Doc's Talk: Stabilizing Iraq: Intelligence Lessons for Afghanistan

Friday, May 29, 2009

Stabilizing Iraq: Intelligence Lessons for Afghanistan

Barry Harris
May 29, 2009

After the U.S. initiation of hostilities in Iraq in 2003, Washington's focus shifted away from the conflict in Afghanistan. Until recently, U.S. policy focused on winning the war in Iraq while securing an apparent coalition victory in Afghanistan. Although this policy yielded positive results in Iraq, it led to drift and a series of security reverses in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, despite vastly different circumstances, the United States has learned many lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom that can be applied to Operation Enduring Freedom, particularly in the intelligence arena.
Background
Not long ago, sectarian violence, brutal attacks with improvised explosive devices, ambushes, assassinations, and kidnappings were the norm in Iraq. This situation, however, has changed dramatically over the last eighteen months, and the frequency of these types of events has diminished significantly. Some observers attribute the dramatic changes in security to the 2007 "surge" of U.S. military ground forces into Iraq, while others believe the Sunni Awakening, in which U.S. forces helped establish local Sunni militias, should be credited with much of the success. Both factors contributed to the remarkable turnaround in Iraq; however, the major reason for success can be traced to timely and accurate intelligence, born of new technologies and innovation, new leadership at the combat support agencies (CSAs), and new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) derived from lessons learned on the battlefield, which enabled U.S. forces to undertake highly effective, intelligence-driven operations.

In Iraq, initially, the enemy was always one or two steps ahead of the coalition, but improved intelligence capabilities and adjustments in TTPs changed this dynamic. Accurate, timely intelligence allowed coalition forces to be proactive rather than reactive -- often disrupting the enemy during the planning or implementation phase of an operation. Army and Marine intelligence along with the Department of Defense (DOD) and national intelligence agencies have made significant changes to better support counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

Intelligence-Driven Operations
The entire intelligence community and each intelligence discipline -- human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial or imagery intelligence (GEOINT), as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems -- primarily unmanned aerial vehicles -- have contributed in varying degrees to the effort in Iraq. The CSAs have begun to replicate in Afghanistan the support they have provided in Iraq, increasing the strain on the most precious resource -- manpower. But with a shift in priority from Iraq to Afghanistan, and with Washington committed to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, the manpower burden should ease.

Human Intelligence. Initially, HUMINT operations in Iraq were difficult and did not yield timely and accurate information: it takes time to develop HUMINT capabilities in any environment, especially under combat conditions, due to the need for operators to become familiar with their surroundings and understand the society and culture they are operating in. HUMINT was particularly important for exploiting the opportunities created by the Sunni Awakening, which yielded a torrent of information as local citizens began to identify al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) facilitators and operatives in their communities, allowing coalition forces to deliver a serious blow to AQI's infrastructure.

HUMINT has improved significantly in Iraq, and many of the lessons learned are being incorporated into training and preparing forces for future deployments. HUMINT units have also benefited from increased resourcing. HUMINT platoons are now being established in every military intelligence company at the brigade combat team (BCT) level, and two robust HUMINT companies are being incorporated into every battlefield surveillance brigade military intelligence battalion, providing an unprecedented level of tactical HUMINT capability. Experienced HUMINT planning and management sections have been added at the BCT and division levels. Civilian contractors have been employed to fill the need for more interpreters.

Lessons from Iraq have also informed an upgraded HUMINT in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, HUMINT assets are being pushed down to the BCT level, and operational commanders now have a better grasp of how best to employ HUMINT assets. Consequently, HUMINT teams and unit leadership are now more familiar with their surroundings and Afghan culture. Finally, through the use of civilian contractors and refocusing of the Army's language program, more interpreters and interrogators are being provided. Despite these successes, more needs to be done. U.S. forces must continue to make sensitive HUMINT information available to its coalition partners and the Afghan government. And NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) must train Afghan military and civilian personnel to conduct HUMINT operations so they can collect, analyze, and disseminate this information to their own forces.

