gaza until the PA can restore control; 3. an extensive military operation to overthrow the Hamas government in Gaza, destroy its strategic capabilities (medium and long range missiles and rockets), and strike at and arrest its leaders and terrorist operatives.

Thus far, the government of Israel has chosen a combined approach of weakening and isolating Hamas and viewing it as responsible for Gaza. In this context, the government has avoided ordering the IDF to undertake a military operation unless required by the situation, such as ongoing volleys of rocket fire with casualties on the Israeli home front. These operations were limited in their objective and focused on striking at Hamas infrastructures and capabilities. This was done to restore deterrence, achieve prolonged calm, and establish rules of the game that are favorable to Israel, usually with Egyptian mediation. An operation of this kind can focus on the battle against the rockets and mortars to damage Hamas’s capabilities, and on targeted killings of the group’s commanders and senior officials. At the same time, humanitarian support is needed for residents of Gaza.

The escalation in the Gaza sector and the barrages of rockets and shells fired at Israel for over a week invite consideration of other options, such as:

Focusing on Hamas’s ability to produce missiles and rockets and launch them deep into Israel: Given that the Egyptian military is weakening Hamas and stopping the arms smuggling from Sinai, there is an opportunity to dismantle the Hamas and Islamic Jihad strategic launching capabilities. This would involve land maneuvers with ground forces entering deep into Gaza, including built-up areas. The goal would be to uncover and dismantle long range arsenals, destroy the infrastructure for rocket manufacture in Gaza, and trike at the launch chain against Israel. An operation of this kind does not require a prolonged IDF presence in the Gaza Strip.

Toppling the Hamas government in Gaza, which requires understanding the implications of such a move, including, who would fill the vacuum, since the PA presumably lacks the ability to regain control of Gaza, and it is very doubtful that Abbas would be prepared to accept control through the “gift” of the IDF. There is an idea of setting up an alternative government in Gaza (Muhammad Dahlan?) with Egyptian intervention. This would require close coordination with Egypt and an Egyptian willingness to accept responsibility and provide guarantees for Gaza’s future. Past experience shows that there is little chance that Egypt would agree to be the main actor in implementing this option. In the absence of an alternative to the Hamas government, the risk increases that radical jihadis would fill the vacuum, Israel’s losses would exceed its gains, and a worse situation would replace the current reality. The result could make a prolonged IDF presence in the Gaza Strip necessary, and Israel would be responsible for the needs of the more than 1.5 million people there.

Advocates of the option of toppling the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip must also consider the following: 1. broad mobilization of the reserves on the scale of several divisions for operational activity in Gaza and reinforcement of defense in the other sectors; 2. placing the economy on an emergency footing; 3. a phased military effort to clear the terrorist infrastructures and thwart terrorism, which could continue for about six months and cause a delay in economic growth during this time; 4. a serious impact on daily life on the home front, from Tel Aviv southward, as well as the fear of a high number of casualties. All this activity would require a budgetary allocation estimated at some 15 billion shekels.

Therefore, it is best to have a modest and attainable strategic objective, which would involve, in cooperation with Egypt, mainly isolating and weakening Hamas. If Hamas continues to fire missiles and rockets or allows them to be fired from Gaza, Israel would expand its military operation to strike a hard blow at Hamas’ launching capabilities, particularly medium and long range capabilities, and would use precision strikes to attack Hamas operatives and launch focused, limited ground invasions. The emphasis would be on strengthening deterrence and striking a harsh blow against the ability of Hamas’ military wing to attack Israel, without occupying Gaza and without making the dismantling of Hamas the supreme objective.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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