Summary
STRATFOR has received information in recent weeks indicating that Hezbollah is making serious preparations for a possible Israeli attack. The inevitability of such a conflict is uncertain, but if Israel attacks Hezbollah, it would likely foreshadow a bigger confrontation with Iran.
Analysis
In recent weeks, STRATFOR has noticed an unusual uptick in Hezbollah’s anxiety levels over a potential Israeli attack. A number of sources tightly linked into the Shiite militant group have revealed that discussions are taking place amongst the senior military command over additional measures the group should take to prepare for an Israeli attack, which to them appears nearly inevitable. Many Hezbollah troops are reportedly suffering from mission fatigue in maintaining a constant vigil over the southern Lebanese border.
Further down the ranks, many of Hezbollah’s younger, student activists have taken the summer off from school and are spending the bulk of their time in Hezbollah’s stronghold in the western Bekaa Valley, north of the Litani River. Several of these younger Hezbollah cadres are reportedly being trained to employ anti-tank guided missiles and man portable air defense systems — light surface-to-air missiles — to defend against a potential attack.
Hezbollah appears to have been particularly shaken by a July 14 explosion at a Hezbollah weapons depot in the village of Khirbit Silim in southern Lebanon. Israel immediately accused Hezbollah of violating U.N. Resolution 1701 that calls for the total disarmament of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon by actively maintaining a large arms cache just 11 miles from the Israeli border. According to a STRATFOR source in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Israel provided UNIFIL with the intelligence on this Hezbollah weapons site and demanded that they destroy it. The source claims that after a considerable time lag, the French UNIFIL contingent took the matter into its own hands and blew up the weapons depot as Hezbollah commandos were loading munitions. Since that explosion, Israel has provided UNIFIL with information on some 100 other Hezbollah weapons depots that it expects to be destroyed, or else Israel has threatened to take action.
It is no secret that Hezbollah has been re-entrenching itself in southern Lebanon since its 2006 confrontation with Israel. Hezbollah has little interest in provoking a rematch, but it can clearly discern how tensions have skyrocketed in the region in the wake of the post-election crisis in Iran. Since then, STRATFOR has tracked a number of indicators that hint at preparations by the United States and Israel for a potential military strike against Iran. Though this is by no means an inevitable outcome, shifts in Hezbollah’s operations and anxiety levels bear close watching as these tensions continue to build.
Any Israeli attack plan against Iran would have to factor in Hezbollah, as any Iranian retaliatory plan would naturally utilize Iran’s strongest militant asset in the Middle East. The Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) directly runs major Hezbollah operations from their safe-houses in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Since the 2006 conflict, these IRGC commanders in Lebanon have been preparing Hezbollah for a potential war scenario with the Israelis, and have made the appropriate adjustments in Hezbollah’s command structure to ensure that the group’s leadership remains loyal to Tehran.
In anticipating the blowback from Hezbollah, Israel would have a strong interest in degrading Hezbollah’s military capabilities prior to attacking Iran. The Israelis are not interested in getting bogged down in a ground war in Lebanon, where Hezbollah could quickly gain the upper hand in a protracted war of attrition. Instead, Israel’s primary focus would be on eliminating the IRGC positions in Lebanon that control Hezbollah’s operations. By undermining Iran’s direct influence over the organization, Hezbollah would be far more likely to put their own interests ahead of Tehran’s when a split already exists within the group, with a faction arguing that Hezbollah should avoid cornering itself as a proxy of the Iranians and instead focus on entrenching itself more firmly in the Lebanese political system.
The Israelis would also attempt to decimate Hezbollah’s artillery rocket arsenal as well as its stocks of more advanced anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles. Such arsenals can be replenished with time, but given the recent progress in Syria’s negotiations with the Americans and the Saudis, the Israelis (theoretically) could obtain better intelligence on Hezbollah positions to set the group back considerably and compromise their communications network.
As the indications of war have been building and as Syria’s negotiations with the West have progressed, Syria’s ties with Hezbollah and Iran have come under increasing strain. The Syrians have been isolating Hezbollah, albeit gradually, and Hezbollah no longer feels that it can fully trust its long-time ally, particularly in a time of war. Still, the Syrians are not ready, nor willing to completely sacrifice their relations with Iran and Hezbollah at this stage. After all, these relationships are what give Damascus leverage in its negotiations with the West. So, at the same time Syria is sharing intelligence with the Americans and the Saudis to further its negotiations, it is also providing limited assistance to Iran and Hezbollah as they prepare for an Israeli attack.
According to a STRATFOR source, the Iranian embassy in Damascus is overseeing the construction of heavily fortified residences in undisclosed locations on the slopes of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains near the Zabadani mountain resort. Iranian construction engineers are reportedly working with local Syrian laborers on this project, which is designed to provide refuge for Hezbollah (and IRGC commanders, most likely) should they need to flee Lebanon. Iran and Hezbollah are anticipating that Israeli would likely drop commandos in the northern Bekaa area to pursue these ranking officers. Since most of the targets live in the hilly northern Bekaa area, it would be relatively easy for them to make their way across the Anti-Lebanon Mountains into these Syrian safe houses. The residences, according to the source, are allegedly connected to the Lebanese side by a landline communications network to allow Hezbollah and IRGC to maintain command and control in communicating with their military units in the field. Though these contingency plans appear to be in the works with Syrian approval, the potential for Syria to compromise these Iranian and IRGC positions remains a serious question for Iran and Hezbollah.
Hezbollah senses that something is afoot in the region and is preparing for a conflict ahead. The inevitability of such a conflict is far from certain, but should Israel make a move against Hezbollah, it would very likely be the precursor to a larger confrontation with the Iranians. STRATFOR will continue to monitor this situation closely.
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