Signals Intelligence. SIGINT was very important at the onset of hostilities in Iraq, but became less relevant after the Iraqi army was defeated. With the reconstruction of Iraq's communication infrastructure, however, SIGINT has reemerged as a valuable source of information. The National Security Agency (NSA) has pushed cryptologic support teams down to the BCT level and deployed assets in theater so that information and support is timely and relevant. Because NSA has control over all SIGINT operations, it is able to lead effectively and synergize these operations. NSA hosts weekly meetings and video teleconferences in Iraq and Afghanistan with all SIGINT-producing entities to guide SIGINT collection, discuss successes and failures, share TTPs, and assess emerging enemy tactics.

SIGINT support continues to improve in Afghanistan, and as the country modernizes and the infrastructure improves, opportunities for collection and exploitation will increase. As it did in Iraq, NSA has started pushing cryptologic support teams down to the BCT level in Afghanistan. The biggest challenge in Afghanistan is being able to share intelligence with coalition partners without divulging sensitive collection methods. As with HUMINT, the Afghan government needs to be trained to conduct SIGINT operations on their own.

Geospatial Intelligence. In the area of imagery or geospatial support, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) continues to enhance the operational commander's ability to visualize the battlefield. In Iraq, NGA established geospatial support teams at the force, corps, and division levels, and in coordination with NSA recently provided manning down to the BCT level. NGA analysts were integrated into cryptologic support teams providing near-real-time actionable SIGINT and GEOINT to brigade combat team commanders. In conjunction with NSA, NGA developed the TTPs and identified requirements for integrating GEOINT into SIGINT and HUMINT "find-fix-finish" support operations. In addition, NGA advisors, working with the Iraqi Directorate of Imagery and Mapping-Intelligence Affairs (DIMA), forged an effective relationship with their Iraqi counterparts and helped them develop the analytic skills to support Iraqi combat units. These interactions also led to the development of a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement between NGA and the Iraqi DIMA. The agreement facilitates the exchange of geospatial data, allows the Imagery and Mapping Directorate to support Iraqi military forces with GEOINT, and decreases Iraq's reliance on U.S. forces. No other CSA has developed this level of intelligence cooperation and sharing with its Iraqi counterparts.

In Afganistan, GEOINT has eclipsed the other intelligence disciplines in sharing of information and TTPs as well as training of analysts, just as it did in Iraq. NGA established geospatial support teams at various levels within ISAF and, again, similar to Iraq, plans to integrate NGA analysts into cryptologic support teams. In 2008, NGA advisors developed an excellent relationship with the Afghanistan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office. As a result, Afghan GEOINT analysts are providing products at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement has been developed between the two organizations.

Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. DOD's 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review Report states that persistent reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities provided by unmanned aerial systems have proven to be invaluable force multipliers in Iraq and Afghanistan. ISR platforms such as these give ground forces the ability to cover more territory, including previously inaccessible terrain. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of multinational forces in Iraq, commented that "employment of ISR, according to the current counterinsurgency doctrine, set the conditions for the initial success of the surge in Iraq. Decentralization of ISR assets allowed brigade combat team and regimental combat team commanders (faced with vastly different problem sets) to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. ISR evolved along with the fight."

The robust ISR currently available to brigade-level commanders in Iraq provides them with an unprecedented level of situational awareness and is now being deployed to Afghanistan, where ISR use on the battlefield is becoming critical and decisive. Commanders will now have the flexibility to push ISR assets -- which are among the most powerful enablers on the battlefield today -- to the lowest tactical echelon. Afghanistan is a large country, roughly the size of Texas, with diverse and treacherous terrain, which in many places is not easily accessible. Persistent surveillance will significantly multiply coalition combat capabilities in Afghanistan. (See PolicyWatch #1519, "Intelligence Transformation: Meeting New Challenges in the Middle East and Beyond")

Conclusion
While Iraq and Afghanistan have many similarities, one major difference is the presence in Afghanistan of forty nations working as part of ISAF, under NATO command. The complexity of interoperability, data management, and data sharing (in part due to classification issues) is one of the top issues that NATO faces in day-to-day operations. The recent establishment of an Intelligence Fusion Center in Afghanistan, where analysts from NATO nations work together on critical intelligence products, provides an excellent example of needed cooperation. Sharing sensitive data in a multinational environment is challenging, but these issues must be resolved in order to win the counterinsurgency campaign and provide a peaceful and secure environment in Afghanistan.

Barry Harris, a colonel in the U.S. Army, is a visiting military fellow at The Washington Institute.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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