Doc's Talk: Hizballah's Military Wing Under Pressure Despite Political Gains

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Hizballah's Military Wing Under Pressure Despite Political Gains

Matthew Levitt
July 16, 2008

Hizballah has much to celebrate. With the formation of a national unity government in Lebanon last week, it is now well positioned to block any effort to dismantle its military wing. Today, the organization is celebrating the release of five Lebanese prisoners and the remains of several Hizballah and Palestinian militants. But even as Hizballah enjoys the political dividends of its successes, its military wing finds itself under pressure at home and abroad. PolicyWatch #1389
Hizballah's Military Wing Under Pressure Despite Political Gains
By Matthew Levitt
July 16, 2008

Hizballah has much to celebrate. With the formation of a national unity government in Lebanon last week, it is now well positioned to block any effort to dismantle its military wing. Today, the organization is celebrating the release of five Lebanese prisoners and the remains of several Hizballah and Palestinian militants. But even as Hizballah enjoys the political dividends of its successes, its military wing finds itself under pressure at home and abroad.

Protecting the Arms of the "Resistance"
The "blocking third" Hizballah formally secured in the new Lebanese cabinet is part of the Doha agreement reached in May. The one-third plus one representation of Hizballah and its allies within the thirty-member cabinet effectively undercuts any legislative means to disarm the group's military wing as required under UN Security Council Resolution 1701. At the time, then-UN secretary general Kofi Annan stated, "Dismantling Hizballah is not the direct mandate of the UN." Commenting on the continued flow of weapons from Iran to Hizballah through Syria, Annan made clear the UN force would not stop the transactions. "The understanding," he added, "was that it would be the Lebanese who would disarm [Hizballah]." Clearly, although it is much needed, that will not now happen.

Israeli intelligence officials told the Israeli cabinet that Hizballah has tripled the number of rockets it had during the summer 2006 war. More disturbing, according to a French diplomat, not only has the quantity increased, but also the quality as well. Hizballah now has "serious weapons," the diplomat reported, "not just Katyushas." According to an Israeli security official, Hizballah can now fire rockets on Tel Aviv from north of the Litani River, and hit as far south as Dimona from southern Lebanon. Moreover, because of Hizballah's blocking third, the new Lebanese cabinet may not be able to approve renewal of UNIFIL's mandate, which expires in August.

Reclaiming the July War as a Victory
The summer 2006 war caused massive damage to Lebanon's infrastructure and led to significant domestic criticism of Hizballah and its military wing for its decision to kidnap Israeli soldiers and fire thousands of missiles into northern Israel. Local criticism of Hizballah arose once more this May, after the organization briefly seized control of part of west Beirut, turning the weapons it claims are maintained to "resist" Israel against fellow Lebanese. Speaking in late May, U.S. principal deputy director of national intelligence Donald Kerr noted, "Hizballah's early May actions inflamed the Sunni 'street' in Lebanon and contributed to a dramatic increase in sectarian tensions."

But Hizballah now expects, with good reason, that the prisoner exchange will catapult the group and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, back into the limelight as the spearhead of "resistance" against Israel. Among the slogans being plastered along coastal roads from the Israeli border to Sidon is Nasrallah's refrain: "Thanks to the weapons of the resistance, we will free our prisoners." Hizballah posters refer to the exchange as "Radwan Operation" -- a reference to Hizballah's recently assassinated chief of international operations, Imad Mughniyeh (a.k.a. Hajj Radwan).

Hizballah under International Scrutiny
Even as Hizballah celebrates these successes, it is under increasing pressure and scrutiny abroad. Yesterday, Britain's parliament approved a Home Office order issued earlier this month, banning Hizballah's military wing, al-Muqawam al-Islamiyya or Islamic Resistance. Hizballah's terrorist wing, often called the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) or, as in Britain, the External Services Organization (ESO), was banned in 2001. Condemning "Hizballah's violence and support for terrorism," the ban outlaws raising funds, encouraging support for, or belonging to, Hizballah's military wing.

