Arlene Kushner
The question: “Is it wise to trust Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah to negotiate peace at Annapolis?” must be answered both in terms of the will and the capacity of Abbas to serve as a genuine peace partner. Using the earlier report and its addendum – which provide ample evidence that Abbas and Fatah are not moderate – as background, these parameters will be succinctly examined here in terms of statements and actions on the ground in recent months.
Fatah and Hamas
The prevailing myth, which has fueled Annapolis, is the notion that Hamas – the radical party – will be contained if Fatah – the moderate party – is strengthened. Abbas, however, continues to have contact with Hamas, despite his protests to the contrary.
In July, when Israel decided to release withheld tax monies to the PA, precisely so that Abbas might be strengthened against Hamas, the PA decision was to pay ministers’ salaries with this, including the salaries of Hamas ministers who had been dismissed from the government by Abbas after the Hamas takeover in Gaza. Among those receiving money was Mahmoud Zahar, former PA foreign minister and one of Hamas’s most radical members. Members of Fatah charged that Abbas was “using double standards against Hamas – he declared war on them, but pays their wages and helps them stabilize in Gaza.”
Abbas has repeatedly said that he would renew the unity government with Hamas if Hamas would return Gaza to the situation that existed before the coup in June. He says nothing about requiring Hamas to be a partner for peace, renouncing terrorism or recognizing Israel.
At the beginning of October, the London-based Arabic paper al-Sharq al-Awsat reported that Egyptian mediation efforts had been successful and that the parties had agreed to secret meetings in Cairo. Azzam al-Ahmad, head of the Fatah faction on the PA parliament, was said to be the one who would lead the talks for Fatah. The report additionally said that “unplanned meetings” between the two sides had already been held in Beirut.
On November 2, Abbas met with Hamas leaders in Judea and Samaria, and invited them to pray with him in his compound.
Abbas’s will to fight terrorism
When 300 security forces were dispatched to Nablus to take back the streets from gunmen who were in control, an officer of these forces told The Jerusalem Post that neither he nor his men had been given clear instructions to clamp down on the gunmen, especially the gunmen of Al Aksa Brigades, which is an arm of Fatah.
Security forces of the PA do not control the UNRWA refugee camps in Judea and Samaria; these camps are controlled exclusively by Fatah gunmen and have been consistently off limits to the security forces.
When the security forces were dispatched, a clash ensued between them and armed militia of Al Aksa Brigades in Balata. Orders had been given by Abbas, however, to avoid confrontation. This has consistently been the policy of Abbas.
Perhaps the most serious questions involving will to fight terrorism involve the loss of Gaza to Hamas in spite of the fact that the Fatah forces were more numerous, better trained and better equipped. Journalist Charles Levinson interview several Fatah fighters after the rout and summarized his findings thus:
“Fatah never fought. Gaza was essentially handed over to Hamas. Soldier after soldier said they felt betrayed and abandoned by their leadership. There was a seemingly willful lack of decision making by the senior most political leadership. Up and down the Gaza Strip from the first moments of fighting, the military leadership disintegrated while the political leadership remained eerily silent.”
The nature of the PA security forces
In early July Abbas decided to incorporate Al Aksa gunmen into the PA security forces, which would entitle them to full salary. This was a method for dealing with fugitives being pursued by Israel.
In October, the Shin Bet revealed a plot to assassinate Prime Minister Olmert when he was on his way to Jericho to talk with President Abbas on August 6. Some of the five operatives who were part of this plot were actually members of the PA security forces and were scheduled to guard Olmert’s convoy. When Israel provided intelligence to the PA about this plot and the identities of those involved, the PA arrested three of the suspects; two had been arrested by Israel and turned over to the PA. Two months later, two of the suspects were picked up at a checkpoint, having been released from prison.
The security forces of the PA do not control Judea and Samaria. Hamas would be able to quickly gain ascendancy in the area if it were not for the intervention on a regular basis of the IDF, which seeks out terrorists and their weapons caches. As mentioned above, the UNRWA refugee camps of Judea and Samaria are off limits to PA security forces; yet those camps are the focal points for terrorism in the area.
The strength of Abbas and Fatah
According to political commentator Ehud Ya’ari, “The Fatah movement has in
fact ceased to exist, although there are still tens of thousands of card-carrying members. There is no meaningful process of resuscitation or reform under way in either the PA, or its ruling party, Fatah. In private conversations, associates of the PA chairman, Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), call him ‘a pensioner still going to the office.’”
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