Doc's Talk: WHAT TO DO ON LEBANON: THE FUTURE OF LEBANON-ISRAEL RELATIONS

Sunday, September 13, 2009

WHAT TO DO ON LEBANON: THE FUTURE OF LEBANON-ISRAEL RELATIONS

Eyal Zisser *

During the first decades of Israel’s existence and until the late 1970s, many Israelis felt Lebanon would be the second Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel. This belief was based on the fact that during this period, Lebanon was dominated by the Maronite community, whose foremost goal at that time was believed by many Israelis to be the preservation of Lebanon’s Christian and generally Western character. This article is based on a paper presented at the June 8-9, 2009, conference, "Israel and the Arab States: Parallel Interests, Relations, and Strategies," jointly held in Jerusalem by the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. While many Israelis once felt Lebanon would be the second Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel, today, it is assumed that Lebanon will be the last Arab state to take this step. While Hizballah didn't obtain a majority in the June 7, 2009, parliamentary elections, the results showed its continuing power. Any chance of advancing an Israeli-Lebanese understanding, which would also help to stabilize Lebanon's internal political situation, depends on broader regional results. Meanwhile, Israel must ensure preservation of its deterrence vis-a-vis Hizballah to try to preserve calm on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

During the first decades of Israel’s existence and until the late 1970s, many Israelis felt Lebanon would be the second Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel. This belief was based on the fact that during this period, Lebanon was dominated by the Maronite community, whose foremost goal at that time was believed by many Israelis to be the preservation of Lebanon’s Christian and generally Western character. Thus, in the view of many Israelis, it followed that the Maronites in Lebanon would not only be prepared, but even eager to establish peaceful relations with Israel, which they presumably saw as a kind of natural ally in face of the Muslim Arab world surrounding both states.

Yet contrary to the expectation of many Israelis that Lebanon would manifest goodwill toward the Jewish state, until the late 1970s, Lebanon generally showed itself to be hostile or, at the very least, unwilling to establish ties with Israel. Hopeful Israelis explained the anti-Israel stance taken by Lebanon as the result of the Maronites’ fear of how Lebanon’s Muslim population would respond to improved relations with the Jewish state, and of how the Arab states in general might respond. Lebanon was, after all, dependent on trade with those states for its economic survival. Therefore, the conclusion drawn in Israel was that while Lebanon could not take the lead in the Arab world in making a settlement with Israel, once Israel had signed a peace treaty with another Arab state, Lebanon would quickly follow and become the second Arab state to make peace.

Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and Jordan did so in 1994. Yet regarding Lebanon, it is commonplace among Israelis to assume that Lebanon will be the last Arab state to take this step for two reasons: first, the feelings of resentment in light of the belligerent Israeli-Lebanese relations of recent decades; and second, the dominance of Hizballah in Lebanese life. Hizballah, after all, absolutely rejects any recognition of or negotiations with Israel, and consequently any prospect of a peace treaty.

However, there is a third reason, which is perhaps the main one, accounting for Lebanon’s refusal to make peace with Israel--the fact that nearly 400,000 Palestinian refugees now reside in Lebanese territory. Most Lebanese do not want these people to remain in their country. Indeed, this issue is one of the few upon which there is a consensus cutting across the communal lines and ideological commitments that divide the country so sharply. Even Hizballah supporters are part of this consensus, which makes the removal of the Palestinian refugees from Lebanon and their resettlement either in Israel or in the expected Palestinian state a necessary condition for any future settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Israel’s dilemma regarding its Lebanese policy became sharply apparent once more in the wake of the June 7, 2009 Lebanese elections. The elections yielded a number of surprises, mostly positive for Israel and perhaps the region as a whole. The first surprise was Hizballah’s failure to obtain a majority in the Lebanese parliament. Still, the election results did not change the situation in Lebanon in any fundamental way. The challenges facing Israel thus remain more or less the same.

THE JUNE 7, 2009 LEBANESE ELECTIONS: INITIAL THOUGHTS

The parliamentary elections held in Lebanon on June 7, 2009 came exactly four years after the previous balloting, which had heralded the major change of course that became known as the “Cedar Revolution.” On February 14, 2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated in the heart of Beirut. His death evoked a political storm in the country, which was manifested in a great wave of public demonstrations directed mainly against Syria, whose leaders were perceived by those in Beirut as being behind Hariri’s murder. Within a month, the demonstrations led to the expulsion of the Syrian forces that had been stationed on Lebanese soil for many long years. As early as March 5, 2005, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad declared his intention to remove the Syrian troops from Lebanon, and by the end the month, the Syrians had fully retreated. During May and June 2005, still under the shadow of the storm raised by Rafiq al-Hariri’s murder, parliamentary elections were held in Lebanon. The results completed the change of direction begun by the public demonstrations that followed Hariri’s assassination. The results showed a clear victory for the so-called “March 14 camp.” This bloc was an anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian coalition, led by Sunni leader Sa'd al-Din al-Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who were joined by a number of Maronite partners. The name “March 14” came from the huge demonstration in support of the camp’s ideas that took place in Beirut on that date in 2005.

During the four years following the 2005 elections, the March 14 camp ruled the country. In order to maintain political stability, however, it was willing to compromise its ideas and even cooperate with the forces headed by Hizballah that opposed its path.

The forces constituting the opposition to the March 14 camp were given the name “March 8,” in reference to the huge demonstration organized by Hizballah and its allies in Beirut on that date in 2005 in order to express solidarity with Syria. Hizballah’s junior partners in the March 8 opposition bloc were the Shi'i Amal movement, led by Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament Nabih Berri, and the Free Patriotic Movement, led by the Maronite General Michel Aoun.

The tension between these two camps--the Sunni and Druze-led March 14 camp on the one side, and the Shi'i camp led by Hizballah on the other--stemmed not only from Lebanon’s internal situation, but also from Sunni-Shi'a tensions throughout the region, as well as the tensions engendered by the division of the Arab states into those favoring a pro-Western line and those labeled the “axis of evil” (Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas). In recent years, it seemed the “axis of evil” was gaining power and that the U.S. failures in Iraq were opening the way for it to exercise great influence over the region. People were concerned about Iran in particular, due to its hegemonic aspirations over the entire region, from the Iran-Iraq border to the shores of the Mediterranean.

In light of these factors, the heightened interest manifested by the other states of the region in the course of the Lebanese elections and their results was understandable. Observers tended to view the balloting as a reflection of the power struggles bedeviling the entire region, speculating the results might provide an indication of the balance of forces between the moderate and radical axes. In this regard, no observer could ignore...
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*Prof. Eyal Zisser is the Director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University.
MERIA Journal Staff

Publisher and Editor: Prof. Barry Rubin
Assistant Editors: Yeru Aharoni, Anna Melman.
MERIA is a project of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary University.
Site: http://www.gloria-center.org/ - Email: info@gloria-center.org

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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