Prime Minister Gordon Brown informed members of parliament that the decision to act now was based "on the sole grounds of new evidence of [Hizballah] involvement in terrorism in Iraq and the occupied Palestinian territories." According to reports in the British press, these include "planning to kidnap British security workers in Iraq," echoing the charges of two Iraqi parliamentarians claiming that Hizballah planned and oversaw the kidnapping of five Britons -- still missing -- from the Iraqi Finance Ministry in May 2007.

The U.S. government has also taken action against Hizballah since its forced takeover of Beirut. The U.S. Department of Treasury designated two Hizballah operatives in Venezuela, highlighting the scope of the organization's global footprint. One, Ghazi Nasr al-Din, is a Venezuelan diplomat who has been posted to its embassies in both Damascus and Lebanon. According to the Treasury, Nasr al-Din "counseled Hizballah donors on fundraising efforts and has provided donors with specific information on bank accounts where the donors' deposits would go directly to Hizballah." Undercutting the notion that there are distinct wings within Hizballah, he also met with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon "to discuss operational issues" and "arranged the travel of Hizballah members to attend a training course in Iran."

Treasury describes the second designated individual, Fawzi Kanan, as "a significant provider of financial support to Hizballah" who "facilitated travel for Hizballah members," and also went to Iran for training with other members. He too crosses the lines between support, military, and terrorist activity, having "met with senior Hizballah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, including possible kidnappings and terrorist attacks."

While denying responsibility for the killing of Mughniyeh, the Israeli government has taken a variety of steps to try and prevent a Hizballah retaliatory attack. Israelis officials fear three scenarios for Hizballah revenge: an attack on current or former senior Israeli officials traveling abroad; an attack on an Israeli embassy or other diplomatic mission abroad; or an attack targeting a location affiliated with a Jewish community abroad, as was the case in the 1994 Jewish community center bombing in Argentina. According to Israeli officials, Azerbaijani security services thwarted an attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku just weeks following the Mughniyeh assassination.

The pressure against Hizballah, however, is not just coming from governments. In the United States and Canada, two civil lawsuits were filed this month against Lebanese banks for providing Hizballah with financial services needed to carry out military and terrorist operations. In New York, plaintiffs sued a series of banks for providing Hizballah with "regular, systematic, and unfettered access to U.S. currency" with which it purchased rockets and other weapons. In Canada, plaintiffs sued banks for allowing U.S.-designated Hizballah entities, such as Yousser Company and Martyrs Foundation, "to open and maintain accounts and to freely transfer many millions of dollars of Hizballah funds and to carry out millions of dollars in financial transactions" (see PolicyWatch #1267). Cases such as these can be costly not only financially, but also in terms of the unwanted exposure they are likely to bring to both the banks and Hizballah.

Conclusion
Two years after surviving a brutal war with Israel, Hizballah has leveraged its military success into significant political gain. It has restocked its military arsenal, achieved new levels of political influence within the Lebanese government, and has now secured the release of prisoners from Israeli jails. Far from weakened or cowed by the summer 2006 war, Hizballah has emerged far stronger inside Lebanon.

Yet over the same time period, the group's military and terrorist activities abroad have been increasingly uncovered. Further exposing Hizballah's global footprint, and the violent and illicit activities in which its operatives are engaged, could help roll back the group's successes at home. According to Nasrallah, a European designation of Hizballah would "destroy" the organization since "the sources of our funding will dry up and the sources of moral, political, and material support will be destroyed." This week, Hizballah celebrates. But its party may be short-lived, especially if European leaders followed Britain's lead and held the group accountable for its militant and terrorist activities.

Matthew Levitt is a senior fellow and director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute. He is also author of Negotiating Under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks (Rowman & Littlefield, August 2008).

View this PolicyWatch on our website at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2913

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk