Doc's Talk: Lebanon in Crisis

Thursday, January 20, 2011

Lebanon in Crisis

Stratfor

Summary

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal announced Jan. 19 that the Saudi kingdom is withdrawing from its mediation efforts in Lebanon, leading many to believe that civil war is on the horizon. Saudi Arabia is facing an immense challenge in trying to both work out an understanding with Syria and place limits on Iran’s presence in the Levant, but Riyadh is not abandoning its strategic position in Lebanon. The fate of Lebanon’s stability comes down to an understanding, however temporary, between Syria and Saudi Arabia, with Syria holding the upper hand. Analysis

Lebanese caretaker Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri spoke on the telephone the evening of Jan. 19 with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal after the foreign minister said on Al-Arabiya television that the Saudi kingdom had abandoned its mediation efforts in Lebanon. Al-Faisal said the situation in Lebanon was “dangerous” and warned that “if the situation reaches separation or partition of Lebanon, this means the end of Lebanon as a state that has this model of peaceful cohabitation between religions and ethnicities and different groups.” The Saudi statement follows the Jan. 17 delivery of the first indictment (likely incriminating Hezbollah) to the International Court of Justice at The Hague on the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri.

The media largely have interpreted al-Faisal’s statements as Saudi Arabia abandoning its allies in Lebanon, leaving the fractious country to be dominated exclusively by Iran and Syria and dooming the country to civil war. However, this is an inaccurate reading of the situation. As it tries to contain Iran’s spreading influence in the region, Saudi Arabia remains heavily invested in Lebanon, a traditional proxy battleground for influence between Riyadh and Tehran. The challenge Saudi Arabia (and by extension, the United States) faces is how to shape Syria’s position in Lebanon so that it effectively limits Iranian leverage in the Levant and contains Hezbollah (and thus Iran) in the process. Syria, unwilling to sign onto all of Riyadh’s terms, has the upper hand, as it could use Hezbollah to threaten a crisis in Lebanon if its demands go unanswered. Yet there are still very real constraints on Hezbollah’s ability to ignite a civil war in the country.

Saudi-Syrian Talks

Over the past year, Saudi Arabia and Syria were engaged in negotiations, dubbed the Saudi-Syria initiative, designed to facilitate and recognize Syria’s reclaimed hegemonic position in Lebanon while limiting Hezbollah as a proxy force for Iran. Those negotiations, while extremely trying, reached a pivotal point in July 2010 when Saudi King Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar al Assad visited Lebanon together — a deliberate display of Saudi approval of Syria’s return to Lebanon. Tensions between Syria and Iran naturally escalated as a result, but Syria mitigated Iranian and Hezbollah blowback to this diplomatic initiative by assuring its Iranian allies that Hezbollah would remain intact in Lebanon and by quietly supporting Iranian interests in Iraq.

Syria’s intention was not only to dominate Lebanon but also to strategically position itself in the region to negotiate a strategic rapprochement with the United States. As long as Iran held a large stake in a country where Syria wielded significant influence, Damascus theoretically could be assured that Washington would ask it for help in containing Iran and its militant proxy allies. From Syria’s perspective, the Saudi-Syria initiative for Lebanon was the first step in this broader diplomatic process envisioned by Damascus.

The process broke down, however, when Saudi Arabia (allegedly influenced by a number of U.S. intelligence reports on Syrian intentions for Lebanon) came to realize that Syria was attempting to excise Saudi influence in Lebanon altogether while giving quiet assurances to Iran. A Saudi diplomatic source explained to STRATFOR that Riyadh could not tolerate the Syrian government’s attempts to replace al-Hariri’s political and security team with its own loyalists through the issuance of arrest warrants in connection with the so-called false witnesses in the al-Hariri assassination probe. Syria and Hezbollah claimed that several witnesses interviewed in the investigation produced false testimony implicating Hezbollah and Syrian officials. Syria then used this claim as justification to demand their arrests and removal. The same source also said the Saudis are frustrated with the double game Syria allegedly played in Iraq, where Damascus overtly supported (Saudi-backed) Iyad Allawi’s prime ministerial candidacy, in support of Iraq’s Sunni faction, while (according to the source) colluding with Iran to undercut Allawi and improve Nouri al-Maliki’s chances of running the new government. In short, numerous Saudi leaders (most notably Saudi Prince Bandar) argued that the Syrian president could not be trusted in this Lebanon initiative and thus (along with the United States) instructed al-Hariri to reject Syria’s and Hezbollah’s terms regarding the false witnesses, the impending indictments from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on the al-Hariri murder and the overall makeup of the Lebanese government.

Syria’s response was the Jan. 13 collapse of the Lebanese government. According to STRATFOR sources in Syria and Lebanon, the decision for 11 ministers representing the Hezbollah-led March 8 Coalition to resign their Cabinet positions and drive al-Hariri out of office was engineered in Damascus. The move likely was made in coordination with the Iranians. Not only does Iran have an interest in derailing the Saudi-Syrian initiative in order to retain its stake in Lebanon, it also would not mind a distracting crisis in the run up to its own negotiations with the P-5+1 group slated to take place Jan. 21-22 in Istanbul.

A New Lebanese Civil War?

With Lebanon’s stability hanging in the balance, speculation is rampant over whether the country will again descend into civil war. Several factors could escalate tensions further, but there are also several critical arrestors to keep in mind.

The first is that Saudi Arabia has not given up on Lebanon, despite various interpretations of al-Faisal’s statements. Saudi Arabia has a stake in containing Iranian influence in the region, and Lebanon remains a key battleground in this affair.

The second is that Syria has already made its big move in the collapse of the Lebanese government. In traditional Damascene mercantilist bargaining mentality, the Syrian government is now watching and waiting for the Saudi royals to return to the negotiating table, with the threat of civil war ignited by Hezbollah being carefully mentioned as a reminder of the consequences of allowing this crisis to fester. Syria still has an interest in keeping Hezbollah contained overall and in demonstrating its control over Hezbollah. A meeting between al Assad and Lebanese army commander Gen. Jean Qahwaji on Jan. 18 in Damascus was a deliberate public signal from Syria that Damascus is working with the army to keep the situation under control.

The third is that Hezbollah itself faces real constraints in trying to instigate widespread sectarian strife in Lebanon. The organization remains vulnerable to the Syrian intelligence apparatus’s pervasive presence in Lebanon. Hezbollah is also wary of creating a situation in Lebanon that spirals out of control and gives Syria an excuse to militarily intervene in Lebanon and thus place even greater limits on the militant group.

Several STRATFOR sources in Lebanon have reported that Hezbollah activists are deliberately planting rumors threatening a protracted conflict. Many families are keeping their children at home from school and are refraining from nonessential activity as a result, with pressure growing on the regional powers to work out a solution to this crisis. This apparent campaign to organize street rallies and spread rumors seems to be more indicative of Hezbollah’s unpreparedness to resort to wide-scale violence than a sign of imminent action. Still, the organization is taking care to publicize its preparations for a worst-case scenario, with reports leaking out about Hezbollah military drills and indicating potential targets at vital highways, seaports, airports and U.N. institutions.

Meanwhile, quiet negotiations likely will resume between Syria and Saudi Arabia in an attempt to prevent a larger conflagration. So far, one indictment has been issued to The Hague, but with Syria holding more leverage in these talks and the Lebanese government now in a state of collapse, the two sides can once again debate the indictments while Syria bargains to reshape the Lebanese government in its favor. Turkey and Qatar are also seizing a public relations opportunity by entering the fray and attempting to mediate a resolution, but the influence of these countries is still limited in Lebanese affairs. This is a negotiation that still comes down to Syria and Saudi Arabia, with Syria holding the upper hand.

Lebanon is a fractious country with a violent history. With so many variables and players involved, a protracted conflict cannot be ruled out. At the same time, these factors have also made Lebanon well-versed in accommodationist politics. A resolution, however temporary, to the current crisis is not out of sight yet.

No comments:

The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk