Doc's Talk

Saturday, June 27, 2009

Amir Taheri
Asharq Alawsat

Whatever the outcome of the current power struggle in Tehran, one thing is certain: the ruling establishment is split down the middle, with little possibility of reconciliation in the near future.

One could see the split in all the constituencies that together form the Khomeinist establishment.
The politically active segment of the Shiite clergy is split, with some senior mullahs like Hussein-Ali Montazeri, Abdul-Karim Mousavi Ardebili, and Yousef Sanei, siding with the opposition.

On the other hand, other senior mullahs such as Muhammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, Ahmad Jannati, and Ahmad Khatami support the "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenei who has emerged as the regime's field commander.

The military are equally split.

Some, like Defense Minister General Mostafa Muhammad Najjar and Interior Minister General Sadeq Mahsouli have sided with Khamenei's new hard-line stance.

Others like Admiral Ali Shamkhani, a former defense minister, and General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a former Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have indicated support for the opposition.

The split in the IRGC may be deeper than many suspect.

According to unconfirmed reports, at least 17 mid-ranking IRGC officers have been relieved of their posts. A senior commander, General Ali Fazli, who led the elite "Master of the Martyrs' Division", has been "reassigned" after refusing to order troops to crush the demonstrators.

The position of General Muhammad-Ali Jaafari, the IRGC's Commander, remains an enigma. Although promoted under Ahmadinejad, he has, on occasions, indicated unhappiness with the president's style, if not the substance of policies.

General Hassan Firuzabadi, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and the country's most senior military figure, has also tried to remain neutral, although some claim that his sympathies lie with the opposition.

Among senior technocrats, some like former Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati, have rallied to the "Supreme Guide" without ifs and buts. Others like Gholam-Reza Aghazadeh, who heads the nuclear project, and former Foreign Minister Kamaleddin Kharrazi, have indicated support for the opposition. Deputy Oil Minister Akbar Torkan has just been dismissed because of suspected sympathies for the opposition.

Other influential figures such as General Muhammad-Baqer Qalibaf, the Mayor of Tehran, and Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Islamic Majlis, Iran's ersatz parliament, have tried to sit on the fence, making noises in support of the opposition one day and professing loyalty to the "Supreme Guide" the next.

The current showdown has also divided Iran's academic elite.

More than 400 university professors and faculty deans have resigned in protest against the alleged rigging of the election.

In contrast, hundreds of academics have rallied behind Ahmadinejad and condemned Mousavi for "doing the work of the enemies of the regime."

The merchant class of the bazaars, a mainstay of the Khomeinist regime,

is also split between supporters and opponents of the regime.

In recent days, rival appeals have been published for the bazaar to shut down in protest at the election results or to celebrate Ahmadinejad's "historic victory."

Initially, some in the West, including some of US President Barack Hussein Obama's advisors, claimed that the pro-Mousavi’s revolt was little more than an expression of anger by Iran's upper middle classes and "the golden youth" of Tehran's wealthy districts. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Today, the two camps are present throughout Iranian society, cutting across class, regional, and age boundaries. Mousavi enjoys much support among both the rural and urban poor while Ahmadinejad has partisans among the rich even in the posh districts of Tehran.

It would be interesting to see what happens when some of the key organs of the regime hold their next meetings.

Take the High Council of National Defense. Both Ahmadinejad and Mousavi are ex-officio members along with other players such as former presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami. One half might side with Mousavi, the other half with Ahmadinejad.

Then we have the pompously named Council for the Discernment of the Interests of the Established Order, or the Expediency Council for short. It is headed by Rafsanjani, with General Mohsen Rezai Mir-Qaed, one of the three defeated presidential candidates, as secretary-general.

And, yet, at least half of the council's members have expressed support for Ahmadinejad.

A similar situation exists in the Assembly of Experts, a 92-mullah organ whose task is to supervise the work of the "Supreme Guide." Rafsanjani, now regarded as a key figure of the opposition, chairs the assembly. Legally speaking, the assembly has the power to impeach Khamenei and dismiss him as "Supreme Guide". However, that would require a two-third majority that Rafsanjani is not able to produce at this time.

The split in the Islamic Majlis, the ersatz parliament, is even more glaring. According to some estimates, a third of the members tilt towards Mousavi with another third favoring Ahmadinejad. The remaining third belongs to the "party of the wind", siding with whoever may seem to be winning.

Within the Council of Ministers, headed by Ahmadinejad, at least four men are believed to be sympathetic to the opposition, and thus likely to be purged in the coming reshuffle.

Many of the more charismatic figures of the Khomeinist movement broke with it long ago. Among them is former Interior Minister Abdallah Nuri, a mid-ranking cleric, who was a favorite of the late Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini. Nuri is now regarded as the most senior ex-Khomeinist to support regime change in Iran.

The split also extends into the leading families associated with Khomeinism.

One of Khomeini's granddaughters has emerged as a passionaria for the Mousavi camp. On the other hand, a grandson of the late ayatollah is a propagandist for Ahmadinejad.

Khamenei's eldest son Mujtaba has become an ardent advocate of Ahmadinejad, touring the country to mobilize support for him. On the other hand, Khamenei's brother, Hadi, is a supporter of Mehdi Karroubi, one of the defeated presidential candidates, and a vocal opponent of Ahmadinejad.

The 12 June presidential election forced the various rival factions of the regime into two broad camps.

Under different circumstances, this might have evolved into a two-party system, allowing rival factions to alternate by forming the government.

Mousavi might have been allowed to win and form a new administration. Such an outcome would have provided a rather discredited regime with new legitimacy through elections. The system would have remained intact with the defeated faction preserving its chances of returning to power in future elections. Those chances would have been all the stronger because the system does not allow "outsiders" to stand for election.

Now, however, all that we could expect is a bloody showdown at the end of which the winner will launch a massive purge at all levels. In the Khomeinist system, there is no room for compromise, whether at home or in the field of foreign policy.

Amir Taheri's new book " The Persian Night: Iran Under the Khomeinist Revolution" is published by Encounter Books in New York and London.
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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.